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Abstract
This thesis examines the level of income risk in conjunction with private and social
insurance mechanisms in the United Kingdom. In particular, I focus on the evolution of
income risk and insurance mechanisms during the last decade. This thesis emphasises
the importance of measuring the heterogeneity of risk and the nature of two insurance
mechanisms (i) marriage and (ii) social insurance generated through welfare policies. I
complement these findings with a discussion on how adverse income shocks affect welfare.
The first chapter sets the scene by offering a theoretical review of the background of
income risk and its developments in the United Kingdom over the past four decades. At
the same time it also offers information on the data set and the methodological approach
of the thesis. The chapter presents the data set used in this work, from Understanding
Society: the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) with information of
individuals and households in the United Kingdom from 2009 to 2018. This chapter also
introduces the model of income dynamics, which comprises a transitory and a permanent
component following Friedman’s Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH).
The second chapter of the thesis measures the distribution of individual gross and
net income risk in the United Kingdom. Whenever realised income differs from expected
future income, individuals encounter an income risk. These risks are not uniformly dis-
tributed across individuals, which might result in losses of welfare. The current literature
lacks an in-depth analysis of the potential heterogeneity of income risks. Therefore, this
chapter examines the heterogeneity of individual income risk, based on social and demo-
graphic factors in the United Kingdom. Women face more than double the permanent
income shock variance than for men. Further, individuals from Non-White ethnic back-
grounds face slightly higher levels of permanent income shocks than White individuals.
Government policies such as taxes and benefits do not mitigate the income risk distri-
bution. Consequently, the chapter exposes evidence of income risk heterogeneity in the
United Kingdom.
The third chapter quantifies the insurance opportunities arising from marriage in the
United Kingdom. Marriage can reduce individual net income risk through income risk
pooling with a partner. However, if one partner faces higher income volatility related
to certain socioeconomic characteristics, marriage can lead to an increase in net income
risk for one of the partners. Firstly, I find that marriage generates a form of income
risk insurance as single individuals face considerably higher levels of net income risk
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than those who are married. Secondly, the results indicate that the degree of marriage
insurance depends on marital choice. Sharing the same socioeconomic background with
a spouse is found to reduce levels of net income risk, compared to couples from different
socioeconomic backgrounds. In addition, assortative couples face a lower probability
of encountering permanent income shock. To test the robustness of these findings, a
counterfactual exercise was created in the form of a synthetic dataset in which I randomise
the couples based on their original marital choice. This controls for any endogeneity, for
example, responses of labour supply. The test further supports my main finding.
The fourth chapter compares the impact of British welfare policies on net income
risk for welfare receiving households. A major role of the welfare policy is to mitigate
the impact of adverse income shocks through financial support such as benefits. This is
particularly relevant as the British welfare system is currently undergoing a major reform.
The new system, Universal Credit, provides considerably lower benefits to programme
recipients for their daily expenses than the former Legacy System . I use a natural policy
experiment to quantify the effects of a change in the welfare system on net income risk
for programme receiving households., The main finding is that net income risk increases
for households under Universal Credit compared to households under the Legacy System,
as there is reduced social insurance for households under the new policy scheme. The
lower cost to taxpayers associated with Universal Credit has reduced the effectiveness of
the social insurance provided. The policy suggestions indicate the need for welfare policy
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Thesis Introduction
What is the nature of income risk? People face income changes during their working
lifetime. They encounter economic hardship through job loss or illness, and they encounter
unexpected relative prosperity, perhaps from a pay rise through a promotion. In other
words, income risk captures the extent to which people experience sizable unanticipated
income changes 1.
I measure income risk as the variance of income shocks to the idiosyncratic compo-
nent of income. It reflects unanticipated income changes from an ex-ante perspective.
The standard method of income risk analysis in the literature is based on the Permanent
Income Hypothesis (PIH) by Friedman (1957). This theory asserts that income processes
are characterised by permanent and transitory components (see e.g. Meghir and Pista-
ferri, 2011). According to the PIH, an individual’s or household’s consumption and sav-
ings choices respond differently to permanent income shocks compared to transitory ones.
Permanent income shocks directly translate into changes in consumption choices, while
transitory income changes or shocks may be smoothed across time (see e.g. Hall, 1978;
Deaton and Paxson, 1994 and Blundell and Preston, 1998). The realised income variation
generates challenges for individuals and households with low income to cover daily expen-
ditures associated with the standards of living. Consequently, individual’s or household’s
can face diffi culties in smoothing consumption against adverse income shocks over time
(Dickens, 2000; Blundell et al., 2008; Jenkins, 2011; Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 2009, 2012;
Heathcote et al., 2010; Hardy and Ziliak, 2014; Hannagan and Morduch, 2015; Hill et al.,
2017). This thesis contributes to the income risk debate by examining the income risk in
the United Kingdom (UK).
It is important to understand the level and nature of income risk as it affects economic
choice on an individual or household level. The response to adverse income shocks affects
economic choices. Savings constitute a precautionary measure and allow partial insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks. Another measure against adverse income shocks lies in an
individual’s (or household’s) ex-post response, for example, by decreasing consumption
1I use the terms ’risk’ and ’uncertainty’ interchangeably. However, there is a technical difference.
Knight (1921) argues that the difference between risk and uncertainty lies in what is known. A risky
event has an unknown outcome, but the underlying outcome distribution is known. In other words, it is
a ’known unknown’. In contrast, an uncertain event is based on an unknown outcome combined with an
unknown distribution. He refers to an ’unknown unknown’event.
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(Krussel and Smith, 1998; 2003; Jenkins, 2011). Consequently, they can use i) prudent
measures such as savings or ii) react to adverse income shocks by undertaking corrective
economic activities (Dickens, 2000; Jenkins, 2011; Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 2009, 2012;
Heathcote et al., 2010; Hardy and Ziliak, 2014; Hannagan and Morduch, 2015; Hill et al.,
2017).
Moreover, income risk also entails other implications. Current empirical evidence
shows that adverse income shocks affect not only an individual’s or household’s economic
choices regarding personal resources, but also directly- and indirectly affects (among oth-
ers): i) an individual’s potential development because of poor health conditions (Halliday,
2007); ii) food insecurity (Leete and Bania, 2010; Dahl et al., 2014; Wolf and Morrissey,
2017); iii) mortgage default (Diaz-Serrano, 2005); iv) fluctuating public benefits (Lambert
and Henley, 2013; Mills et al., 2014; Ben-Ishai, 2015); v) reduced educational achievement
of children (Hardy, 2017); vi) reduced child health outcomes (Dahl and Lochner, 2012).
Ultimately, the individuals’or households’ economic choices in response to adverse
income shocks can lead to changes in aggregate consumption, saving, and labour supply
(see e.g. Krussel and Smith, 1998, 2003; or Krueger et al., 2016). Thus, the economic
choices in response to risk and realisations of adverse income risk have macroeconomic
effects and can lead to economic fluctuations.2
The presence of income risk in conjunction with incomplete labour markets implies
that individuals or households cannot insure themselves against adverse income shocks.
The incompleteness of markets for insurance against income risks is a result of adverse
selection and moral hazard issues. Therefore other types of insurance against adverse
income shocks play a key role in insuring individuals and households. Currently, there are
two forms identified by the literature (i) social insurance and (ii) private insurance. This
thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion by measuring the effects of each insurance
mechanism on the level of income risk.
Social insurance usually mitigates the size of adverse income shocks. Policies generated
by the government can supplement or partly replace the need for self-insurance through
taxes and benefits, which are accessible to all individuals (or households). Current em-
pirical findings provide a consensus on income risk mitigation through policy support.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell et al. (2008) find that government policies
are a key factor that blunts the transmission of adverse income shocks into consumption
2This aligns with the discussion by Krussell and Smith (1998) and the subsequent literature, e.g.
Krueger et al. (2016).
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choices. As a consequence, partial self-insurance or social insurance can mitigate the im-
pact of adverse permanent income shocks (Blundell et al., 2008; Blundell and Etheridge,
2010; Heathcote et al., 2010; Dolls et al., 2012; Blundell et al., 2013; Blundell et al.,
2016; Belfield et al., 2017; Hill et al., 2017; Bush et al., 2020). In particular, during eco-
nomic recessions, the government provides social insurance for individuals or households
(Guvenen et al., 2014; Belfield et al., 2017).
Understanding the role of income risk is important to creating effective stabilisation,
stimulus policies and government insurance programmes. Welfare policies conditional on
an individual’s (or household’s) income can further supplement the need for self-insurance
through a progressive welfare system. These mitigate the impact of adverse shocks to in-
come through financial support for individuals or households with low income. Therefore,
changes to the welfare framework have a direct impact on the well-being of programme
recipients. However, the literature lacks a detailed analysis of the link between welfare
reform and the level of income risk. This thesis exploits a natural experiment by exam-
ining the impact of a reform of the UK’s welfare scheme on the level of income risk that
the households face.
Another way of mitigating adverse income shocks occurs through partial private in-
surance. This relies on access to private resources such as saving for a rainy day, portfolio
diversification, family ties and family planning, such as birth control and marriage. The
focus in this thesis is on the role of marriage in mitigating income risk. The income risk
insurance in marriage is based on pooling income between spouses (Becker, 1973; At-
tanasio et al., 2005; Cherlin, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2013; Frémeaux and Lefranc, 2017;
Low et al., 2018; Ejrnæs and Jørgensen, 2020). The marriage insurance is expressed
through different channels, such as unemployment insurance, the added worker effect and
the marriage premium (Becker, 1976; Hyslop, 2001; Ortigueira and Siassi, 2011; Chris-
tiansen, 2015; Choi and Valladares-Esteban; 2015; 2018). However, there is the possibility
that some couples face higher income risk, for example by getting married to a person with
a more volatile income stream (Eike et al., 2019). More recent studies examine the role
of homogamy and income inequality, including Schwartz (2019), Boertien and Permanyer
(2019) and Milanovic (2019), but the literature does not analyse the role of marital choice
with respect to income risk.
Moreover, the partial private insurance based on income pooling is affected by two key
factors, referred to as i) extensive margin and ii) intensive margin. The former indicates
whether a spouse is working, while the latter reflects the number of hours worked. I do
not examine changes at the extensive margin of as I focus on working couples. Yet, the
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time worked, defined as the intensive margin, affects the response to an adverse income
shock within a married couple (Blundell et al., 2011b; Blundell et al., 2013; Fisher et al.,
2013). I create a counterfactual exercise to examine the size of income risk mitigation and
control for any endogeneity related to time worked by the partner. Within this exercise,
I randomise the spouses of the couples by their marital choice, and thus, focus on the
intensive margin of partial private insurance through marriage.
The empirical literature on income risk can be differentiated into several key groups.
The initial literature focuses on the decomposition of income process, which includes
work by Lillard and Willis (1978), MaCurdy (1982), Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994). The
findings mainly focus on the distinction between permanent and transitory income shocks,
the sources of income risk, its impact on consumption choices and the business cycle (see,
for example, Lillie and Willis, 1978; MaCurdy, 1982; Blundell and Preston, 1998; Jarvis
and Jenkins, 1998; Ramos, 2003; Blundell et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2010; Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2011, 2004; Blundell et al., 2013;).
The initial literature focuses on the effects of income shocks associated with their
permanent or transitory nature. The majority of this work concentrates on examining
the earnings process for male workers. Following the PIH theory, only permanent income
shocks have a direct impact on lifetime incomes and so drive changes in income levels
(Friedman, 1957; Hall and Mishkin, 1982). The first to study income risk based on the
PIH were Lillard and Willis (1978), who used male annual earnings based on the PSID
from the United States of America (USA). Their findings indicate that men seem to
retain their position in the earnings distribution, which results in limited income mobility.
Therefore, they find that most of the variation is related to permanent factors. More
recently, Primiceri and van Rens (2009) found that permanent changes in income explain
the increases in income risk in the 1980s and 1990s in the USA. Key drivers for the rise are
related to low income and education levels (Heathcote, 2010; Hannagan and Morduch,
2015; Hill et al., 2017). Similarly, Dickens (2000) and Ermish and Cheti (2005) show
that income inequality increases with the persistence of permanent income shocks, thus
demonstrating that such income shocks can contribute to income inequality.
Moreover, the literature shows that transitory income shocks are also important.
MaCurdy (1982), Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994; 2012) and Baker (1997) decompose the
income process for US data and they find increased transitory wages and earnings volatil-
ity, which contributes to a widening earnings distribution in the US labour market. The
literature asserts possible factors of income instability such as a rise in wage or earnings
instability, related to the decline in unionisation, the decline in regulation, and general
4
increases in competition within industries (Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 1994, 2012). Jenkins
(2005) examines the role of income instability due to frequent job changes.
Another branch of work focuses on the impact of income risk on consumption choices.
It combines the perspective of income risk with consumption inequality and includes
studies such as Deaton and Paxson (1994), Cutler and Katz (1992), Carroll (2001) and
Gourinchas and Parker (2002). They focus on examining the permanent income hy-
pothesis through the empirical analysis of life-cycle profiles of consumption and income
dispersion, using data drawn from several economies. In particular, the work in this area
examines the transmission channels of income shocks into the individual’s or household’s
consumption choice. A key factor in the transmission of income shocks is its durability.
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), Heathcote, Blundell, Low and Preston (2013)
and Storesletten and Violante (2014) find that an individual’s or household’s consump-
tion behaviour is sensitive to their income level. They find that individuals or households
with low income are more sensitive to transitory income shocks than those with high
incomes. As a result, income inequality across individuals or households influences the
dispersion of income risk. While the literature highlights the role of partial self-insurance,
to date there is no examination that jointly investigates the role of partial private and
social insurance. My work offers a nuanced perspective on income risk which considers
both insurance mechanisms.
Further, the literature offers evidence on how income risk evolves during the business
cycle. Guvenen et al., (2014) show that income risk is more likely to be negative during
recessions. Using different methods, Storesletten et al. (2004), Angelopoulos et al. (2019),
Bush and Ludwig (2020) and Bush et al. (2020) analyse the dynamics for the USA based
on the PSID, and the BHPS for the UK. Their findings suggest that variation of income
risk over the business cycle is asymmetrical. In particular, some key theorists, Mankiw
(1986), Brav et al. (2002), Storesletten et al. (2004; 2007), Guvenen et al. (2014), and
Sanchez and Wellschmied (2020), examine the link between the counter cyclical risk of
asset prices and economic volatility. Even though this study includes a recession (2009),
it does not provide explicit differentiation between contractions and expansions.
However, there are also alternative indicators for income changes and income devel-
opments. Another part of the literature studies earnings and income fluctuations using
measures, such as the amount and regularity of income changes (Gosselin and Zimmer-
man, 2008; Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish, 2011; Hacker et al., 2014; Western et al., 2016),
frequency in worked hours (Abowd and Card, 1989), the coeffi cient of variation (Leete
and Bania, 2010; Gennetian et al.2015), and the percentage change in labour income
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(Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel, 2012; Hardy and Ziliak, 2014; Wolf et al., 2014). These
measures examining income changes are not the focus of this thesis, which rather follows
the approach by Heathcote et al., (2010) and Blundell and Etheridge (2010,) based on
the PIH. This provides a flexible tool that enables me to analyse unanticipated income
changes and allows me to disentangle permanent and transitory income risk, which the
alternative approach mentioned above cannot provide.
This thesis, in examining the potential heterogeneity of income risk and its partial
private and social insurance mechanisms, focuses only on income risk . Yet, it is important
to highlight that there are other types of risk, such as health risks or mortality risks. The
relevance of these types of risk rises with increasing age (Blundell et al., 2020). Another
string of risk currently reflected in the literature is the wealth effect, which refers to
how shocks to the value of assets influence consumption choices (Japelli and Pistaferri,
2017). In addition, the literature also discusses the dynamics between interest rate risk
and labour market risk, focusing on how households use portfolio decisions effi ciently to
mitigate labour market risk (Davis and Willen, 2000).
6
Thesis Contribution
This thesis contributes to the literature with new findings on the size of income risk in
the United Kingdom. It also addresses the level of income risk in conjunction with both
private and social insurance mechanisms. Income risk is measured across British people,
focusing on the evolution of income risk and insurance mechanisms over the last decade.
The emphasis is on the importance of measuring the heterogeneity of risk across people
and on the nature of two insurance mechanisms (i) marriage and (ii) social insurance
generated through welfare policies. Findings are complemented by discussing how adverse
income shocks affect individual and household welfare and the probability of individuals
(or households) facing adverse income shocks.
The first chapter contributes to the thesis by setting the scene and offering a theoretical
review of the background of income risk and its developments in the United Kingdom over
the past four decades. At the same time, it also offers information on the data set and the
methodological approach of the thesis. The second chapter contributes to the literature
(see, e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994), Dickens (2000),
Heathcote et al. (2010) and Jenkins (1995, 2005)) with novel findings on the size and
heterogeneity of income risk in the United Kingdom. The present empirical evidence
shows that the size and impact of income risk are not uniformly distributed. A vast body
of work provides evidence of the impact of adverse income shocks. In particular, the
income risk literature in the United Kingdom focuses on the development of transitory
and permanent income risk to explain income and consumption inequality during the
past decades. In addition, these studies predominantly focus on examining the income
risk of individual males or households with male heads. However, the literature lacks a
recent analysis of the distribution of income risk in the UK. Thus, chapter 2 offers a novel
perspective by examining the size and heterogeneity of income risk.
The third chapter contributes to the literature on the insurance effect of marriage on
income risk. In particular, the third chapter finds that marital choice plays a crucial role
in the degree of insurance against adverse income shocks (post marriage). Sharing the
same socioeconomic background with a spouse is found to reduce levels of net income risk
compared to couples with spouses from different socioeconomic backgrounds. In addition,
assortative couples face a lower permanent income risk. Employing a counterfactual
exercise to control for potential endogeneity issues, I find that the results are robust.
The fourth chapter contributes to the literature by using a natural policy experiment
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based on the ongoing British welfare reform. It quantifies the effects of a change in
the welfare system on net income risk for programme receiving households. To date,
and to the best of my knowledge, nobody has examined the effect of this particular
welfare reform on income risk. The main contribution is that net income risk increases
for households under the new system, Universal Credit, compared to households under
the former Legacy System. The findings indicate reduced social insurance for households
under the new policy scheme. Furthermore, the effects are more prominent for benefit-
receiving households with children. The lower cost to taxpayers associated with Universal
Credit has reduced the effectiveness of the social insurance mitigating income risk.
8
Thesis Review
This thesis examines income risk across British individuals and households in conjunc-
tion with private and social insurance mechanisms against unanticipated income changes.
The first chapter sets the scene for the thesis. It offers an income risk literature review
while also providing information on the data set and the methodological approach of the
thesis. This chapter explains the distinct income risk types and their development in
the United Kingdom over the past four decades. Further, the chapter presents the data
set used in this work, namely, Understanding Society: the United Kingdom Household
Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). This includes income, socioeconomic and welfare support
information on British individuals (and households) from 2009 to 2018. This chapter also
introduces the model of income dynamics which comprises a transitory and a permanent
component based on the PIH by Friedman (1957).Thus, this chapter provides a foundation
for the three following chapters.
In the second chapter the size and potential heterogeneity of individual gross and
net income risks is investigated. The literature highlights the role of lack of education
and low incomes as being key factors contributing to the uneven distribution of income
risk (Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 1994; Dickens, 2000; Jenkins, 2005; Heathcote et al., 2010;
Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2012; Hill et al., 2017). To this date, there is no widespread
analysis of social factors that influence the heterogeneity of income risk. The majority of
the literature focuses on earnings risk for men, with the recent exceptions of Angelopoulos
et al. (2017) and Belfield et al. (2017). My work contributes to the understanding of the
heterogeneity and degree of income risk based on a detailed group decomposition of net
and gross income risk. This reveals that income risk is not uniformly distributed. Women
encounter more than double the permanent income shock variance than men and are more
likely to encounter adverse income shocks compared to men. Individuals from Non-White
ethnic backgrounds face marginally higher levels of permanent income shocks compared
to White individuals. In particular, Non-White individuals encounter considerably higher
levels of transitory income shocks compared to White individuals. They also indicate a
1.1 percentage point higher likelihood of a 20 per cent adverse permanent income shock
compared to White individuals. Moreover, policies such as taxes and benefits do not
mitigate the income risk heterogeneity, so these income risk patterns translate into net
income. As a consequence, this chapter provides evidence for income risk heterogeneity
in the UK.
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The third chapter quantifies the insurance opportunities arising from marriage in the
United Kingdom. Marriage can reduce individual income risk through income risk pooling
with a partner. However, if one partner faces higher income volatility related to certain
socioeconomic characteristics, marriage can lead to an increase in income risk for their
partner. A comprehensive body of work has identified different insurance channels of
marriage such as income pooling, unemployment insurance, the added worker effect, and
the benefits of a marriage premium (Antonovices and Town, 2004; Ortigueira and Siassi,
2011; Choi and Valladares-Esteban, 2015, 2018; Christiansen et al., 2015). A smaller body
of work has examined the adverse impact on an individual’s welfare due to a marriage.
Dynan et al. (2012) find evidence for income inequalities generated by marriage (Becker,
1973, 1974; Goodman and Greave, 2010; Lise and Seitz, 2011; Eike et al., 2018). The
chapter adds to the literature by quantifying the degree of insurance induced by marriage
against adverse income shocks. The first finding indicates that married couples show
an insurance against adverse income shocks compared to single individuals. The second
finding indicates that private insurance through marriage depends on marital choice.
Assortative married couples encounter lower levels of income risk and face a 1.4 percentage
point lower likelihood of facing 20 per cent adverse income shock compared to couples who
differ in these characteristics. To test the robustness of my findings, a counterfactual was
created based on a synthetic data set, which randomises the married couples associated
with the marital choice. This controls for any endogeneity issues, for example, responses
of labour supply. I also complement the findings with a marital choice based on education.
A similar pattern in income risk across married couples can be found. As a result, the
findings indicate that marital choice plays a role in the insurance against adverse income
shocks.
The fourth chapter compares the impact of British welfare policies on income risk
for welfare receiving households. Welfare policies provide social insurance for households
in financial distress, mitigating the impact of adverse income shocks through financial
support such as benefits. This is particularly relevant as the British welfare system is
currently undergoing a major reform. The new system, Universal Credit, provides consid-
erably lower benefits to welfare receiving households for daily expenses than the former
Legacy System. Thus, my work contributes to understanding how the design of welfare
systems affects the welfare of households who face unexpected income changes. The cur-
rent literature highlights the role of welfare systems in smoothing income. Several key
channels have been identified, such as the redistributive character of the welfare system,
its progressiveness and the degree of benefit payments. This work complements find-
ings including Kniesner and Ziliak (2002), Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Jenkins (2011),
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Avram et al.(2019) and DeNardi (2019). This analysis uses a natural policy experiment–
resulting from the British welfare policy reform– to quantify the effects of the change in
the welfare system on household income risk. Specifically, it is found that households
under Universal Credit face higher income risk than under the Legacy System. Universal
Credit recipients are almost twice as likely to face an adverse permanent income shock
of 10 per cent compared to households under the Legacy System. This indicates a re-
duced social policy insurance for households under the new policy scheme, particularly
for welfare receiving households with children. The lower costs to taxpayers associated
with Universal Credit have decreased the effectiveness of the social insurance provided by
the new welfare policy. The implication is that income risk should be considered within




OVERVIEW: INCOME RISK IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
1.1 Introduction
This chapter offers a review of income risk in the United Kingdom during the past decade.
It begins with an explanation of the nature of income risk and an overview that combines
economic analysis and the theoretical background of income risk. Further, it outlines the
underlying data set and methods on which the three following chapters are based. The
thesis contributes to an extensive literature on trends in income risk and inequality in
recent decades (other work on the UK includes Cowell and Jenkins, 1994; Jenkins, 1995;
Atkinson, 1997, 1999; Brewer and Wren-Lewis, 2016).
The UK has experienced an increase in income inequality over the past 40 years,
particularly during the 1980s. Empirical evidence shows the increase in income inequality
is at least partly associated with earnings differentials, which are in turn attributed to
technological change, globalisation, and labour market deregulation (see, for example,
Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Belfield et al., 2017; and Blundell et al., 2018). In the 1990s
income inequality stabilised at a higher level. Greater investment in welfare support, for
example through child care and pension income along with higher redistribution during
the 1990s and 2000s, stabilised the trend around its current levels (Blundell et al., 2016;
Belfield et al., 2017; Angelopoulos et al., 2018; Avram et al.,2019).
Yet, there is a large part of the increase in inequality which cannot be attributed to
the above factors. In particular, the rise in earnings and income inequality is apparent
even after controlling for observable characteristics such as education, location and de-
mographics (see for example, Blundell and Etheridge, 2010). Increasing residual earnings
and income inequality suggest that there are other contributory factors which may have
to do with uncertainty at the individual or household level. Dickens (2000) examines the
dynamic structure of male wages using the New Earnings Survey Panel and finds that
permanent earnings risk plays a crucial role in determining income distribution from 1975
to 1995 in the UK. He finds evidence of a permanent component of earnings that increases
over the life cycle and is highly persistent. In the same vein, Ermish and Cheti (2005) show
that income inequality increases through the persistence of income shocks through time,
and they find that permanent income shocks contribute to the rise in income inequality
in the UK during the 1980s.
Changes in inequality since the mid-1990s have been on a smaller scale than the sharp
increases seen in the 1980s. Ramos (2003) and Daly and Valetta (2008) find that the
transitory variance of male earnings increased while earnings persistence falls during this
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period based on the BHPS dataset. Jenkins and Cappellari (2014) estimate the earnings
volatility of men and women between 1991 and 2008. They find that despite earnings
volatility, there is a constant trend during this period. Further, they find that labour
market volatility, which accounts for individuals with zero earnings, has fallen. They
argue that a critical driver is associated with stronger employment attachment. Similarly,
Blundell and Etheridge (2010) document the link between income inequality and income
fluctuations. Their findings indicate that the transitory earnings variance is flat while
disposable income is u-shaped, falling in the early 1990s and rising subsequently. More
recently, Jenkins (2011), Bartels and Bönke (2013) and Pruit and Turner (2020) find that
the transitory income shock variance of male earnings increased significantly between the
1990s and 2005, but that of household net income remained flat.
The majority of the initial empirical income risk literature focused on its evolution in
the USA, partly due to the readily available data. The findings suggest a rise in income
risk from the 1970s until the 1980s associated with the rise in income inequality and
the rise in female labour market participation, which is followed by a decline in earnings
volatility from the 1980s through 2005. The body of work includes Lillard and Willard
(1976), MaCurdy (1982), Hall and Mishkin (1982), Topel and Ward (1992), Deaton and
Paxson (1994), Gottschalk and Moffi t (1994), Altonji et al. (2003), Storesletten et al.
(2004), Guvenen (2006), Krueger and Perri (2006), Heathcote et al. ( 2007), Blundell et
al. (2008), Sabelhaus and Song (2009; 2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010).
Recently, the ongoing debate surrounding income risk analysis has expanded to other
economies. It focuses on different underlying factors that contribute to changes in the
level of income risk. Bach et al. (2007), Krebs and Yao (2018) and Fuchs-Schündeln et
al. (2010) map income risk geographically. They provide evidence for the different devel-
opment of permanent and transitory income shocks in former East and West Germany.
Bonhomme and Robin (2009) examine the change in the magnitude of earnings mobility
in France during the 1990s based on income levels and education. Similarly, Baker and
Solon (2003) and Brzozowski et al. (2010) examine the development of wage and income
risk in Canada in relation to income inequality. The general findings are that permanent
income shocks have contributed to the rise in income inequality during the past 30 years
(see also Krueger et al. (2010)). De Nardi et al. (2019) in a comparative study of the USA
and the Netherlands discuss the role of social insurance through welfare policies and fam-
ily networks. My work contributes to the literature by providing a detailed examination
of income risk heterogeneity within the United Kingdom from 2009 until 2018.
The chapter is structure as follows. Section 1.2 provides the theoretical background
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on income risk combined with empirical evidence. Section 1.3 provides an outlines of the
dataset used throughout the thesis. Section 1.4 introduces the estimation approach of
income risk. Section 1.5 sets out the income risk results for the UK sample and discusses
several tools to quantify adverse permanent income shocks. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature
1.2.1 Theoretical Review: Income Risk
This thesis uses the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) characteristics to analyse the
differences between income risks in conjunction with private and social insurance mech-
anisms. In particular, this section examines the theoretical literature associated with
income risks. The PIH combines consumption smoothing with an income process de-
composition, which enables the analysis of specific income risks. Prior work identifies
separate sources related to income shocks and establishes a close relationship between
income shocks and consumption decisions.
The PIH provides a simple framework to explain the notion of the two components.
The uncertainty of future income can be separated into two stochastic components: a
shock to permanent income and a shock to transitory income (Friedman, 1957; Hall and
Mishkin, 1982; Meghir, 2004). During work-life, individuals face a different degree of
income shocks. The nature of the income shocks can be either permanent, for exam-
ple through job displacement, or a change in returns to education; or transitory, such
as bonus payments (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). The PIH describes how individuals
smooth consumption over their lifetime and suggests that an individual’s or household’s
consumption and savings choices are determined not only by their current income but also
by their expected income in future years, referred to as the permanent income. To max-
imise consumption utility over the life cycle, they consume less from a transitory change
of income than from a permanent change to income (Friedman, 1957). For example, con-
sumers with sizeable positive transitory income shocks save most of it. Thus, the PIH
entails two key features: consumption smoothing and income decomposition. This chap-
ter uses the distinction between the permanent and transitory income components (see
eq. (1.2) and eq. (1.3)) to analyse the heterogeneity of income risks between individuals
in the United Kingdom.
The hypothesis states that changes in permanent income, rather than changes in tem-
porary income, are what drive the changes in a consumer choices. The key point is that
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transitory income shocks are mainly absorbed through self-insurance. They do not trans-
late into consumption choice. In contrast, permanent income shocks are not smoothed
through saving, but rather translate into a consumption response (Atkinson and Bour-
guignon, 2015; Blundell et al., 2008; Meghir, 2004). The difference between the two
shocks can generate a welfare loss for individuals or households (Drazen, 2000; Friedman,
1957; Jenkins, 2011). A permanent income shock has a substantial impact on an indi-
vidual’s income, resulting in a potential welfare loss through its effect on consumption.
In addition, if an individual is liquidity constrained, a transitory income shock as well
as a permanent income shock, might have a direct impact on consumption choices. The
liquidity constraints imply a limit on the amount an individual can borrow, resulting in
a reduced ability to smooth consumption from one period to the next combined with a
limited amount of resources within one period. Consequently, a permanent income shock
might affect an individual’s consumption choice.
Another factor that influences an individuals or households ability to smooth con-
sumption is associated with house ownership. British households and individuals who
own a house are wealthy but are likely to be illiquid associated with their housing invest-
ment (Cloyne and Surico, 2019; Cloyne et al., 2020). This situation implies that house
owners are more exposed to adverse income shocks. In particular, Cloyne et al. (2020)
find evidence for different consumption choices between house owners and tenants using
survey data from the UK and the US. This is an interesting strand of the literature but
requires consumption and house ownership information. However, the UKHLS dataset
provides limited information about the former and thus it is not part of this analysis.
The PIH also connects permanent and transitory income risk with income inequality.
For a given set of individuals, the variance in incomes in a specific period depends on the
shocks to the permanent component that individuals have experienced in the past com-
bined with transitory shocks within the respective period. The former implies that for
this set of individuals the cross-section variance (income inequality) of income increases
over time, while the latter affects only the ordering of the individuals within the income
distribution in the specific period (income mobility) (Blundell and Preston, 1998; Jenkins,
2005). Blundell and Preston (1998) and Jenkins (2005) find evidence that a permanent
income shock increases income and consumption inequality. The empirical evidence un-
derpins the PIH and follows the theory regarding which permanent income shocks have
an impact on income inequality.
An increase in income shock variance is driven by a change in either a permanent, a
transitory or by both income shocks. The underlying factors driving such changes differ.
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The increase in the permanent income variance is considered the key driver for the rise
in income inequality between 1975 and 2000s in the UK according to Hill (1992), Dickens
(2000) and Blundell and Etheridge (2010). Similarly, Dickens (2000) finds that the per-
manent component of earnings increases over the life cycle and there is a highly persistent
serially correlated transitory component. The estimated variances of both these compo-
nents have risen over this period, each partially explaining the increase in inequality from
1975 to 1995 in the UK (Dickens, 2000). Factors that contribute to the rise in the tran-
sitory variance include labour market competitiveness, a decrease in the minimum wage,
and a decline in unionisation or increases in short-term contracted employment (Moffi tt
and Gottschalk, 1994, 2011). Caroll (2001), Ramos (2003) and Etheridge (2015) empha-
sise the role of income mobility as an explanation for an increase in transitory income
variance in the UK. More recent evidence by Kalwij and Alessie (2007) shows that the
upward trend of wage inequality in the UK has been driven by the transitory component.
Consequently, the permanent and transitory income shocks stem from different sources.
The current literature offers evidence on the distinct transmission channels of the in-
come shocks into individuals’ (or households’) consumption behaviour. Blundell et al.
(2008) and Blundell et al. (2013) find that an individual’s consumption behaviour is sen-
sitive to the income level. They find individuals with low-income are more susceptible to
transitory income shocks than those with a high-income. They also argue that the per-
manent income shock can be partially insured and find comprehensive insurance against
transitory income shocks, mainly based on self-insurance in the form of accumulated sav-
ings. This indicates that income risk is not uniformly distributed across people. Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008) find a difference in the ability to insure against income
shocks , in particular when analysing individuals based on educational background and
age (and thus proximity to retirement). Furthermore, Blundell, Low and Preston (2013)
argue that taxes, transfers, and family labour supply play an essential role in the insur-
ance against permanent income shocks in the UK. As a result, the nature of the income
shock plays a significant role in the impact on consumption decisions.
Some literature finds evidence in line with the PIH, such as Lillard and Willis (1978).
They were the first to study income processes based on the PIH decomposition using male
annual earnings based on a panel dataset from the USA. Their findings indicate that the
majority of cross-sectional earnings variation is related to permanent factors, which leads
to limited income mobility - individuals tend to retain their position in the earnings
distribution. Dickens (2000) finds that permanent income shocks play a significant role
in determining income distribution in the UK. Blundell and Preston (1998) and Jenkins
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(2005) find evidence that permanent income shocks increase income and consumption
inequality.
MaCurdy (1982) uses a similar estimation approach based on the PSID dataset. How-
ever, he shows that male earnings are considerably influenced by the transitory component
and finds evidence of earnings instability and income mobility. Similarly, Gottschalk and
Moffi tt (1994; 2011), Baker (1997) and Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) investigate in-
come mobility by decomposing the income process in the USA. They also find increased
income variation, which contributes to widening earnings distribution in the US labour
market. They identify possible reasons for the increases in wage instability, related to
the decline in unionisation, the decline in regulation, and general increases in competi-
tion within industries. They also find that some income variation is related to frequently
changing jobs. Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) find that income mobility appears to be greater
for persons in the tails of the income distribution relative to those in the middle, and
elderly adults compared to young adults.
Since the work of Bewley (1983), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), there is a
burgeoning literature on the heterogeneous agents incomplete markets models, and income
risk lies at the core of these models. The literature has shown the importance of income
risk on the agents’consumption and savings choices. The precautionary savings motive
incetivise agents into engaging in asset holding, which works as a "buffer" stock, and is
heavily driven by the uncertainty of their future income (Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994;
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994; Carroll, 1997; Storesletten et al., 2008; Krueger and
Perri, 2011; Bayer et al. 2019). Predicting the effects of an income change on asset
holdings requires knowledge of the degree of income risk and their level of liquid assets.
Agents with higher income risk, all else being equal, should save more out of their current
income to be able to smooth consumption over time, should an adverse shock happens.
Agents with no liquid assets are forced to adjust their consumption in the occasion of an
adverse income shock.
Additional extensions of the income risk analysis focus on incomplete markets and the
business cycle. The economic agents not only face income risk but also this risk varies
over the business cycle. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).find that the variance of
persistent shocks to disposable household income almost doubles in recessions for US.
Similar evidence on the dynamics between income risk and the business cycle, is found
by Angelopoulos et al. (2019) for the United Kingdom. In addition, Bayer et al. (2019)
analyse income variations in a model with incomplete markets with a focus on liquid
and illiquid assets. They find that increased uncertainty depresses aggregate demand as
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households respond by hoarding liquid assets for precautionary motives, thereby reducing
both illiquid physical investment and consumption demand. However, the theoretical and
numerical analyses using models of heterogeneous agents incomplete market models are
outside the scope of this thesis.
This section discusses the theoretical background of income risk based on the PIH. It
highlights the different dynamics of the shocks to the distribution of the permanent and
transitory component and how these affect consumption choice. Moreover, it provides
an extension on other models that account for the business cycle, additional uncertainty,
buffer stock savings as well as the role of wealth.
1.3 Dataset
The United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) is an extensive panel
dataset that maintains income, welfare and socioeconomic information across a sample
of Britain’s population from 2009 to 2018. The UKHLS initially started with a sample
of around 40,000 households and individuals. It collects data from each member within
households such as demographics, labour market income, health conditions and informa-
tion on welfare policies. The survey was launched in 2009, and the first nine waves within
the framework of this thesis. Each wave reflects two calendar years in this period (see
Table 1.1).
The aim of the survey is to reflect the life changes and stability of the British population
in a representative sample. It is the follow-up study to the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) with a broader based sample size and designed to be representative of the UK
population. The primary survey sample consists of the General Population Sample (GPS),
as well as four other components: the Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (EMBS), the General
Population Comparison (GPC) sample, the previous BHPS sample, and the Immigrant
and Ethnic Minority Boost Sample (IEMBS). The IEMBS is disregarded as it only starts
in wave 2, meaning it is not comparable to the other samples. Thus the GPS combined
with the GPC and EMBS is used.
One essential characteristic of this data set is its panel structure. This implies that
each individual is reported in every period, and it enables the observation of the same
individuals over the survey time horizon. It is a crucial feature to consistently analyse
changes in income dynamics for the different individuals over the time periods. Another
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key feature of this survey is the information included. The UKHLS reports information on
distinct sources of income, and on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the
respondents, such as gender, education, geographical areas, marital status, social (profes-
sional) class, health status, and ethnicity. The EMBS makes the UKHLS a unique data
set, unlike other panel data sets -such as BHPS-, which includes insuffi cient information
on health and ethnicity characteristics.
The UKHLS has a particular structure in the time dimension, which is constructed
in waves. Each wave reflects two calendar years, e.g. wave one contains 2009-2010,
and wave two contains 2010-2011. This structure continues throughout the data set and
implies an overlapping nature of the time periods in calendar years. Nevertheless, the
data collection for a single wave is scheduled across 24 months, and so, corresponding to
the construction of the sample design, no repeated observations of individuals are present.
Table 1.1 translates the waves to the respective calendar years:












Notes: The data structure by
translated from waves to years.
Furthermore, the sample weights are associated with the wave framework and include
a person design weight for individuals and a household grid for households. This design
weight corrects unequal probability of selection at several levels, such as unequal selection
probability based on the boost in Northern Ireland, and unequal selection probability
related to the selection of the EMBS. In particular, the weights for ethnic minorities are
adjusted for their dual probability of being part of the GPS and the EMBS. An analysis
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in a calendar year decomposition would disregard the original sample design and disrupt
the associated weights. Therefore, the original sample design is kept, working with the
time horizon in waves.
The panel structure of the UKHLS allows observation of individuals and households
over time. In particular, the wide span of labour income, socioeconomic and demographic
information provides the key ingredients to quantify the income risk for individuals and
households in the UK. Also the income risk estimation relies on the access to panel data.
The UKHLS panel framework provides such a structure, which facilitating income risk
estimation throughout this work.
Further, Table 1.2 reports the income information on individual and household level
used throughout this thesis:
Table 1.2: Definition of Income Types
Income Type Definition
Gross Individual Income Weekly income of the individual before taxes and benefits
Gross Household Income Weekly income of the household before taxes and benefits
Net Individual Income Weekly income of the individual after taxes and benefits
Net Household Income Weekly income of the household after taxes and benefits
Source: UKHLS
Notes: Income Type Definitions
1.4 Methodology
To measure idiosyncratic income risk a researcher needs to have a proxy of the idiosyn-
cratic component of income. The typical approach in the literature to find a proxy for it
is to assume that the log individual or household income is the sum of a time specific part,
a deterministic part that typically is a function of age and education and a residual part.
The latter is interpreted as the idiosyncratic component of income and is approximated
as the residual of a first step Mincerian regression partialling out the time specific and
deterministic parts (Mincer, 1974).
In turn, the idiosyncratic component of income is modelled as a sum of two subcom-
ponents, a purely transitory and a permanent one (see e.g. Deaton and Paxson, 1994;
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Blundell and Preston, 1998; Heathcote et al., 2010; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011; and
Japelli and Pistaferri, 2017). Using panel data, this methodology exploits the variance-
covariance structure of the idiosyncratic income component to identify the properties of
the distribution of transitory and permanent income shocks. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that it provides a simple and flexible framework to distinguish between transitory
and permanent income shocks (Japelli and Pistaferri, 2017).
Yet, there are drawbacks which are associated with the underlying assumptions. To
test the empirical implications of the response to income risk one has to consider the
available information set. Income risk is highly subjective and lies in the ’eye of the
beholder’ (Japelli and Pistaferri, 2017; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). The underlying
assumption is that the response to income shocks reflects the size of information available
to individuals or households. Thus, it as has to be assumed that they have no better
information than the econometrician.
1.4.1 Empirical Model
This section describes the model used in this analysis. It follows the approach by Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010), who analyse trends in income dynamics
in the UK and the USA respectively. This thesis focuses on the UK and uses the panel
data from the UKHLS over the time horizon from 2009 to 2018. In line with the literature,
I analyse the ’residual’dispersion (Brzozowski et al., 2010; Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2010;
Heathcote et al., 2010). Note that all chapters consider a version of the model presented
below. Within each chapter, I consider different definitions of incomes and households
instead of individuals in some cases.
I consider individual log net income, ygi,c,t, for a household i, belonging to a cohort c
and population subgroup g, and observed in year t. I assume the following model




which means that the log net income consists of a determinist (or explained by observ-
ables) linear part βgXi,c,t and a residual (unexplained or idiosyncratic) part u
g
i,c,t. Xi,c,t
includes a constant term, a quadratic in experience approximated by age, dummies for
region of residence, dummy for gender, dummy for marital status and time fixed effects.
Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010) I also include as a regressor the logarithm of the
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household size. The superscript g denotes the eight subgroups defined by the combination
of three variables: sex (men and women), ethnicity (White and Non-White), education
(degree holders or not).1 Moreover, I consider three cohorts. Controlling for the observ-
ables captures the idea that expected changes to income do not represent risk (see Japelli
and Pistaferri, 2017).
I further assume that the residual term, ugi,c,t, consists of two components, a perma-
nent component, pgi,c,t, and a transitory component, ε
g
i,c,t; the permanent component is a
random walk while the transitory component is a purely i.i.d shock. In addition, the two













where ζgi,t ∼ N(0, σζgt ) and εi,t ∼ N(0, σεgt ) are innovations that are uncorrelated over
time, i.i.d. across individuals, and orthogonal to each other. The variances are potentially
time varying and different across population subgroups, but do not depend on the cohort.2
Note that the assumption of the random walk means that the cross section variance of a
cohort is increasing in time due to the accumulation of shocks by the individuals.
1Analytically, the eight subgroups are: i) male, degree, White; ii) male, degree, Non-White; iii) male,
no degree, White; iv) male, no degree, Non-White; v) female, degree, White; vi) female, degree, Non-
White; vii) female, no degree, White; viii) female, no degree, Non-White.
2The assumption of normality of shocks is very typical in this literature, see for example Brzozowski
et al. (2010), Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010).
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Identification Scheme in Levels
Two alternative approaches to identifying income shocks are used in the current litera-
ture. The identification schemes are based on i) levels and ii) first-differences estimation.
The first, more common in macroeconomic applications (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2004b;
Guvenen, 2007; Heathcote et al., 2008), uses moments in log income levels. The second,
common in labour economics (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004;
Blundell et al., 2008), uses moments based on income growth rates—or first-differences in
log income. Both identification schemes can be used to estimate the permanent-transitory
model. Yet, they differ regarding the set of moments, which identify the structural pa-
rameters (Heathcote et al., 2010). The level identification scheme enables me to exploit
more data observations compared to the first-differences approach. The presence of the
identification scheme puzzle provides evidence for the robustness of the results, as the
ranking in the groups are the same (for more details see Appendix B).















i,c,t−1) + σζgt + σε
g
t
covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t) = varc(p
g
i,c,t−1) + σζgt .
Then, the model is estimated based on the following within-cohort moment restrictions:
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t) = σεgt (1.4)
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t, ui,c,t−1) = σζgt + σεgt (1.5)
This model is exactly identified: that is, we have the same number of moments restric-
tions and unknowns. The first set of restrictions identifies σεgt in eq.(1.4) for t = 1, .., 8.
Given the identification of σεgt , the second set of restrictions identifies σζgt with in eq.(1.5)
for t = 2, .., 8. Note that, as stated earlier, under the true model the above moments do
not depend on cohort, c. Therefore, to estimate variances at date t, I average across all




[varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t)] = σεgt (1.6)∑
c∈C
[varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t, ui,c,t−1)] = σζgt + σεgt (1.7)
where the set C denotes the set of cohorts.
Identification Scheme in First-Differences









i,c,t−1 (see detailed derivation in Method Appendix E):
covc(∆ui,c,t+1,∆ui,c,t) = −σεgt (1.8)
varc(∆ui,c,t) = σζgt + σε
g
t
+ σεgt−1 . (1.9)
Then, the model is estimated based on exactly these within-cohort moment restric-
tions. This model is exactly identified; that is, we have the same number of moments re-
strictions and unknowns. The first set of restrictions identifies σεgt in eq.(1.4) for t = 2, .., 8.
Given the identification of σεgt , the second set of restrictions identifies σζgt with in eq.(1.5)
for t = 2, .., 8. Again, under the true model the above moments do not depend on cohort,
c. Therefore, to estimate variances at date t, I average across all the three cohorts for a
given year t i.e.
∑
c∈C
[covc(∆ui,c,t+1,∆ui,c,t)] = −σεgt (1.10)∑
c∈C




where the set C denotes the set of cohorts.
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1.4.2 Standard Errors
To compute the standard errors, I follow MaCurdy (2007), and use the block bootstrap
procedure for 1,000 replications. The resulting standard errors and confidence intervals
account for serial correlation of arbitrary form, heteroskedasticity as well as for the fact
that we use pre-estimated residuals. This estimation process is a standard procedure
and is used in similar research, such as Hall and Horrowitz (1996), Etheridge (2015),
Greenwood (2014), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
1.5 Results and Discussion
This section provides an overview of how income risk is distributed in the UK. It focuses
on the results of the entire UKHLS sample maintaining all individuals.
I focus on the adverse impact of the income shocks between individuals or households
by calculating the monetary loss of a one-standard deviation negative shock (as per cent
from the mean) and by calculating the utility loss that a one-off loss would imply under log
utility (see eq. (1.12)). The associated welfare losses in each section can be approximated
by considering an individual’s log utility in a regular period and comparing it to a period
where a negative income shock is realised. According to the theory (see section 1.2) the
permanent income shock should directly transfer into consumption behaviour. Therefore,
a drop in income translates into a drop of consumption. Consequently, this section focuses
on the utility and welfare impact of permanent shocks only. Assuming that income is fully
consumed (i.e. individuals do not save or borrow), this allows for a welfare comparison:




where, µ is the mean of the weekly wage, µreduced is the difference between the mean and
one standard deviation change of a negative income shock in monetary terms. Therefore,
the utility welfare loss illustrates the impact of the permanent income shock. It expresses
the differences in the income risks between individuals or households and identifies the
utility welfare loss associated with the income risk. Consequently, the following section
outlines several measures for adverse permanent income shocks.
Another way to quantify the impact of permanent income shocks focuses on the as-
sociated probabilities of encountering an income gain or income loss. I assume a normal
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distribution and compute the distribution for the shocks to the permanent component of





. In Table 1.5 I document the probability that an
individual receives an idiosyncratic shock to a permanent component of their income that
increases (decreases) their permanent income by a specific percentage, compared to what
it would have been had it received the mean ζ i,t shock. Severe gains (losses) in income
refer to a 50 or 20 per cent probability. Such a gain (loss) in income translates into situa-
tions associated with an increase in pay, for example through a promotion, or a reduction
in income due to a spell of unemployment . In particular, self-employed individuals are
prone to considerable reductions in income. Another way to think about such events in a
household setting would be if one member faces a change in job associated with a wage
reduction or raise. These probabilities are adjusted in Chapter 4 based on the low-income
nature of the households that receive support under either the Legacy System or Universal
Credit.
Within this thesis, it is assumed that the income shocks to the permanent component
are normally distributed. The "normality" assumption is chosen to keep the model in its
simplest form to examine unanticipated income changes using the UKHLS data set. In
the literature there are examples that account for the tail changes such as Guvenen et
al. (2014), Angelopoulos et al (2019) and Bush et al (2020). The key approach is to use
higher moments than the second such as skewness to examine the asymmetry and kurtosis
of the income shock distribution. However, this analysis requires relatively large samples
on the cross section. The reason is that the higher moments than variance, skewness
and kurtosis, require large samples to be estimated accurately. The afforementioned
studies typically use the whole sample to conduct such examination. In contrast to these
studies, the subsequent chapters of this thesis focus on a group decomposition approach
and the respective samples are relatively small (also note, as discussed earlier that the
identification is per period t). Consequently, the analysis of the tails of the income shock
distribution is not a viable approach for this thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, I leave this
type of analysis for future research.
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1.5.1 Income Risk in the United Kingdom
The first set of results focuses on income risk dispersion across the U.K. In particular,
it focuses on age differences between British individuals considering the levels of income
risk. Table 1.3 also reports transitory and permanent income shocks of individuals for the
entire sample. It reports a permanent income shock of σ2
ζUKt
= 0.0160 and a transitory
income shock of σ2
εUKt
= 0.0854. In addition, Table 1.3 supports the difference between the
permanent and transitory income shock variance by showing the variance of each income
shock variance from 2010 until 2018. I consider the impact of a one standard deviation
change in the permanent income shock. The results in Table 1.4 indicate that British
individuals encounter a utility welfare loss of 2.41 per cent. Further, Table 1.5 shows
the probability of facing a positive or a negative income shock with different degrees of
income losses and gains. The results indicate that British individuals are 3.88 per cent
likely to face an income loss of 20 per cent due to an adverse income shock. In contrast,
they encounter almost double the probability of 7.44 per cent of encountering a 20 per
cent income gain.








Entire Sample 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0032) (0.0035)
Sample Size 150,572
Notes: Table 1.3 indicates the income risk based on
transitory and permanent income shock variances;
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based
on the level estimation method; The bootstrap standard
errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in
parentheses;*significant at p<0.1;**significant
at p<0.05;***significant at p<0.01.
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Table 1.4: Utility Welfare Loss, UK
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
Entire Sample 12.65% 2.41%
Notes: Table 1.4 shows the utility welfare loss for individuals in
the UK; Net Individual Income; The loss indicates a one standard
deviation change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent
income shock from one period to the next.
Table 1.5: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, UK







income gain>50%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.50)) 0.07%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.20)) 7.44%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.50)) 0.06%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.80)) 3.88%
Notes: Table 1.5 indicates the likelihood of an individual to encounter a permanent income shock.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζ i,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the distribution of individual income risk in the
United Kingdom. It shows the transitory and permanent income shock variances for
individuals from 2009 until 2018. This is the most recent analysis of income risk in
the United Kingdom. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) report the income risk based in
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 1991 until 2005. The income risk is
shown in Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and indicates the same magnitude as in the first
difference identification found in Appendix B.
As a part of a project trying to uncover ’cross sectional facts for macroeconomists’,
Heathcote et al. (2010), Fuchs and Schündeln et al. (2010), Brzozowski et al. (2010),
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), Domeij and Folden (2010) use panel data sets for US,
Germany, Canada, Italy and Sweden respectively to estimate the size of income risk. In
particular, Brzozowski et al. (2010) find that wage and income inequality have increased
substantially from the end 1960s to 2005. Yet, the increase was partially mitigated by
the canadian tax and transfer system. As a result, the increase in consumption inequality
has been relatively mild in Canada. Similarly, Domeij and Folden (2010) find low levels
of consumption inequality in Sweden from 1978 to 2004. Yet, they show a rise in Swedish
earnings inequality in the early 1990s, and that much of this increase was associated with
labour market movements. Heathcote et al. (2010) use the PSID and find that changes in
the distribution of hours worked sharpen the rise in earnings inequality before 1982, but
mitigate its increase thereafter. Taxes and transfers decrease the level of income inequality,
especially at the bottom of the distribution, but have little effect on the aggregate trend.
Further, Fuchs and Schündeln et al. (2010) find a geographical difference in income risk in
Germany. By compaing former East and West Germany they show that the institutional
framework plays a role in the degree of income risk. Households in former East Germany
encountered considerably less income risk compared to households in West Germany. The
studies highlight the importance of the tax and welfare system.
During last decade and within the framework of the afromentioned project no studies
examine income risk year by year in the UK, US or any other major european country
from 2010 to 2018. The studies cover the period form the end 1960s until the early 2000s.
This highlights the novelty of the estimates depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Individual Income Risk in the United Kingdom













Transitory  Income Shocks
Permanent Income Shocks
Source: UKHLS, own calculations
Notes: Figure 1.1 reports individual income risk based on level estimation
in the United Kingdom.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides a foundation for the thesis and reviews income risk and its develop-
ments in the UK. It explains the background of income risk and key factors that influence
it, and the evolution of income inequality. It also introduces the empirical approach based
on the PIH by Friedman (1957). In doing so, it provides information on two identification
schemes used in the literature and the estimation approach of this thesis. It enables the
analysis of income risk based on the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks.
The primary data set used throughout the thesis is the UKHLS with income, welfare pol-
icy, demographic and socioeconomic information from 2009 to 2018. The economic agents
the economic agents differ based on the focus of the chapter, whether on individuals,
households or both.
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The thesis contributes to the literature with a unique perspective on the level of
income risk, focusing on the evolution of income risk and insurance mechanisms during
the last decade. It emphasises the importance of measuring the heterogeneity of risk
among population groups and on the nature of two insurance mechanisms (i) marriage
and (ii) social insurance generated through welfare policies. I complement these findings
with a discussion on how income shocks potentially affect well-being. To date, this thesis
is the only one to address the level of income risk considering both private and social




INCOME RISK HETEROGENEITY IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
2.1 Introduction
An individual’s well-being depends not only on their average income or expenditure but
also on their income variation. Once actual income varies from expected future income,
a form of income risk occurs. The subsequent income variation, in turn, might decrease
an individual’s well-being. To understand the effects of income risk on an individual’s
well-being, it is necessary to examine the size of adverse income shocks and the dispersion
of associated risk. Is income risk uniformly distributed? Not necessarily; it depends on
several factors. For example, adverse labour income shocks affect individuals with limited
private (income) resources, other than labour, to a greater extent. Another example, if
a group of the population has persistently lower income than another group, then the
welfare policy (benefits and taxes) has different effects on their income risk. In turn, the
heterogeneity of income risk also adds another dimension to income inequality. Although
the literature discusses the sources of income risk, it lacks a detailed perspective on income
risk heterogeneity.
This chapter contributes to the literature of income risk by measuring the size and
heterogeneity of individual gross and net income risk in the UK between 2009 and 2018
providing evidence for considerable income risk heterogeneity. The finding of this chap-
ter suggests an uneven distribution of income risk across British individuals, in terms
of gender and ethnicity. The group decomposition reveals that women and Non-White
individuals face higher levels of income risk compared to men and White individuals. The
resulting adverse income shocks are associated with a considerable decrease in well-being.
Women are five times as likely to face an adverse income shock of 20 per cent as com-
pared to men. Non-White individuals show a 1.1 per cent point higher likelihood of a 20
per cent adverse income shock compared to White individuals. This uneven distribution
reveals an income risk heterogeneity in the UK, thus providing a nuanced perspective on
the nature of income risk.
The second main contribution is the provision of evidence on unconditional insurance
mechanisms by examining the effects tax and benefits system on mitigating income risk.
Welfare policies usually target to support the lower parts of the income distribution.
Therefore, it is expected that the welfare policies are likely to reduce income risk for the
low income individuals. Indeed, there is evidence that benefits decrease the magnitude
of adverse income shocks in the general population (see, e.g. Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002;
Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Angelopoulos et al., 2019). Nevertheless, it might not
be enough to alleviate income risk that they face, especially permanent income shocks.
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In other words, they might still be exposed to large and permanent in nature income
fluctuation even if they are now smaller than the pre policy income shock. Given that
in my sample I find considerable differences in mean incomes between sociodemographic
groups (see Appendix B.2), it is important to examine the effects of policy on mitigating
income risk, especially for sociodemographic groups with relatively lower income.
This chapter provides a unique perspective on levels of gross and net income risk, by
examining detailed group-specific characteristics. In investigating the widespread presence
of income risk across British individuals, the size and heterogeneity of gross and net
income risk is analysed, based on socioeconomic and demographic factors such as gender,
ethnicity, marital status, parenthood, geographical location and employment status. The
majority of the earnings risk literature focuses on education and income levels, but this
paper contributes to the debate by offering in-depth analysis across a wider variety factors
in seeking to understand the heterogeneity of income risk.
Following Chapter 1 the analysis applies the Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman,
1957). It decomposes the income process to consider long-term features, such as job
displacement or changes in returns to education, and transitory characteristics such as
bonus payments (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). In theory, an individual’s consumption
and savings behaviour responds differently to permanent or transitory income shocks.
Permanent income shocks directly translate into consumption choices, while transitory
income shocks can be smoothed, unless, for example, an individual is liquidity constrained.
In that case adverse transitory income shocks can contribute to welfare losses (see detailed
literature review in the first Chapter).
The group-specific decomposition is a unique approach to examining the heterogeneity
of individual gross and net income risk. It is a tool that reveals whether individuals who
share specific characteristics also share a similar degree of income risk, and consequently
indicates a heterogeneous distribution of income risk between individuals. To direct wel-
fare policy appropriately, it is necessary to identify this heterogeneity of individual gross
and net income risk between groups in the UK (see Section 1.4 for a detailed review).
The literature focuses on the sources of income risk, with empirical evidence iden-
tifying low levels of education and income as key drivers. Within this discussion the
literature also considers the distinction between permanent and transitory income shocks
and their subsequent impact on consumption choices (see for example Lillie and Willis,
1978; MaCurdy, 1982; Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Blundell and Preston, 1998; Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2004, 2011; Ramos, 2003; Blundell et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2010; Blundell
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et al., 2013). By decomposing changes in the distribution of income in the UK, the find-
ings of this chapter complement existing work, including Jenkins (1995, 2005), Dickens
(2000), Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Heathcote et al. (2010), Brewer and Wren-Lewis
(2012) and Belfield et al. (2017). To date, the literature offers sparse analysis on the
heterogeneity of income risk based on a wider range of socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics. The only studies that currently feature income risk for female workers in
the UK are Belfield et al. (2017) and Angelopoulos et al. (2017). The key contribution
of this chapter is a detailed analysis of the heterogeneity based on gender for income risk
in the UK.
Further, the literature provides evidence for inequality in earnings and income risk
(see e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004, and Chang and Kim, 2006, both for the USA,
and Angelopoulos et al. ,2017, 2020, for the UK) and inequality in mean earnings and
income between different groups in the population (earnings premia) (see, e.g. Heathcote
et al., 2010, for the USA and Blundell and Etheridge, 2010, for the UK). Usually, these
comparisons focus on education and sometimes gender. This inequality in risk and mean
income can increase wealth accumulation and wealth inequality via direct and indirect
effects (see Angelopoulos et al., 2020 and Kim, 2019).
The UKHLS maintains income information from 2009 to 2018. The estimation method
uses the dynamics of weekly income in the UK. The income risk approach is based on work
by Heathcote et al., (2010). Following the literature, I focus on ’residual’dispersion. The
income process is specified to allow for temporary and permanent income shocks. Further,
the income process uses two distinct identification schemes: levels and first differences.
These schemes are estimated by exploiting the variance and covariance structure of the
residual term in the respective identification scheme. The differences in income dynamics
are examined for individuals with different group characteristics such as: gender, marital
status, parenthood, ethnicity, urban-rural classification and employment status.
The chapter is organised into six sections. Section 2.2 reviews the theoretical and
empirical evidence. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 introduces the empirical
model and presents the underlying methodology. Section 2.5 reports the estimates of
the variances for each wave and provides the time series evidence. It also discusses the




Recent evidence from the Offi ce of National Statistics (ONS) Report (2019) indicates a
gradual decline in income inequality over the past decade in the UK. Similarly, the Family
Resource Survey (2019) also indicates a continually improving trend, based on a decrease
in wage differences, for example the gender pay gap. The median disposable income in the
UK for the financial year 2017/18 is estimated to have been £ 28,400, which is higher than
at the time of the great financial crisis. An increase in disposable income has primarily
been driven by a rise in household income from employment, related to both average
earnings growth in real terms in 2017/18, and continued growth in employment rates
(ONS, 2019). However, to assess the development of income inequality, a deeper analysis
is required, including indicators such as the Gini coeffi cient.
Figure 2.1 shows the Gini coeffi cient, based on the Understanding Society data set
(UKHLS), indicating the level of income inequality in the UK. The Gini coeffi cient is a
tool that measures the distribution of income within an economy, where 0 indicates com-
plete income equality and 1 indicates complete income inequality (Atkinson and Bour-
guignon, 2015). In this case, the income Gini coeffi cient fluctuates between 0.39 and 0.36
between 2009 and 2018. The estimates of the income Gini coeffi cient indicate that in-
come inequality is still relatively high in the UK. The estimates are comparable to those
by Blundell and Etheridge (2010), who determine the Gini coeffi cient for the UK using
the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data
sets, covering the period 1978 to 2005.
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Figure 2.1: Gross and Net Income GINI UK












Gross Income Gini Trend
Net Income Gini
Net Income Gini Trend
Source: UKHLS, own calculations
Notes: Figure 2.1 shows the gross and net income GINI index for the United Kingdom
with trend lines from 2010 until 2017.
The income Gini coeffi cient (Figure 2.1) and average income developments provide
an overview of UK income distribution. However, to analyse the dispersion of income
risk across individuals, income variation has to be considered. Therefore this chapter fo-
cuses on the income shock variance of individuals who share certain group characteristics
such as gender, ethnicity, employment status, marital status, parenthood and urban-rural
classification. These groups may vary in their exposure to adverse income shocks. By con-
sidering several income measures, this analysis provides a new perspective on the nature
of income risk. Here, I provide information on each of the groups’income developments
based on the primary characteristics.
The development of wage rates across workers provides evidence for the gender pay gap.
Considering the weekly wage premium between men and women indicates a marginally
increasing trend (see Table 2.1). Over the last two decades, inequality in male earnings
for the UK has increased. This is partly due to an increase in the male hourly wage
inequality, driven by a fall in the number of hours worked by men on low incomes (Shin
and Solon, 2010; Jenkins, 2018; Coutler, 2018). Female earnings inequality has decreased
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across the vast majority of the distribution as inequality in the number of hours worked
has fallen (Belfield et al., 2017). The gender pay gap among full-time employees stands
at 8.9 per cent which indicates a decline of only 0.6 percentage points since 2012 (Smith,
2019), although it is the lowest since 1997, when the gender pay gap was 17.4 per cent
(Smith, 2019). There is also evidence of an age effect related to the gender pay gap. A
woman’s wage does not tend to rise with age and work experience. Instead, hourly wages
for women reach their peak in the early thirties age group and decrease for each subsequent
age group. Only women with high levels of educational qualifications combined with a
career in the public sector indicate a strong ‘career progression’in wages (Heathcote et
al., 2014; Gardiner, 2018).
Marital status and family planning of individuals influence their employment choice.
This in turn, affects the labour market mobility between married and single individuals.
Married individuals tend to opt for an occupation with a more stable income compared
to single individuals (Choi and Valladares-Esteban, 2015; Ejrnæs and Jørgensen, 2020).
Family planning is a key factor that contributes to the need for more stable employment
among married workers. Further, post-childbirth women lose labour market experience as
they temporarily drop out of the labour market. In addition, when these women return to
the labour market, they tend to work in part-time positions. Part-time work offers moth-
ers more flexibility. However, it also tends to reinforce the gender pay gap due to the lack
of wage growth. This lack of wage growth is associated with less training, less skill accu-
mulation over time and lower informal networking opportunities and promotions (Joyce,
2018). From a researcher’s standpoint, it is unclear whether the part-time occupation
is based on choice or the lack of alternative options. As a result, the income inequality
by gender is characterised by distinct payment and progression rates associated with em-
ployment status patterns. Therefore, this chapter uses a detailed group decomposition
approach to examine the dispersion of income risk based on gender.
The British labour market is also shaped by income inequalities related to a worker’s
ethnic background. The disadvantage for individuals across Black Asian and minority
ethnicity (BAME) is reflected in lower income and occupation immobility compared to
White individuals. The literature refers to this type of inequality as the ethnic minority
ratio (Catney and Sabater, 2015; ONS, 2020). Hill et al., (2018) observes that individuals
of ‘African’ ethnicity are the most likely to have a weekly income of less than £ 400
compared to White individuals (Finch, 2017). These income differences are mainly related
to the occupational distribution. Individuals of BAME backgrounds are under-represented
in high- and mid-skilled jobs (ONS, 2020). They are more likely to be employed in
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part-time, low-income employment and self-employment (see Appendix B). The UKHLS
data indicates a clear trend of the wage premium between Non-White/BAME and White
individuals (see Table 2.1). The ethnic inequalities in the labour market play a major
part in the high poverty rates among some ethnic minority groups (Catney and Sabater,
2015). The differing experiences between ethnic groups in labour market participation
lead to questions on their exposure to income risk. Consequently, this chapter focuses on
income risk dispersion based on ethnicity.
In recent years, the UK labour market has undergone changes with respect to types of
employment. The British labour market has experienced an increase in self-employment
and part-time work. Since the Great Financial Crisis, the rise in the share of self-employed
workers has increased to 14 per cent in the British labour market (Giupponi and Xu, 2020).
This has contributed to the growth in non-traditional employment forms, and also to the
growth in overall employment. However, the average gross income of solo or single self-
employed individuals 1 in 2018 was 30 per cent lower compared to employees (Giupponi
and Xu, 2020). Moreover, since 2013, the share of part-time workers and workers with a
zero-hours contract has increased by around a quarter of the UK workforce (Clegg, 2019).
As a consequence, in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, employment has shifted
towards part-time employment and self-employment.
The geographical location contributes to income inequality in the UK. In 2018, median
workplace-based earnings in predominantly urban areas (excluding London) were £ 22,900,
while in predominantly rural areas they were slightly lower at £ 21,400 (Finch, 2018; ONS,
2018). Urban residents earn more on average than people living in rural areas. As a result,
a clear income difference based on the urban-rural classification can be observed. In
contrast, the income inequality trends related to local authorities in the United Kingdom
are inconclusive. Hill et al., (2010) and the ONS Report (2018) do not find a clear pattern
between regional allocations. The UKHLS data indicates an increasing trend in the wage
premium between urban and rural individuals revealing that geographical classification
contributes to the income divide (see Table 2.1). London is a key city which shows higher
income inequality compared to other cities in the UK. Notably, earnings inequality has
increased faster in London over the last decade than anywhere else in the UK (Hill et al.,
2010).
The development of the UK economy needs be taken into account when discussing
the heterogeneity of income risk, as the thesis focuses on the period from 2009 to 2018.
1This term refers to sole traders or company owner-managers without employees (Giupponi and Xu,
2020).
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The UK’s ‘Great Recession’, beginning in 2007/2008, was characterised by sharp falls in
real wages and productivity, alongside evidence of growing labour market polarisation.
Unemployment in the UK rose from 5.1 per cent in early 2008 to a recessionary high
of eight per cent in early 2010 (ONS, 2017). It was also accompanied by a sharp and
prolonged drop in gross domestic product (GDP), by six per cent from 2008 to 2009. On
the other hand, there was a growth in part-time jobs and in self-employment (Coutler,
2018; Clegg, 2019; Giupponi and Xu, 2020). Further, the literature highlights the role
of income risk during the business cycle. The current evidence indicates that during
recessions adverse income risk rises in magnitude (Guvenen et al., 2014).
Despite the seeming improvements in terms of the reduction in income inequality in the
UK shown by the ONS Report (2019) and Family Resources Survey Report (2019), current
evidence indicates that income inequality affects individuals unevenly, although reflecting
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, marital status and geographical location (see
Table 2.1). This chapter compares the patterns of income risk across individuals. It does
not consider patterns within groups.














1 0.6698 0.9554 0.8713 0.9666
2 0.6648 0.9205 0.8599 0.9582
3 0.6687 0.8809 0.8495 0.9717
4 0.6662 0.9299 0.8554 0.9714
5 0.6676 0.9271 0.8409 0.9559
6 0.6598 0.9620 0.8345 0.9820
7 0.6773 0.9401 0.8248 0.9930
8 0.6725 0.9488 0.8299 0.9653
9 0.6753 0.8990 0.8308 0.9765
Based on net income of UKHLS, own calculations.
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2.2.2 Income Risk Heterogeneity
This section reviews the empirical work related to income risk heterogeneity. The PIH
offers a framework to analyse the heterogeneity of gross and net income risk based on social
and demographic factors. Its key characteristics are based on the notion of consumption
smoothing and the decomposition of the income process into permanent and transitory
components (see eq. (1.2) and (1.3) in chapter 1).
A key concern of the UK government is the development of income inequality. Recent
evidence in the ONS Report (ONS, 2018) indicates a gradual decline in income inequality
over the past decade and the Family Resources Survey indicates an improvement in gender
income inequality, for example, in the gender pay gap since 2010 (FRS , 2017; Jenkins,
2011; ONS, 2017). However, it is not only the average income inequality that might affect
an individual’s welfare, but also their exposure to income variation. If individuals have a
low income, this does not imply that their exposure to income risk is also low. Their low
income might make these individuals more exposed to adverse income shocks (Gorbachev,
2011; Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 1994; Jenkins et al., 2011). Having a precise measure of
income variation is essential to assess the degree of the loss in wellbeing associated with
income risks (Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 1994; Jenkins et al., 2011).
The group-specific analysis offers a tool to examine the heterogeneity of income risk
across British individuals. The majority of the literature discusses dispersion in earnings
risk amongst men in the USA2. Empirical evidence in the literature relating to the UK,
such as Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Belfield (2017) and Dickens (2009), focuses on
analysis of general trends in earnings risks to explain income inequality. To date, it is not
well understood how income risk is distributed across British individuals in relation to
social and demographic factors. This chapter contributes to the literature with a detailed
analysis of these factors on the heterogeneity of gross and net income risk in the UK.
The PIH combines income risks with income inequality. Income inequality reflects the
variance in the distribution of incomes in a specific period. The income risk is measured as
the variance in permanent and transitory income shocks. For a given set of individuals,
the variance in incomes in a specific period depends on the shocks to the permanent
component that individuals have experienced in the past combined with transitory shocks
2This body of work includes Lillard and Willard (1976), MaCurdy (1982), Hall and Mishkin (1982),
Topel and Ward (1992), Deaton and Paxson (1994), Gottschalk and Moffi t (1994), Altonji et al. (2003),
Storesletten et al. (2004), Guvenen (2006), Krueger and Perri (2006), Heathcote et al. ( 2007), Blundell
et al. (2008), Sabelhaus and Song (2009; 2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010)
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within the respective period. The former implies that for this set of individuals the
cross-section variance (income inequality) of income increases over time, while the latter
affects only the ordering of the individuals within the income distribution in the specific
period (income mobility) (Blundell and Preston, 1998; Jenkins, 2005). Permanent income
shocks are associated with structural changes in the labour market such as the decline in
unionisation, the decline in regulation, general increases in competition within industries,
the decline in blue-collar manufacturing jobs and the increased reliance on part-time and
contingent work arrangements (Gottschalk and Moffi tt, 1994, 2009; Haider, 2001; Keys,
2008; Heathcote et al., 2010; Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger, 2011; Dynan, Elmendorf, and
Sichel, 2012; Western, Bloome, Sosnaud, and Tach, 2016). The increase in the permanent
income variance is considered to be a contributory factor in the rise in income inequality
between 1975 and the end of the 1980s in the UK (see Chapter 1 for more details).
The literature has established that the level of education and income are key factors
influencing income risk. The higher the education level, the higher the returns to educa-
tion. As a result of the higher income associated with the education level, individuals can
smooth adverse income shocks across time. In contrast, individuals with low incomes face
financial constraints. A large body of work focuses on the link between income variation
and education combined with income levels. Moffi tt and Gottschalk (1994, 2011) studied
the trends in male earnings from the 1970s and 1980s in the USA. They analysed occu-
pational differences based on the sector worked in and union membership. In particular,
increases in between-job instability have been large for less educated, Non-White, and
private sector workers (Jaeger and Stevens, 1999). Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). find a
difference in the variance of income shocks based on educational background, underpin-
ning evidence of stratification related to income shock exposure. Similarly, Angelopoulos
et al. (2017) show that private and public insurance mechanisms against an increase in
idiosyncratic risk are less effective for households with no university degree. Yet, the lit-
erature lacks a detailed group decomposition across social factors. This chapter provides
an in-depth decomposition to analyse income heterogeneity.
The key contribution refers to the dynamics of income risk and the general tax and
benefit system. In contrast to welfare policies designed against low wage realisations
such as Universal Credit, workers automatically contribute through taxes and benefit
payments to the system. In particular, benefits enable individuals to smooth adverse
income shocks across time. Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) refer to an explicit insurance
mechanism. In contrast, taxes reduce income volatility, thereby constituting an indirect
measure against adverse income shocks. The effects of the tax-benefit social insurance
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system in mitigating adverse income shocks has been demonstrated in work by Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) for the UK and in Domeij and Flodén (2010) for Sweden. The
British tax-benefit system indicates that benefits mitigate adverse income shocks more
extensively than taxes (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Belfield et al., 2017; Avram et
al.,2019; Angelopoulos et al., 2020). To understand the income risk-mitigating impact of
the British tax and benefit system, I distinguish separate types of income, such as gross
income, income with benefits, income minus taxes and net income. My findings are in
line with the empirical evidence of the literature.
A large body of work discusses income risk based on male earnings. The widespread
availability of data has led to the main focus on income risk of men3. This perspective has
widened with the examination of income inequality. Studies document average income
levels and changes in the level of income based on several income indicators across men and
women, such as Heathcote et al. (2010) for the USA and Domeij Flodén (2010) for Sweden
and USA, and Angelopoulos et al. (2019) for the UK. Also within the analysis of family
insurance, income risk for women plays a key role (Mandel and Stier, 2009; DeNardi et al.,
2019). The findings suggest that female income risk differs amongst women depending on
the presence of children and motherhood. Evidence is sparse on income risk heterogeneity
by gender in the UK. To date, the only study that features female income risk for the UK
is Angelopoulos et al .(2017), and Belfield et al. (2017) emphasise the role of female labour
market participation in the reduction of household income risk. This thesis contributes
to the discussion by offering new evidence on individual gross and net income risk that
focuses on gender differences.
A small body of work discusses the link between income risk and ethnicity. One of the
first papers on gross income risk, Lillard and Willis (1978), focuses on ethnic backgrounds
in the USA, finding that the permanent income shock for African-American individuals
is about 44 per cent larger than for White individuals. More recently, the literature
examines the growing gaps in household income risk. The evidence suggests that ethnic
minorities encounter higher levels of income change, which creates more income variation
(Banerjee, 2009). In particular, the evidence suggests that Black and Hispanic households
have insuffi cient savings or assets to buffer against income changes (Jaeger and Stevens,
1999; Hamilton and Darity, 2017; Darity et al., 2018; Gibson-Davis and Percheski, 2018).
Thus, the limited empirical evidence indicates an uneven dispersion of gross income risk
3Research that focuses on male income risk in earnings: Lilliard and Willis (1976), McCurdy (1984),
Deaton and Paxson (1994), Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994), Blundell and Preston (1998), Dickens (2000),
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Ramos (2003,2006), Blundell et al. (2008), Blundell, Low and Preston
(2013), Bush and Ludwig (2020), Pruit and Turner (2020).
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based on ethnicity. Further, to date, there is no evidence on income risk dispersion in
the UK. This chapter adds to the literature by examining the income risk heterogeneity
based on ethnicity.
The geographic location of individuals also influences income risk. The nature of the
work, such as seasonal work in rural areas, may lead to income fluctuation and, in turn,
a higher level of income volatility. Moreover, institutional changes are also reflected in
geographical dimensions. Fuchs and Schündeln et al. (2010) find a considerable difference
associated with the geographical location. They observe that income shocks in East
and West Germany developed in different ways. Since the reunification of Germany, the
earnings risk findings show a modest rise (Bach et al., 2007; Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2010).
Consequently, the geographical location associated with the type of employment offered
or the institutional framework might influence the level of income risk. To date, an in
depth income risk analysis based on the geographical location does not exist in the UK.
The majority of the empirical literature focuses on how income risk contributes to the
development of income inequality. The evidence identifies key drivers such as low levels
of education and income as contributors to the level of income risk. Within this debate
the literature discusses sources of income risk, the distinction between the permanent
and transitory income shocks and their subsequent impact on consumption choices (see,
for example Lillie and Willis, 1978; MaCurdy, 1982; Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Blundell
and Preston, 1998; Ramos, 2003; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Blundell et al., 2008;
Blundell et al., 2013; Heathcote et al., 2010; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). The findings of
this chapter complement existing work, including Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Dickens
(2000), Heathcote et al. (2010), Jenkins (1995, 2005), Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2012) and
Belfield et al. (2017), by decomposing changes in the distribution of income in the UK.
To date, the literature offers sparse analysis on the heterogeneity of income risk based on
a wide range of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The key contribution of
this chapter is a detailed analysis of the heterogeneity of income risk.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample Selection
The analysis is based on the UKHLS dataset. The original sample of the dataset needs
modifications to match the requirements of the analysis. I keep only individuals with full
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interviews, and remove incomplete interviews. As a consequence, the sample maintains
consistent information of individuals across each wave. I concentrate on individuals in
the labour market with a positive income. Consequently, in any wave, individuals aged
between 25 to 60 years are included, in line with current research that defines the working
age to be between 25 to 60 years, as, after the age of 25, most individuals have completed
their education (e.g. postgraduate), and the usual retirement age for individuals is around
the age of 60. Although one can find a variety of income changes after the retirement
age, these income changes rarely stem from labour income uncertainty. Thus, I follow the
related literature and create an age band from 25 to 60 (Blundell and Etheridge, 2010;
Guvenen et al., 2010; Heathcote et al., 2010; Busch et al., 2018).
To analyse the individual group heterogeneity, I split each of the samples based on the
six subgroups: gender, ethnicity, marital status, parenthood, urban-rural classification
and employment status. The decomposition of the samples enables me to examine the
heterogeneity of income risk in distinct income types. Moreover, I construct cohort bands
to account for fixed effects in the level identification scheme, and I also separate the
sample into three age cohorts according to when the individuals turn 25 and enter the
labour market, namely: below or equal to 1990 (Cohort 1), 1991 to 2000 (Cohort 2), and
above or equal to 2001 (Cohort 3). The number of cohorts is dictated by the size of the
sample.
I drop all imputed income variables. The measure of gross and net income is usual
weekly wages, and the weekly wage is defined as the multiplication of typical monthly
wages by 12, and then divided by 52 weeks. This approach is used for each of the four
income types. It is a precise measure of income applied in related literature (Heathcote
et al., 2010). The panel structure of the survey and its additional information are the
foundation for the examination focusing on heterogeneity in income risk across British
individuals.
Four income types are considered in analysing income risk. These are differentiated by
separating the distinct components from gross income to net income based on taxes and
benefits. The analysis follows the structure of the dataset in incorporating the tax and
benefit components such as income tax and child benefits. The differentiation by income
type enables the examination of income risk mitigation through the tax and benefit system
(see Appendix B for more details on the income variables). Unfortunately, the UKHLS
does not provide enough information to allow for analytical decomposition of the various
sub-components of taxes and benefits.
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The income variables are deflated using the retail price index (RPI), and I trim the top
and bottom of the observations of wages in any wave by 0.25 per cent, to deal with possible
outliers in recorded wages and ensure robust results. These changes to the original sample
construct a homogeneous sample of individuals, who are observed across all waves, and
are of interest for the analysis.
2.3.2 Variables
This section describes the key variables of this income risk analysis. I create several
dummy variables such as education and region, based on the original sample. The UKHLS
reports the education bands as follows: ’University degree’, ’A-levels O-levels or appren-
ticeship’, and ’No degree’.
I also construct a regional variable based on the regions of the UK: North-East, North-
West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, Lon-
don, South-East, South-West, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The geographical
areas ‘urban’and ‘rural’are separate variables, also provided by the dataset. Whether
an individual is married or single is reflected in the marital status variable. The mari-
tal status group is designated by a binary dummy variable ’married’and ’single’. The
group of single individuals includes those who are divorced, widowed or single, while the
married group includes i) married couples, ii)civil partnerships, and iii) couples living to-
gether. The marital status variable is pooled into a binary dummy variable as otherwise
the sample size would have been too small to examine (see Table B2.3).
The parent variable reflects whether an individual has children. These include biolog-
ical and adopted children. Individuals who have a child and those who do are considered.
The sample size for individuals with more than three children is small. Therefore, I con-
struct a binary variable ’Parent’and ’Non-Parent’. Also, full-time working individuals
and part-time working individuals are based on an already constructed variable from the
original dataset. Full-time working individuals are classified as those working equal to
or above 30 hours (or 25 or more for the teaching professions). Part-time working indi-
viduals are those with an hourly workload of below 30 hours per week. In addition, the
variables ’employed’and ’self-employed’are formed based on the existing classification
of the UKHLS. Thus, the ’employed’variable refers to an individual who works for an
employer. Self-employed individuals can either be single self-employed, which means that
they are the sole trader of the company without employees or the head of a company with
employees. The education group reflects the level of qualification achieved. It is based on
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a binary dummy variable that refers to i) university degree holders and ii) non-university
degree holders. These former is an indication for high levels of education qualifications,
while the latter one indicates low level of education qualifications. Non-university degree
includes the following educatioun qualifications. A-level, GCSE and other qualifications.
These are based on the existing information on education in the UKHLS sample.
The ethnicity variable is constructed based on ethnic background, provided by the
survey and supported by the EMBS. The UKHLS provides data on the following ethnic
groups: Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Caribbean, and African within the sampled areas.
Within the UKHLS framework the ethnicity refers to individuals reporting a related
person (e.g. their parents or grandparents) coming from the same ethnic group. On this
basis, a dummy variable is constructed: ’White’, to include individuals from a British, and
Northern Irish ethnicity; ‘Non-White’to include Asian, African, Arabic, and Caribbean




This section describes the model used in this analysis. It follows the approach by Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) and Heathcote et al., (2010), who analyse trends in income dynamics
in the UK and the USA respectively. I focus on the UK, using panel data from the
UKHLS over the time horizon from 2009 to 2018. In line with the literature, I analyse the
’residual’dispersion (Brzozowski et al., (2010), Fuchs-Schündeln et al., (2010), Heathcote
et al., (2010)). In this chapter I focus on individuals.
I consider individual log gross and net income, ygi,c,t, for an individual i, belonging to
a cohort c and population subgroup g, and observed in year t. I assume the following
model




which means that the log gross and net income consist of a determinist (or explained
by observables) linear part βgXi,c,t and a residual (unexplained or idiosyncratic) part u
g
i,c,t.
Xi,c,t includes a constant term, a quadratic in experience approximated by age, dummies
for region of residence, dummy for gender, dummy for marital status and time fixed
effects. The superscript g denotes the 8 subgroups defined by the combination of three
variables: sex (men and women), ethnicity (White and Non-White), education (degree
holders or not).4 Moreover, I consider three cohorts. Controlling for the observables
captures the idea that expected changes to income do not represent risk (see Japelli and
Pistaferri, 2017). The idea is to examine the heterogeneity of income shocks based on
certain characteristics. In doing so, I also examine different income types such as gross
income, net income, income with benefits and income minus taxes. The differentiation by
income type enables me to examine possible insurance mechanisms through the tax and
benefit system.
The key interest concerns the patterns in the group-specific decomposition namely,
gender and ethnicity. The results for the entire sample reflect the ranking of the gender
4Analytically, the 8 subgroups are: i) male, degree, White; ii) male, degree, Non-White; iii) male, no
degree, White; iv) male, no degree, Non-White; v) female, degree, White; vi) female, degree, Non-White;
vii) female, no degree, White; viii) female, no degree, Non-White.
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and ethnicity decomposition, supporting the robustness of the results (see Appendix B2).
The income shock exposure holds across both identification schemes (see Appendix B2).
Additionally, I also implement a robustness test based on employment status. The
robustness test exercise, uses the same approach with a different Mincerian regression
also controlling for employment status (ftpti,c,t) as a full-time or part-time working in-
dividual (Mincer, 1974). This implies that working full-time or part-time is a choice. It
contrasts the Mincerian regression in eq. (2.1), which represents the employment status
as an income shock. The results indicate the same findings in the dispersion of income
risk. Consequently, the income risk heterogeneity estimates across British individuals are
robust.
I further assume that the residual term, ugi,c,t, consists of two components, a perma-
nent component, pgi,c,t, and a transitory component, ε
g
i,c,t; the permanent component is
a random walk while the transitory component is purely a i.i.d shock. In addition, the
two components are additive (in logs). The formal expression of ugi,c,t, can be found in
Chapter 1, Section 1.4.
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2.5 Results and Discussion
The key contribution of this chapter focuses the heterogeneity of individual gross and
net income risk in the UK. The findings provide evidence of income risk heterogeneity
across individuals based on specific socioeconomic and demographic factors. The esti-
mates indicate an uneven distribution of income risk across UK individuals. The group
decomposition reveals that particularly women face higher levels of individual gross and
net income risk compared to men. Women are five times as likely to face an adverse
income shock of 20 per cent compared to men. The resulting adverse income shocks are
associated with a decrease in wellbeing. Similarly, Non-White individuals indicate a 1.1.
percentage point higher likelihood of a 20 per cent adverse income shock compared to
White individuals. Yet, the difference in permanent income risk based on ethnicity is
not as significant as that based on gender. The approach to examining the impact of
income risks reflects the utility welfare loss and likelihood of adverse permanent income
shocks (see Section 1.5 for more details). This analysis reveals new patterns of income
risk heterogeneity in the UK.
The following section reports the results and discusses the key findings and their
economic implications. Of particular interest are the results of the group-specific decom-
position of the permanent and transitory income shock estimates. I use the residuals of
the regressions and specify the income process that allows for temporary and permanent
income shocks. I focus on the group heterogeneity estimated in the level identification
scheme as this contains more data. The results of the first difference identification are
used as a robustness check, as they report the same income risk patterns. I exploit the
variance and covariance structure to disentangle the transitory and permanent income
shock as seen in Chapter 1. Individual income risk estimates are obtained by firstly using
a standard Mincerian regression for each fixed subgroup based on gender, education and
ethnicity (see Section 2.4.1) (Mincer, 1974). In each regression, I control for all observable
factors and an additional time dummy as seen in eq. (2.1). The results for the entire
UK sample and the identification scheme in first differences indicate the same findings in
the distribution of income risk, which provides evidence that the results are robust (see
Section 2.5.3 and Appendix B for robustness checks).
Moreover, I calculate the risk ratio based on the levels of income risk on gender and
ethnicity. The risk ratio is defined as the ratio of the permanent income shocks based on
gender (women and men) and ethnicity (Non-White and White individuals). It expresses
the differences and the degree of income variation between the respective groups. A high
51
level of risk ratio indicates a high degree of permanent income shocks resulting in higher
income variation. In contrast, a low risk ratio indicates few permanent income shocks
indicating income stability. It therefore serves as an indicator of income variation related
to permanent income shocks and endorses the economic relevance of this chapter.
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2.5.1 Results: Income Risk based on Gender
This section focuses on income risk patterns based on gender 5. In doing so, it provides a
thorough review of individual income risk based on group characteristics. It also explores
the income risk pattern across distinct income types. The income risk estimates in Table
2.2 show that women encounter higher levels permanent income shock variance compared
to men. However, men are more exposed to higher levels of transitory income shocks
relative to women (see Table 2.2). Thus, a distinct pattern in the level of income risk
across gender can be observed.
Further, the group decomposition based on income types in Table 2.2 indicates different
levels of income risk across men and women. In particular, it provides evidence for distinct
income risk mitigation effects based on taxes and benefits. The estimates show that
income with benefits decreases the level of income risk more than income minus taxes.
The size of the income risk mitigation depends on gender as comparing income across
the income types shows. The respective differences from gross income to net income are,
σ2
εWoment
= 0.0300 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0205 and for σ2
εMent
= 0.0100 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.0080. The
risk ratio decreases from 2.4 to 2.3 comparing gross and net income (see Table 2.2). In
addition, the permanent risk estimates between women and men are significantly different
at the 90 per cent confidence interval. Thus, the key finding is a gender difference in
income risk that translates from gross income into net income, as women face higher
income risk compared to men.
Further, the results in Table 2.2 indicate a reduction in income risk from gross to net
income, however the heterogeneity of income risk is observed in net income risk. Therefore,
the second finding is that benefit and taxes insure individuals differently against adverse
income shocks. Benefits have a stronger insurance mechanism as they show a lower
risk ratio of the permanent income shock variance. The results in Table 2.2 show that
through benefits and taxes income risk is decreases by, σ2
εWoment
= 0.03 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.03
for women and by, σ2
εMent
= 0.01 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.008 for men. The insurance dynamics of
taxes and benefits are in line with Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) and Avram et al. (2019).
Overall, the results in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 indicate an insurance induced by taxes
and benefits, which depends on gender. In particular, when considering the difference in
the levels of permanent income shocks, (σ2ζ,t) highlights the difference based on gender.
Women encounter less income risk reduction through the tax and benefit system than
5Appendix F gives the results for the entire UK sample, which indicates the same group- specific
ranking as the ethnicity decomposition. It shows that the results are robust.
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men. As a result, Table 2.2 reveals an income risk heterogeneity based on gender that
translates from gross to net income risk.


















Gross Income 0.1316∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0893∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 2.4∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Income plus Benefits 0.1137∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0020)
Income minus Taxes 0.1201∗∗∗ 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0019)
Net Income 0.1016∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0793∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Sample Size 94,785 78,327
Notes: Table 2.2 shows the gross and net income risk based on gender.
Individual Income Types; The estimation is based on the level estimation method; The bootstrap
standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses; The risk
ratio is based on σ2ζ,t; p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01.
The difference in permanent and transitory net income shock variances from 2010 to
2017 is shown in Figure 2.2. The estimates in Figure 2.2 support the average income
shocks based on gender, highlighting that the levels of permanent income shock variance
are higher for women than for men. The high permanent income shock for women can be
related to their low-income profile and their employment status.
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Figure 2.2: Net Individual Income Risk based on Gender
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Notes: Figure 2.2.shows that Women face higher levels of transitory and permanent income shocks
compared to men from 2010 until 2017.
55
Gender Decomposition
This section analyses the gender difference for net income risk based on a detailed group
decomposition in Table 2.3 to.2.6 and Figure 2.2. Thus, I examine the level of income
risk across men and women based on, ethnicity, marital status, parenthood, urban-rural
classification, and employment status. Appendix B indicates the results for the entire UK
sample and for the estimation in first differences. The results in Appendix B indicate the
same group-specific ranking as the gender decomposition in first-differences, showing that
the results are robust.
The estimates of the gender breakdown in Table 2.3 to 2.6 and Figure 2.2 show that
men and women face different levels of income risks. Women encounter higher degrees
of permanent income shocks in each subgroup. For some subgroups such as geographical
location gender independent patterns are reported. The high permanent income shock
of women may be related to their low employment status, income profile, the economic
situation in the UK between 2009 and 2018, and low progression rates for women (for
details, see discussion). As a consequence the findings indicate a net income risk hetero-
geneity based on gender. Further, the gross income risk estimates in Appendix Tables
B2.11 − B2.12 provide evidence for the same income risk heterogeneity based on the
subgroups.
The decomposition by ethnicity indicates marginal differences. The results in Table
2.3 show that men and women of Non-White ethnicity encounter marginally higher levels
of income risks, compared to White individuals. The estimates indicate an income risk
heterogeneity based on ethnicity for both men and women. The average estimates for
men of Non-White ethnicity reveal higher income shock variances compared to men of
White ethnicity, with the respective differences being, σ2
εMent
= 0.0150 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.0017.





= 0.0014. This also reflects existing labour market challenges faced by
individuals with Non-White ethnicity (Catney and Sabater, 2015; Hill et al., 2010; ONS,
2018).
Table 2.3 provides evidence regarding net income risk difference based on marital sta-
tus. Married individuals face considerably lower levels of net income risk compared to
single individuals. The average estimates for men show lower permanent income shock
variances, with the respective differences being, σ2
εMent
= 0.0874 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.0038
between married and single men. Similarly, the results show that married women face
higher levels of permanent income shock, compared to their single counterparts, with the
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respective differences being, σ2
εWoment
= 0.0191 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0034. The risk ratio un-
derpins the gender differences based on marital status. Married women face considerably
higher permanent income shocks compared to married men, as the risk ratio indicates:
Women
Men
= 1.6. The estimates indicate net income risk heterogeneity related to the marital
status of individuals. Single individuals may have higher labour market mobility com-
pared to married couples (Becker, 1973; Guner, Kulikova and Valladares-Esteban, 2015;
Gardiner, 2017). Moreover, the combined income of married couples might represent
private insurance against income shocks.
Table 2.4 provides evidence regarding net income risk heterogeneity based on education
across gender. Individuals with a university degree face increased income risks compared
to individuals with no university degree. The findings complement evidence on the role
of education and income risk in the literature such Angelopoulos et al. (2019). In addi-
tion, the results also indicate a difference based on gender. High educated women with a
university degree encounter increased transitory and permanent income shock variances





= 0.0113 (see Table 2.4). Also,non-university degree male individuals
encounter lower transitory and permanent income shock variances compared to their





= 0.0156 (see Table 2.4). The risk ratio reflects the income variation based
on gender for a university degree with Women
Men




The net income risk estimates indicate a difference based on parenthood. Parents face
higher levels of income shocks compared to Non-Parents, as per the estimates in Table
2.5. The average income risk estimates for fathers indicate higher income shock variances





= 0.0094 (see Table 2.5). The same pattern can be observed for mothers,
with the respective differences being, σ2
εWoment
= 0.0605 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0105. The risk
ratio is higher for Non-Parents with Women
Men
= 1.5, emphasising higher income variation.
The higher risk ratio for Non-Parents may be related to the income mobility individuals
without children have, compared to parents. Parents tend to choose employment with
higher income stability. Yet, the presence of children also contributes to income variation,
which reflects in the relatively higher income risk for parents, irrespective of their gender
(ONS, 2018)
Results based on where individuals are located reveal a regional income shock differ-
ence for both women and men (see Table 2.5). The average estimates for men living in
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a rural area indicate higher levels of income risk compared to men living in urban areas,
with the respective differences being, σ2
εMent
= 0.0072 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.0052. Women living
in rural areas also face higher income shocks compared to women living in urban areas.
The regional difference for women is, respectively, σ2
εWoment
= 0.0032 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0022.
Thus, rural living individuals face higher levels of net income risks compared to urban
living individuals irrespective of their gender. The level of net income risk exposure based
on gender might differ marginally, but the results indicate a regional net income risk het-
erogeneity. Rural-living men and women encounter higher net income risks, resulting in
an net income risk heterogeneity, based on the urban-rural classification. Seasonal work
dependence is a factor that contributes to the difference in net income risk for urban and
rural- living individuals (Finch, 2017).
Part-time working individuals face higher income shocks than full-time working in-
dividuals, and this is the case for both men and women (see Table 2.6). The average
variance estimates of employment status indicate a higher transitory income shock vari-
ance, compared the permanent income shock for both men and women (see Table 2.6).
The average estimates for part-time working men report higher income shock variances





= 0.0087. Similar findings are identified for women, with results showing that
part-time working women face higher income shock variances compared to full-time work-





The risk ratio based on employment status is higher for part-time workers Women
Men
= 1.3
compared to full-time employed Women
Men
= 1.1.
Employment status estimates indicate a clear pattern, in which part-time workers face
a higher net income risk than full-time workers. In particular, the income risk based on
employment status are higher for women. The heightened net income risk for part-time
working individuals may indicate differences in wage flexibility, and higher levels of net
income risk exposure related to lifestyle (Hill et al., 2010).
Similar patterns can be observed for self-employed and employed individuals. Self-
employed individuals encounter higher levels of income risk compared to employed indi-
viduals, and this is the case for both men and women. The average estimates for self-
employed working men report that they face higher income shock variances compared to
employed men, with the respective differences being, σ2
εMent
= 0.1294 and σ2
ζMent
= 0.0035
(see Table 2.6). The results show that self-employed women face higher income shock
variances compared to employed working women, with the respective differences being,
σ2
εWoment
= 0.1012 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0119. Employment status indicates a clear pattern
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in which self-employed workers face significantly higher levels of net income risk than
employed workers, supported by a high risk ratio Women
Men
= 1.8 compared to employed
individuals with a considerably lower risk ratio Women
Men
= 1.3.
The results indicate heterogeneity in net income risk related to employment status,
as the differences indicate higher levels of income risk for women. This may reflect the
fact that self-employed individuals bear the entire income risk. This is not the case for
employed individuals, who encounter less income risk by the nature of their employment
status (Gash, 2008).
59



















White 0.0992∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0024)
Sample Size 78,801 65,947
Non-White 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0080) (0.0028)
Sample Size 15,331 11,680
Marital Status
Married 0.1121∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0893∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Sample Size 63,657 56,104
Single 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.1767∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0012) (0 .0034) (0.0044)
Sample Size 30,983 22,126
Notes: Table 2.3 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on gender.
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01.
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University Degree 0.1163∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0054) (0.0091)
Sample Size 26,113 21,314
Non-University Degree 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0757∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 2.8∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0012)
Sample Size 56,096 47,049
Notes: Table 2.4 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on gender.
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01.
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Parent 0.1529∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.1577∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0086) (0.0091)
Sample Size 46,386 32,781
Non-Parent 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Sample Size 48,399 45,546
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 0.1017∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.1007∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Sample Size 74,095 61,101
Rural 0.0985∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.1079∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0 .0082)
Sample Size 20,690 17,226
Notes: Table 2.5 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on gender; Individual Net Income;
The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01.
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Full-time 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Sample Size 43,350 57,771
Part-Time 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0698∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0031)
Sample Size 24,135 5,598
Employed 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0023)
Sample Size 62,861 55,044
Self-Employed 0.1650∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.1795∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0086) (0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0038)
Sample Size 5,080 8,674
Notes: Table 2.6 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on gender.
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01.
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Discussion: Gender Decomposition
This section discusses the implications associated with the gender decomposition per-
taining to income risk. I consider the impact of one standard deviation change in the
permanent income shock (see Table 2.7), and its effect on the utility welfare loss. The
estimates in Table 2.3-2.6 and Figure 2.2 show that women have on average a higher
variance in permanent income shocks, compared to men. In addition, Table 2.7 indicates
a lower welfare loss for men at a 1.88 per cent utility welfare loss, compared to women
at 3.19 per cent. The results reveal a net income risk heterogeneity based on gender (see
Table 2.7).
Another way to quantify permanent income shocks is by expressing them in terms of
probabilities, as in Table 2.8. The probabilities of income gains and losses indicate the
size of permanent income shocks based on gender in Table 2.8. It shows the likelihood of
facing a 20 or 50 per cent positive or negative income shock. The results indicate that
women are 7.9 per cent likely to face an income loss of 20 per cent due to an adverse
income shock, whereas the corresponding figure for men is only 1.5 per cent. Thus the
likelihood of women facing an adverse income shock of 20 per cent is almost five times
that of men.
The heterogeneity of income risk based on group decomposition reveals an uneven dis-
persion of income risk. This also translates from net income into net income risk patterns.
The results in Table 2.7 show that men face a higher reduction in individual income risk
than women. Considering the different income risk types, it is evident that taxes and ben-
efits mitigate adverse income shocks to differing degree. The findings support Kniesner
and Ziliak’s (2002) approach.
Factor that likely related to the education attainment is marital choice and family
planning. Women with more education are the least likely to marry and are less likely to
have children. The literature shows that the marriage gap has eroded as the returns to
marriage have changed (Isen and Stevenson, 2010; Choi and Valladares-Esteban, 2015).
Marriage and remarriage rates have risen for women with a college degree relative to
women with fewer years of education. However, the patterns of, and reasons for, marriage
have changed. College educated women marry later, have fewer children, are less likely to
view marriage as ’financial security’, are happier in their marriages and with their family
life, and are not only the least likely to divorce, but have had the biggest decrease in
divorce since the 1970s, compared to women without a college degree. In contrast, there
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have been fewer changes in marital patterns by education for men. The role of marital
choice in mitigating income risk is examined in detail in Chapter 3.
Women face higher income variation based on career disruptions due to child-birth.
Post-child-birth women lose labour market experience as they temporarily drop out of
the labour market. Part-time work offers mothers more flexibility, yet the nature of
the part-time position reinforces the exposure to income risk associated with the lower
wage. The low rate of payment is also combined with a lack of wage growth in part-time
work, associated with less training, less skill accumulation over time and lower informal
networking opportunities and promotions (Mandel and Stier, 2009; Blundell et al. 2016;
Joyce, 2018). The evidence of higher levels of income risk for mothers supports this as
well. As a result, women are more vulnerable to income shocks compared to men. The
higher variance in permanent income shocks also reduces their well-being.
The UK’s ‘great recession’was characterised by sharp falls in real wages and produc-
tivity, alongside evidence of growing labour market polarisation. Unemployment in the
UK rose from 5.1 per cent in early 2008 to a recessionary high of eight per cent in early
2010 (Coutler, 2017; Clegg, 2019). As a measure for counteracting rising unemployment,
part-time and short-time and temporary work increased during the crisis (Coutler, 2017;
Clegg, 2019;). The low-income associated with part-time positions limits the ability to
smooth adverse income shocks for women. The UKHLS data set also indicates that the
majority of women are in part-time employment. The additional rise in part-time work
associated with the recession contributes to the higher variance in permanent income
shocks for women.
The results of this research indicate an income risk heterogeneity based on an indi-
vidual’s gender. Existing policies do not mitigate the difference in the heterogeneity of
income risk across gender. Underlying reasons for the higher income risk for women may
be related to employment status, parenthood, the great recession in the UK, and specific
income variance patterns. The British government should consider the degree of income
risk when developing welfare policies.
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Table 2.7: Utility Welfare Loss, Gender
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
Women 15.80% 3.19%
Men 10.34% 1.88%
Net Individual Income; The loss indicates a one standard
deviation change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent
income shock from one period to the next.
Table 2.8: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Gender
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent
Women Men










income gain>50%: Pr(ζ i,t> ln (1.50)) 0.51% 0.01%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.20)) 12.36% 3.88%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.50)) 0.45% 0.13%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.80)) 7.86% 1.55%
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζ i,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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2.5.2 Results: Income Risk based on Ethnicity
This section reports the dispersion of income risk by focusing on ethnicity in the UK
6. Tables 2.9 to 2.12 and Figure 2.3 report the group decomposition of the levels of
income risk associated with an individual’s ethnic background. The results of the ethnicity
decomposition show that Non-White and White individuals face distinct levels of net
income risk. Non-White individuals encounter slightly higher transitory and permanent
income risks in each group compared to White individuals. The results indicate that
the income risk is also observed in a net income risk heterogeneity. The results support
findings in the literature, which emphasise the challenges existing in the labour market
for individuals of Non-White ethnicity (Finch, 2017; Hill et al., 2010; ONS, 2018). In
addition, for robustness the dispersion of income risk across the subgroups reflect the
patterns in gross income risk (see Appendix B). The ethnicity decomposition did not show
any considerable age effects. Therefore, this decomposition is not part of the discussion
in this section.
The decomposition based on income types in Table 2.9 reveals different levels of income
risk based on ethnicity. Similarly,the decomposition also within the ethnicity framework
regarding taxes and benefits indicates a different income risk mitigation effect. Benefits
have a stronger insurance mechanism as they show a lower risk ratio of the permanent
income shock variance. The results in Table 2.9 show that through benefits and taxes
income risk is decreases by, σ2
εWhitet
= 0.0300 and σ2
ζWhitet
= 0.0054 for White individuals
and by, σ2
ζNon−Whitet
= 0.0100 and σ2
ζNon−Whitet
= 0.0086 for Non-White individuals. The
estimates show that income with benefits decreases the level of income risk compared to
income minus taxes. The findings are in line with Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) and Avram
et al. (2019).
Moreover, the level of income risk mitigation depends on ethnicity as comparing gross
and net income for White and Non-White individuals indicates, with the respective dif-
ferences between gross and net income being, σ2
εWhitet





= 0.0100 and σ2
ζNon−Whitet
= 0.0086. Thus, the results in Table 2.9 indicate
a reduction in income risk from gross to net income. Yet, a difference can be observed
based on ethnicity as Non-White individuals encounter less income risk reduction relative
to White individuals. Further investigation based on the subgroups indicate an income
risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity.
6Appendix F indicates the results for the entire UK sample, which indicates the same group-specific
ranking as the ethnicity decomposition, showing that the results are robust.
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As a consequence, the results in Table 2.9 indicate an insurance induced by taxes and
benefits, which depends on ethnicity. In particular, when considering the difference in the
permanent income shocks (σ2
ζgt
) supports the difference based on ethnicity. Non-White
individuals face less income risk reduction through the tax and benefit system than White
individuals. Thus, the estimates provide evidence of an income risk heterogeneity based
on ethnicity that translates from gross income into net income. The risk ratio decreases
marginally, indicating the same level of income variation across all income types. Further,
the permanent risk estimates between White and Non-White individuals are significantly
different at the 90 per cent confidence interval.
In addition, Figure 2.3 shows the estimates of individual net income risk decomposition
based on ethnicity from 2009 to 2017. It shows that Non-White individuals face marginally
higher levels of income risk during this period.


















Gross Income 0.1031∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.1081∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0080) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Income plus Benefits 0.0932∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0056) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Income minus Taxes 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0998∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0035)
Net Income 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0080) (0.0024)
Sample Size 144,748 27,011
Notes: Table 2.9 shows the gross and net income risk based on ethnicity;
Individual Income Types; The estimation is based on the level estimation method;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t; *significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.3: Net Individual Income Risk based on Ethnicity
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Source: U KH LS, own calculations
Notes: Figure 2.3 shows that Non-White individuals face higher levels of transitory
and permanent income shocks compared with White individuals from 2010 until 2017.
This section analyses the ethnicity difference for net income risk based on a detailed
group decomposition in Table 2.10 and Table 2.12 and Figure 2.3. Thus, I examine
the level of income risk across White and Non-White based on, gender, marital status,
parenthood, urban-rural classification, and employment status. Appendix B indicates the
results for the entire UK sample and for the estimation in first differences. The results
in Appendix B indicate the same group-specific ranking as the ethnicity decomposition,
showing that the results are robust.
The results in Table 2.10 indicate that men and women based on Non-White ethnicity
encounter marginally higher levels of net income risk compared to men and women of
White ethnicity. Comparing the income risk of women of White and Non-White eth-
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nicity, indicates a difference of σ2
εWoment
= 0.0151 and σ2
ζWoment
= 0.0014. Similarly, the





= 0.0017. Yet, the difference between the subgroup of white men and women
reflects the findings we saw in the previous section. The estimates indicate a net income
risk heterogeneity based on gender. The risk ratio based on gender indicates these differ-
ences with relatively small ratios Non−White
White
= 1.1 for women and Non−White
White
= 1.1 for men,
indicating low income variation (Table 2.10). Thus, while considerable gender differences
are observed, marginal differences based on ethnicity are evident.
Marital status indicates a difference amongst individuals based on ethnicity. Non-
White married and single individuals face higher levels of income shocks than White
individuals, with the respective difference being, σ2
εMarriedt
= 0.0164 and σ2
ζMarriedt
= 0.0036
(see Table 2.10). Further, considering the differences for single individuals based on
ethnicity the differences indicate, σ2
εSinglet
= 0.0325 and σ2
ζSinglet
= 0.0050. The risk ratio
reflects the income variation based on ethnicity for married Non−White
White
= 1.3 and for singles
Non−White
White
= 1.2 (see Table 2.10). The finding of lower levels of income risk for married
individuals, independent of ethnicity, provides evidence for a private insurance. This
finding on marital status complements income risk patterns on gender (Gardiner, 2017;
Guner, Kulikova and Valladares-Esteban, 2015). The role of private insurance through
marriage is examined in detail in Chapter 3.
The results in Table 2.11 report the levels of income risk related to an individual’s
parenthood status and distinguish between the ethnicity of an individual’s background.
The decomposition based on the presence of children reveals differences in income risk.
The income risk estimates for Non-White parents indicate higher levels, compared to
White individuals with the respective differences being, σ2
εParentst
= 0.0115 and σ2
ζParentst
=
0.02078. The level of income risk for individuals with no children is marginally different
across ethnicity, σ2
εNon−Parentt
= 0.025 and σ2
ζnon−Parentt
= 0.0011. The results show that
White parents face lower income shock variances, relative to Non-White parents. The
parenthood risk ratio supports the net income risk difference based on ethnicity, with a
higher risk ratio Non−White
White
= 1.4 for parents and Non−White
White
= 1.1 with no children. Thus,
there is an income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity for individuals with children.
Also regional differences in income risk can be observed. These refer to the urban or
rural geographical location in which individuals live. Rural living Non-white individuals
face higher levels of net income risk than White individuals living in the same area,
σ22 εRuralt
= 0.0064 and σ2
ζRuralt
= 0.0100. The difference in income risk across ethnicity
for urban areas indicate that σ2
εUrbant
= 0.0188 and σ2
ζUrbant
= 0.0010. Table 2.11 reports
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the results based on where they live, whether in rural or urban areas. The risk ratio
highlights the significant difference between individuals located in distinct areas, with
Non−White
White
= 1.1 for urban areas. A considerably higher risk ratio based on geographical
location can be observed for rural Non-White individuals: Non−White
White
= 1.5 (see Table
2.11). It should be highlighted that the sample size for rural Non-White individuals is
considerably smaller, which might contribute to the higher income risk variation. Other
factors are associated with the seasonal work in which Non-White individuals are employed
(ONS, 2018). As a result, an income risk heterogeneity across individuals from different
ethnic backgrounds can be observed that is associated with their geographic location.
Individuals of Non-White ethnicity encounter a higher level of income risk based on
their employment status (see Table 2.12). The differences based on ethnicity considering
part-time working individuals is σ2
εPart−Timet
= 0.0438 and σ2
ζPart−Timet
= 0.0067. The
results show that part-time working Non-White individuals face higher levels of income
shock risk across all the employment classifications, with a risk ratio of Non−White
White
= 1.3
for part-time working individuals. Moreover, the employment status indicates a clear
pattern in which self-employed workers face considerably higher levels of net income risk
than employed workers. Here, also a difference in income risk based on ethnicity can be
observed, σ2
εSelf−employedt
= 0.0625 and σ2
ζself−employedt
= 0.0073.This is related to the fact that
a self-employed person bears most of the responsibility, unlike employed individuals. The
risk ratio for the self-employed is Non−White
White
= 1.2 , indicating income variation between
Non-White and White individuals (see Table 2.12). Further, part-time worker face higher
levels of income risk compared to employed individuals. This is also associated with
the nature of the employment status in lower incomes compared to full-time employed
individuals. The results indicate an income risk heterogeneity related to the employment
status of the individual.
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Women 0.0992∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Sample Size 78,801 15,331
Men 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0080) (0.0028)
Sample Size 65,947 11,680
Marital Status
Married 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0017)
Sample Size 101,807 17,411
Single 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.1217∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0084) (0.0024)
Sample Size 42,744 9,558
Notes: Table 2.10 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity;
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01
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Parent 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0956∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0038)
Sample Size 62,890 15,719
Non-Parent 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.1009∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0101) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Sample Size 81,858 11,292
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 0.0746∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0035)
Sample Size 107,871 26,427
Rural 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0024)
Sample Size 36,877 5,844
Notes: Table 2.12 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity.
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01
73


















Full-time 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0813∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0081)
Sample Size 87,622 12,747
Part-Time 0.2072∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.1634∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0035)
Sample Size 25,069 4,446
Employed 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0017)
Sample Size 91,206 13,427
Self-Employed 0.3234∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.3859∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0018)
Sample Size 8,710 19,354
Notes: Table 2.13 indicates the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity.
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01
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Discussion: Ethnicity Decomposition
This section discusses possible factors related to the income risk heterogeneity associ-
ated with the ethnicity decomposition. I provide several measures for adverse permanent
income shocks differentiated by the ethnic background of the individuals. The decompo-
sition by income types reveals a difference in reduction of income risk based on ethnicity.
Table 2.9 indicates that the income risk from net to net income after taxes and benefits
persists on a higher level for Non-White individuals compared to White individuals. The
results demonstrate an income risk heterogeneity that translates from net to net income
risk.
In Table 2.14 I consider the effect of one standard deviation change in the permanent
income shock. The results show that individuals of Non-White ethnicity face marginally
higher levels of income risk in each subgroup. Table 2.13 shows that Non-White individ-
uals encounter a welfare loss of 2.43 per cent, compared to White individuals at 2.21 per
cent. Although the small sample of Non-White individuals implies some limitations to
formulating implications, the overall results suggest an income risk heterogeneity based
on individuals’ethnic background.
Table 2.14 shows the probability of encountering a 20 per cent or 50 per cent income
gain or loss based on ethnicity. It quantifies the impact of positive and negative income
shocks. The results indicate that Non-White individuals are 3.97 per cent likely to face an
income loss of 20 per cent due to an adverse income shock. In contrast, White individuals
face a 2.87 per cent likelihood of encountering a 20 per cent income loss. Consequently,
Non-White individuals are 1.1 percentage points more likely to encounter an adverse
income shock of 20 per cent. The results support the evidence of income risk heterogeneity
based on ethnicity.
Factors that drive this inequality may be related to employment status. The ma-
jority of Non-White individuals work in part-time jobs or occupations that require low
educational skills. A recent study indicates that ethnic minority groups are commonly
under-represented in mid-skilled and professional occupations, and tend to work in low-
income jobs, compared to individuals of White ethnicity (Catney and Sabater, 2015).
Occupational status is associated with low income, which makes it more challenging for
these individuals to smooth adverse income shocks (Jenkins et al., 2010). In addition,
Giupponi and Xu (2020) provide evidence of how employment dynamics have changed
since the Great Financial Crisis. In the past ten years, sole or single self-employment
has increased considerably. The nature of self-employment is a factor that contributes to
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higher income risk, as they bear full responsibility for generating an income. The major-
ity of self-employed individuals, approximately 60.12 per cent, are Non-White individuals.
As a consequence, individuals of Non-White ethnicity face higher income risk. Therefore,
an underlying factor in income risk is associated with employment status.
The results of this research indicate a higher income risk for individuals of Non-White
ethnicity, compared to individuals of White ethnicity. Also the income decomposition
reveals a stronger income risk reduction effect for White individuals. As a consequence,
the findings confirm an income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity. In addition, tax and
transfer policies do not mitigate the difference in the heterogeneity of income risk across
ethnicity. The difference in income risk stems primarily from employment status and ed-
ucational attainment. To improve the situation, policymakers should focus on supporting
educational attainment and employment for individuals of Non-White ethnicity in their
policy design.
Table 2.13: Utility Welfare Loss, Ethnicity
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
White 11.75% 2.21%
Non-White 12.73% 2.43%
Individual Net Income; The loss indicates a one standard
deviation change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent
income shock from one period to the next.
Table 2.14: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Ethnicity
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent
White Non-White










income gain>50%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.50)) 0.03% 0.07%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.20)) 6.00% 5.57%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.50)) 0.10% 0.21%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.80)) 2.87% 3.97%
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζ i,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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2.5.3 Robustness Check
Tables 2.15 and 2.17 report the findings of the robustness test for the income risk hetero-
geneity. The robustness test exercise uses the same approach with a different Mincerian
regression controlling also for employment status (ftpti,c,t) as a full-time or part-time
working individual (Mincer, 1974). It implies that working full-time relative to working
part-time is a choice, contrasting the Mincerian regression in eq. (2.1) in which employ-
ment status resembles an income shock. The key finding is the heterogeneity of income
risk based on the group decomposition. The same patterns are found using the adjusted
Mincerian regression for the entire UK sample. The exercise supports the ranking of the
groups and provides robustness for the findings.
Another aspect is that some individuals might be less ambitious to get a higher salary
if their spouses make more money. I tested this with a robustness exercise by adding a
dummy variable for those women with a male spouses are above the 75th percentile of
the spouses’income distribution. The changes are to the 4th decimal point.
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Notes: Table 2.16 indicates robust income risk results.
UK Net income; The estimation is based on the level identification
scheme:*significant at p < 0.1;.**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01; The bootstrap standard errors
are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses.
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Notes: Table 2.17 indicates robust income risk results.
UK Net income; The estimation is based on the level identification
scheme:*significant at p < 0.1;.**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01; The bootstrap standard errors
are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses.
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Notes: Table 2.18 indicates robust income risk results.
UK Net income; The estimation is based on the level identification
scheme:*significant at p < 0.1;.**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01; The bootstrap standard errors
are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter measures the degree and the heterogeneity of gross and net income risks
across UK individuals. The results reveal an income risk heterogeneity based on gender
and also marginally for ethnicity in the UK. The analysis uses the income decomposition
by Friedman (1957), which distinguishes transitory and permanent income components,
as seen in the PIH (see Chapter 1 for more details). The income process is estimated
in income levels and as a robustness test as well in first-differences. The group-specific
patterns are robust for both identification schemes (see Appendix B). I use the UKHLS
data set, which contains income and socioeconomic information from 2009 to 2018 for
individuals in the UK.
This chapter provides a unique perspective on the level of income risk, by examining
detailed group-specific socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In investigating
the presence of income risk across British individuals, the size and heterogeneity of gross
and net income risk is analysed, based on socioeconomic and demographic factors such
as gender, ethnicity, marital status, parenthood, geographical location and employment
status. The majority of the income risk literature focuses mainly on education and income
levels, but this paper contributes to the debate by offering in-depth analysis across a wider
variety factors in seeking to understand the heterogeneity of gross and net income risk.
Consequently, the chapter offers a nuanced perspective on the nature of income risk.
The first key finding of this chapter is the income risk heterogeneity across several
factors. I find that women are five times as likely to face an adverse income shock of 20
per cent compared to men. Similarly, Non-White individuals encounter a 1.1 per cent
point higher likelihood of a 20 per cent adverse income shock compared to White indi-
viduals. Thus, the uneven distribution reveals a gross and net income risk heterogeneity
based on gender and ethnicity. The underlying factors that contribute to the heterogene-
ity in income risks are related to employment status, parenthood, access to educational
attainment and the economic situation of the UK from 2009 to 2018.
The second main contribution of this work concerns the dynamics of income risk and
the general tax and benefit system. The decomposition based on gross income, with
benefits, taxes and net income reveals that the reduction based on taxes and benefits
varies. Both contribute to the reduction in income variation. However, the results show
that benefits reduce adverse income shocks by a higher degree than income minus taxes.
The results of income minus taxes shows marginal differences in income risk. Further, the
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results indicate that men and White individuals encounter a greater reduction in adverse
income shocks than women and Non-White individuals. Thus, the results support the
findings regarding income risk heterogeneity across individuals in the UK. In particular,
for gender the results indicate that the gross income risk heterogeneity translates into
an uneven distribution of net income risk across men and women. Consequently, policies
such as taxes and benefits do not mitigate income risk heterogeneity.
The chapter provides evidence of an uneven distribution of income risk in the UK.
Consequently, the UK government should take the degree of income risk into account when
developing policies. Insights gained on net income risk heterogeneity should inform policy
makers regarding those individuals who face higher levels of income risk, and thereby guide
improvements in welfare policy design.
One limitation of this research is based on the time dimension of the UKHLS. Cur-
rently, information is available from 2009-2018. This short time period does not permit
long-run analysis. Further, the UKHLS dataset does not include an annual income vari-
able, which might have given additional insight into the policy implications of income risk
heterogeneity.
Future research should focus on the different impacts of different income shock types.
Income risks reflect only one type of income shock, yet there are others such as employment
shocks, health shocks and wage shocks. The UKHLS provides information on each of these
variables, which enables the examination of the distribution of income risk types in the
UK. To date, the literature does not offer an analysis in this regard. Focusing on these
distinct risk types would be a development of this work.
Another area of interest concerns the transmission of income risk into consumer be-
haviour. Such an examination would enable a more profound discussion of the impact
of income shocks on consumption choices and might have implications for the insurance
mechanism of welfare schemes in the UK (Gorman, 1953, 1961; Jorgenson et al., 1980,
1982; Muellbauer, 1975; Blundell and Stoke, 2005; Chiappori and Ekeland, 2011). Both





MARRIAGE AND INCOME RISK IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
3.1 Introduction
Unexpected changes in income cause financial strain on many individuals. Marriage has
often been seen as a way to increase financial stability. When a married couple combine
their individual incomes, the volatility of their household income decreases. Consequently,
married couples can offset adverse income shocks by pooling their income. Thus, marriage
generates an insurance against adverse income shocks. This is a advantage relative to sin-
gles households. However, marriage also induces additional income risk when education
and employment characteristics differ within a married couple. Consequently, marital
choice influences the degree of insurance against adverse income shocks. The amount of
risk faced by single individuals and married couples is an important question for under-
standing economic behaviour and for developing policy design. This chapter contributes
to the income dynamics literature and investigates the relationship between marriage and
net income risk. The contribution of this analysis is twofold; (i) it compares the insurance
advantage of married households with single individuals and (ii) it finds that income risk
mitigation based on marriage depends on marital choice. In particular, it measures the
degree of private insurance between married couples, based on their marital choice in the
UK from 2009 to 2018.
The key finding of this chapter concerns the role of marital choice in determining the
magnitude of net income risk. I find lower levels of income risk amongst assortative mar-
ried couples, namely those who share the same socioeconomic characteristics, compared
to couples that do not share them. Assortative couples also face a 1.4 percentage point
lower likelihood of facing 20 per cent adverse income shock compared to couples who differ
in these characteristics. Another contribution is my innovative statistical decomposition
quantifying the effect of marital choice on net income risk. This decomposition examines
the magnitude of insurance between married couples. A key factor relates to the net
income risk associated with the socioeconomic and educational background of married
couples. Consequently, the chapter contributes to the income risk literature by providing
evidence on the magnitude of marriage insurance against adverse income shocks based
on marital choice. This chapter provides a unique perspective on the dynamics between
marriage and net income risk.
The contribution of this research is to show empirically to what extent marriage re-
duces net income risk, drawing attention to cases where marriage increases income. A
comprehensive body of work has identified different insurance channels of marriage such
as income pooling, unemployment insurance, the added worker effect, and the benefits
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of a marriage premium (Antonovices and Town, 2004; Ortigueira and Siassi, 2011; Choi
and Valladares-Esteban, 2015, 2018; Christiansen et al., 2015; Chiappori et al., 2020).
A smaller body of work has examined the adverse impact of marriage on an individual’s
welfare, as Dynan et al. (2012) find evidence for income risks generated by marriage. Em-
pirical evidence also supports the rise in income inequality related to assortative marital
choice (Becker, 1973,1974; Goodman and Greave, 2010; Lise and Seitz, 2011; Eike et al.,
2018; Eeckhaut and Stanfors, 2019). To date, the literature does not provide an empirical
analysis of the impact of marriage and marital choice on net income risk. Thus, this
analysis complements current findings by quantifying the relative importance of changes
in the composition of net income risk.
Married couples are differentiated by their marital choice so as to analyse the effects of
such choice. The marital choice of a partner can be characterised as either an assortative
or a cross-group choice. Becker (1973) introduced the assortative mating strategy, which
argues that individuals tend to marry individuals from a similar background. If two
individuals from the same group choose to marry, the net income risk for this couple should
be similar; both members of the couple have more earnings stability than if they remained
single. In contrast, if the married couple differs in their individual characteristics such
as socioeconomic status, their income risk increases as one partner faces higher income
fluctuations related to educational or employment factors. This chapter, follows the of
PIH as it is the standard tool to measure the properties of the shocks to the two income
components, which measure the income risk (see Chapter 1 for more details).
The longitudinal structure of the UKHLS facilitates analysis of the impact of marriage
on net income risk. Further, allows estimation of the magnitude of insurance between mar-
ried couples based on their marital choice. A synthetic data set randomises the partners of
each marriage based on the marital choice. It ensures the removal of any endogeneity and
serves as a robustness test. The estimation method uses the income dynamics in the UK,
based on the approach by Heathcote et al. (2010). Following the literature, the chapter
focuses on residual dispersion. The income process is specified for both temporary and
permanent income shocks and is identified by using the level identification scheme, which
is estimated by exploiting the variance and covariance structure of the residual term.
I find that assortative couples face a lower net income risk compared to couples from
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Specifically, marriage is found to reduce levels of
permanent income risk when married couples share the same socioeconomic characteris-
tics. Couples married across socioeconomic groups indicate a loss in well-being reflected
in a higher level of net income risk and are more likely to face adverse income shocks. In
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particular, the permanent net income risk for cross-group couples is considerably higher
compared to assortative couples. Thus, the lower levels of income risk and consequently
lower probability of adverse income shocks generate an income risk insurance for assorta-
tive married couples. I also test whether the levels of net income risk are influenced by
education, examining the net income risk exposure associated with marital choice based
on education. Based on the marital choice by education, the results are similar; assor-
tative married couples are found to face lower net income risk compared to cross-group
couples. Furthermore, the main finding indicates that marital choice influences income
risk that couples face. A secondary observation is that the assortative couples are more
likely to be composed of high-income spouses. This observation has no bearing on the
finding of heterogenous income risk across marital choice groups. The reason is that I
employ a model in natural logarithms and thus the "starting" point of an income change
does not matter. Put it differently, the income shocks in this model are in fact percentage
changes.
A counterfactual exercise is created based on the information in the data set. I create a
synthetic data set, which randomises the partners of each marriage based on the marital
choice. It ensures the removal of any endogeneity and serves as a robustness test. It
provides evidence that the estimates still hold if the married couples are separated by
their marital choice. The synthetic sample supports marital choice findings. Even though
the magnitude of net income risk exposure is lower in the synthetic sample, the same
ranking between marital choice can be identified. The lower degree of income risk in the
synthetic sample is related to the removal of endogeneity and indicates that other factors
contribute to the insurance mechanism. Thus, from this analysis, a new finding emerges:
the degree of marital insurance depends on marital choice.
The chapter sets out to provide a review on the current literature in Section 3.2. It
describes the data in Section 3.3 and explains the methodological approach in Section




3.2.1 Income Risk: Individuals and Married Couples
This section focuses on the empirical literature on marriage and its impact on income risk.
It discusses several insurance channels identified in the literature, and also highlights risks
that are associated with income risk.
Income risk is expressed in the variance of income shocks based on the PIH by Fried-
man (1957) (see chapter 1 for more details). The impact of the income shocks differs
based on their nature (see eq. (1.2) and eq. (1.3)). This approach decomposes the income
process into permanent components, such as job displacement and change in returns to
education, and transitory characteristics, such as bonus payments (Meghir and Pista-
ferri, 2011). The theory asserts that an individual’s consumption and savings choices
respond differently to permanent income shocks than to transitory ones. Permanent in-
come shocks directly translate into consumption choices, while transitory income shocks
can be smoothed throughout time periods. Transitory income shocks are associated with
mobility, namely transient changes within the income distribution (Blundell and Preston,
1998; Jenkins, 2005). However, if an individual cannot smooth income shocks, due to
being constrained by liquidity, welfare losses can also arise from transitory income shocks
(for more detail see Section 1.2). This risk and the subsequent ex post income instability
make it diffi cult for people to cover their expenditures and can influence their well-being.
The impact of adverse income shocks reduces an individual’s well-being and economic
resources. It motivates the need for insurance against adverse income shocks. Such
insurance potentially enables people to smooth consumption across time. Yet, there are
risks associated with adverse selection and moral hazard issues. The failure of the labour
market to generate an insurance against negative income shocks drives the need for social
or private insurance. Private insurance consists of two key measures in which individuals
and households can partially insure themselves against the impact of adverse income
shocks by (i) using precautionary measures such as savings or a stock of asset and (ii)
reacting with corrective economic activities.
This chapter focuses on private insurance opportunities through marriage. A couple
can insure themselves against adverse income shocks by pooling their income, which en-
ables them to offset a fall in their spouse’s income partially. The partial insurance based
on income pooling is affected by two key factors i) extensive margin and ii) intensive
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margin. The former indicates whether a spouse is working, while the latter reflects the
number of hours worked. The sample includes working individuals only. Thus, changes at
the extensive margin of working couples are not examined. Yet, the time worked, defined
as the intensive margin, reflects the response to a adverse income shock within a married
couple (Blundell et al., 2011b; Blundell et al., 2013; Fisher et al., 2013; Boertien and
Permanyer, 2019). In particular, if a spouse’s exogenous income shocks are not perfectly
correlated with the other spouse’s shocks, income pooling reduces net income risk for
both. I create a counterfactual exercise to examine the size of income risk mitigation
and control for any endogeneity related to time worked by the partner. Within this exer-
cise, I randomise the spouses of the couples by their marital choice. This enables me to
investigate the robustness of my results and control for any endogeneity.
The literature shows that individual and household net income risk differ. It shows
that the choice of how to use their economic resources depends on their capacity. The
literature indicates that economic resources depend on levels of education and income
(Dickens, 2000; Blundell et al., 2018). Thus, individuals depend on their own resources.
In contrast, households can use income pooling as self insurance. This partially offsets the
impact on economic resources of negative income shocks. Therefore, households encounter
less dispersion in their earnings growth than single individuals, which creates an advantage
for households. In a comparative study, Pruit and Turner (2020) find that household
dispersion risk is lower than single male dispersion risk. Also, Avram et al. (2019)
highlight that household net income risk is lower compared to individual net income risk in
the UK. The degree of income risk faced by single and married couples is important both
for understanding economic behaviour and for the welfare consequences. This chapter
contributes to the literature by analysing individual and household net income risk.
This chapter also complements the net income risk analysis with a counterfactual
exercise. I create a synthetic sample in which I randomise married spouses based on their
marital choice. A similar approach has been used by Eike et al. (2018). The choice
reflects whether the spouses share the same socioeconomic background or differ in it. The
UKHLS provides data on the married couples, which enables me to create groups based
on assortative and cross socioeconomic marital choice. I use this distribution to then
match the spouses with new partners based on their socioeconomic status. This method
enables me to observe the net income risk of married couples with new spouses conditioned
on their initial marital choice. This counterfactual method allows me to understand the
dynamics between marital choice and insurance against negative income shocks, as it
controls for the endogeneity associated with the partner.
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3.2.2 Income Risk: Marriage and Marital Choice
Studies of marital choice and assortative mating are found across multiple research dis-
ciplines. In psychology, research focuses on partner selection based on personality at-
tributes. The sociology literature concentrates on marital preferences by social factors
and demographics. In economics marital choice tends to focus on spouses’economic re-
semblance and its underlying role in contributing to income inequality. This chapter
contributes to the economics literature by examining the insurance opportunities that
arise through marriage. In particular, I investigate the role of marital choice across mar-
ried couples, asking how net income risk differs between married couples -and exploring
whether marital choice increases or decreases the level of income risk.
The literature offers several marriage patterns across couples. The literature provide
evidence for the role of education and age as key factors that influence marital choice.
Highly-educated men and women marry at older ages compared to lower-educated indi-
viduals. Further, men and women who did not complete high school are less likely to
marry than individuals with higher education (Waite, 2001; Aughinbaugh et al., 2013;
Musick and Michelmore, 2015; Grossbard et al., 2019). Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) and
Hamilton and Darity (2017) find differences in marriage patterns between ethnic groups
in which Non-White individuals married later relative to White individuals. Moreover,
European countries differ substantially in marriage ages. Individuals in northern Euro-
pean countries tend to marry at a later stage compared to eastern European countries
(Kiernan, 2000). A key issue in the higher age at marriage is the commitment of women’s
careers in the labour market (Waite, 2001; Choo and Siow, 2006; Marti, 2006; Autor et
al., 2008; Autor, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2014; Pestel, 2017). This chapter contributes
to the literature by focusing on the underlying factors of socioeconomic and occupational
backgrounds in marital choice.
The income risk literature lacks an analysis of the relationship between private insur-
ance, marital choice and net income risk, with only vague evidence of the links involved.
This chapter contributes to the present literature by exploring the impact of marriage on
net income risk, taking into account marital choice. The marital choice decomposition is
an innovative approach to examining the size of insurance between married couples. It
allows the examination of different types of married couples in light of their socioeconomic
and occupational backgrounds. The key contribution of this chapter is that marriage can
be an insurance against negative income shocks, but the degree of insurance ultimately
depends on marital choice.
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The current literature outlines several channels of private insurance against negative
income shocks. Income pooling between partners provides the underlying insurance. It
enables married couples to partially offset income shocks. In particular, if a spouse’s
exogenous income shocks are not perfectly correlated with the other spouse’s shocks, in-
come pooling reduces negative income shocks for both. Thus, by adjusting relative labour
supply and diversifying net income risk, married couples can smooth the impact of in-
come shocks. This mechanism is an advantage compared to single individuals. Shore and
Jensen (2015) find that the income volatility of households is significantly lower than that
of individuals. Also a public poll indicates that people are aware that marriage provides
a form of insurance against negative income shocks. According to the poll, 76 per cent
of respondents list financial stability as an important reason for marriage in the USA.
1. Marriage insurance is expressed through different channels, such as unemployment
insurance, the added worker effect and the marriage premium (Becker, 1973, 1974; Chris-
tiansen, 2015; Choi and Valladares-Esteban, 2015; 2018; Hyslop, 2001; Ortigueira and
Siassi, 2011).
Assortative marital choice reflects a form of homogamy. Becker (1973, 1974) origi-
nally introduced the concept, which refers to marriage between individuals from similar
backgrounds. In contrast, non-assortative married couples or cross-group couples refer
to married couples, who do not share the same socioeconomic status. Educational and
socioeconomic homogamy are closely linked. The level of education influences the size of
income an individual or married couple receives. The income and occupational level reflect
the socioeconomic status. In particular, the UKHLS data set associates socioeconomic
status with occupational background, which indicates the close affi nity across educational
and socioeconomic marital choice. Thus, this analysis complements the literature on
assortative marital choice by focusing on socioeconomic homogamy.
The degree of household net income risk depends on the size of income risk associated
with each spouse. Married couples with an assortative strategy do not face additional
income risks because they share the same socioeconomic background (Frémeaux, 2014;
Frémeaux and Lefranc, 2017). Their, low level of income risk in conjunction with income
pooling provide them with an advantage to mitigate adverse income shocks. Yet, working
in the same firmmight decrease the insurance against income shock for assortative married
couples, as adverse income shocks such as insolvency increase the income risk. However,
the UKHLS does not provide the data to examine the risk of being employed in the same
1For details see “A Survey of LGBT Americans: Attitudes, Experiences and Values in Changing
Times,”Pew Research Center, June 13, 2013.
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industry or firm for assortative couples. Therefore, such a robustness test cannot be done
within this chapter.
A key channel of marriage insurance is expressed in unemployment insurance. Un-
employment insurance is based on the income sharing between spouses. The income
loss through unemployment is offset by the working spouse. Choi and Valladares-Esteban
(2015, 2016) find evidence for marriage offering unemployment insurance. They show that
married couples have lower unemployment rates than single individuals. Hyslop (2001)
and Christiansen et al. (2015) also provide evidence for a sharing of labour market risk
by married couples. They highlight the importance of partners in generating protection
against negative income shocks in the USA, thus giving empirical evidence of the presence
of unemployment insurance through a spouse.
The degree of net income risk sharing depends on the income level. Ortigueira and
Siassi (2011) find that household risk sharing has its most substantial impact on low-
income married couples. While high-income married couples mainly use savings to smooth
consumption across periods of unemployment, low-income married couples rely on spousal
labour supply. The average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8 per cent
higher in low-income households than in households with working wives and employed
husbands (Ortigueira and Siassi, 2011). For low-income married couples, unemployment
insurance is an essential factor in smoothing adverse income shocks. As a consequence, the
importance of unemployment insurance depends on the income level of married couples.
Another channel of insurance through marriage relates to the added worker effect. It
investigates the role of marriage as a risk-sharing device focusing mostly on the propensity
of wives to become employed. Findings indicate that an additional worker in the house-
hold provides a robust insurance mechanism. It allows wage shocks to be negatively (or
positively) correlated between spouses. Christiansen et al. (2015) investigate the impact
of marriage on risk sharing and find that the spouse is a key contributor to the smoothing
of income shocks. In particular, Blundell et al. (2016) find that female labour supply is a
key consumption insurance device against wage shocks faced by the husband. Thus, the
added worker effect expresses another type of insurance through marriage.
An additional benefit of marriage is reflected in the marriage premium, which refers
to the increase in the productivity and earnings of husbands caused by entering marriage.
Evidence shows that married men make, on average, almost 30 per cent more than single
men in hourly wages (Jackson et al., 2017). According to Antonovices and Town (2004),
marriage also secures long-term financial stability. On average, entering marriage improves
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an individual’s wages by 27 per cent (Antonovices and Town, 2004). Nevertheless, current
evidence indicates the presence of a marriage premium mainly for White men (Jackson et
al., 2017). Moreover, it is also argued that working longer and more regularly incentivises
a spouse to increase productivity and to further reap income benefits (Antonovices and
Town, 2004; Becker, 1973; Brown, 2000; Cohen, 2002; Jackson et al., 2017). Thus, married
couples have access to a marriage premium.
An extensive literature provides evidence for the marriage insurance mechanism. This
mechanism operates through income pooling in the form of the added worker effect and
unemployment insurance. Additional marital benefits accrue through the marriage pre-
mium. The income risk literature lacks analysis regarding the degree of insurance offered
by marriage, as it focuses mainly on the income pooling and risk sharing of a couple. This
analysis provides new insight based on the influence of marital choice.
In contrast, the marriage gap provides evidence of how income risk rises due to mar-
riage. The marriage gap refers to the difference in income between spouses. This difference
is particularly high if married couples do not share the same socioeconomic background, in
other words, where the spouses are from different socioeconomic groups. Thus, a spouse
who would have encountered low-net income risk as a single person faces higher income
volatility and subsequently a higher net income risk post marriage. In this case, marital
choice generates additional net income risk for at least one spouse within the marriage.
Benson and McKay (2015) find evidence for a marriage gap by investigating married
couples based on income levels and age. Their findings indicate different outcomes of
marriage stability based on income level (Benson and McKay, 2015). As a result, marital
choice can generate additional net income risk by introducing income volatility associated
with the spouse. Thus, this chapter examines the role of marital choice in the degree of
private insurance against adverse income shocks.
Marriage does not necessarily translate into an insurance. Marriage can generate a
negative impact on married couples by inducing income volatility through the income risk
associated with the spouse’s socioeconomic background. Higher income risk of a spouse
results in a welfare loss, expressed in higher income volatility for at least one spouse.
Recent findings support this perspective by providing evidence of increased net income
risk created by marriage. This additional net income risk offsets the advantage of married
couples compared to single individuals. In particular, Dynan et al. (2012) find that
household income is more volatile than single income in the USA. They find that the
share of households experiencing a 50 per cent plunge in income over two years climbed
from about 7 per cent in the 1970s to more than 12 per cent in the early 2000s (Dynan et
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al., 2012). The results indicate that household net income risk has been rising compared
to individual risk.
Assortative marital choice may contribute to rising income inequality. It increases
income segregation between households and decreases social mobility (Burtless, 1999;
Hyslop, 2001, Chiappori et al., 2020). In contrast, a recent body of work revisits the
link between assortative marital choice and income inequality by considering average
aggregated household income. In a decomposition analysis, Hyrshko et al. (2017), Eeckaut
and Stanfors (2019), Eike et al.(2019), Dupuy and Weber (2019), and Schwartz and Mare
(2005) quantify the contribution of various factors to the distribution of household income
and conclude that educational assortative choice accounts for a moderate part of the cross-
sectional inequality in the USA.2. Chiappori et al. (2020) shows in a recent study that
changes in marital homogamy increased income inequality in the UK. Yet, the degree of
this increase depends on factors such as occupation and education.
Concluding, marriage contributes to an insurance against adverse income shocks through
several channels (e.g. added worker effects (e.g. see Christiansen et al. (2015)) or mar-
riage premium (see, e.g. Jackson et al., 2017)). It can also increase income risk e.g.,
fertility, divorce and the marriage gap (see e.g. Benson and McKay (2015)). All these
are ex-post examinations of marriage, i.e. these studies (including this chapter) examine
the effects of marriage after people formed couples. Nevertheless, marital choice itself is
influenced by several factors that might be related to financial security or love or other
subjective perceptions. The analysis of ex-ante factors of marital choice is an interesting
but challenging exercise. This exercise requires a relatively large and long in the time
dimension panel data set. The reason is that we need to have information on both "fu-
ture" spouses well before individuals get married. The second challenge for this exercise
is the way that the sampling procedure operates in this type of surveys; they follow most
probably one of the spouses and the second spouse appears in the sample only after they
get married. The likelihood of having both spouses before they get marries in a survey is
very small. Administrative data though would enable such analysis, but there are not yet
available for the UK (see e.g. Hryshko et al. (2017)). Consequently, the UKHLS dataset
only enables me to examine ex-post marriage patterns.
This chapters examines the role of marital choice, post marriage, on private insurance
against adverse income shocks. Based on the marriages that are observed assortative and
2Hryshko et al. (2017) analyse earnings-based assortative selection from 1980 to 2009 in the US;
Dupuy and Weber (2019) and Eika et al. (2019) examine educational assortative selection from 1962 to
2013 in the US.
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cross-group couples are split on socioeconomic status and education. These observations
are used in the counterfactual exercise to test the robustness of the results based on post
marriage decisions. Yet, this analysis cannot infer on the ex-ante factors that led to the
marriages. The analysis strictly focuses on the patterns ex-post marital choice based on
the information available in the UKHLS dataset.
The empirical literature reports several channels of insurance against adverse income
shocks. These include the marriage premium, additional worker effect and income levels.
Nevertheless, marriage can also introduce new risks such as divorce, fertility and the
marriage gap. The link between marital choice and net income risk is not well understood.
This chapter contributes to the ongoing discussion by measuring the difference in net
income risk exposure based on marital choice. The UKHLS dataset enables an ex-post
marriage analysis.
3.3 Data
In this section, I provide information on the variables used for the analysis, and a brief
description of the sample selection and household decomposition. More details on the
survey structure can be found in Chapter 1. This analysis refers to marital choice patterns.
An assortative strategy reflects married couples who share the same socioeconomic or
educational background. In contrast, non-assortative or cross-group married couples refer
to partners who do not share the same socioeconomic or educational background. I
analyse the marital choice across married couples based on the UKHLS data set. It
includes information on the socioeconomic and educational background of each married
couple. This enables me to analyse marital choice patterns combined with their degree of
net income risk.
3.3.1 Sample Selection
To examine the link between marriage, marital choice and net income risk, I create a
homogeneous data set. Only individuals with full interviews are kept, and incomplete
interviews are removed. As a consequence, the sample maintains consistent information
of individuals across all time periods. I concentrate on individuals and couples who are
in the labour market with positive income and who are within the age range of 20 to 65
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(Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Busch et al., 2018; Guvenen et al., 2010; Heathcote et al.,
2010).
3.3.2 Household Formation
Households where both members are participating in the labour market and are working
are considered. As a result, I focus on dual-earner households including high-earners
and low-earners. The dual earner households give their respective incomes regardless of
gender. The UKHLS maintains information on several different types of household. The
key households considered in this chapter are single-person households and dual-earner
households. Single households refer to individuals who live alone for example due to
a divorce, being widowed or not having a partner. In contrast, dual-earner households
consist of married couples. The marital status variable is pooled into a binary dummy
variable based on the household status of being i) a married couple or legally binding
civil partnership or ii) a single-person household. During the sample period a minority
of individuals divorced and are not living together. I excluded this sub-sample from the
analysis as the focus of this chapter is on income risk during marriage. It can be seen as
a form of attrition across married couples.
Given that the UKHLS data set provides information on personal income, I can com-
pare couples over time and differentiate them based on their income. The dual household
members are classified as high and low earners, regardless of their gender. This approach
to household formation contrasts with contemporary literature which mainly uses male
earnings as the head of the household, being the primary breadwinner, and representing
the entire household as one unit. To analyse the impact of marital choice on adverse
income shocks, I distinguish two groups of dual-earner homes: on the one hand, house-
holds that indicate assortative marital choice and, on the other hand, couples who provide
evidence of ‘cross-socioeconomic’marital selection. Assortative mating refers to individ-
uals who chose their partner from the same socioeconomic or educational background
(Becker, 1973). In contrast, ’cross socioeconomic choice’refers to individuals who chose
an individual from a different socioeconomic or educational group. The sample is split ac-
cording how the household members have chosen their respective partners. Consequently,
this chapter offers an innovative household definition and household member categorisa-
tion, which facilitates investigation of the net income risk dynamics implicit in a spouse’s
marital choice.
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This chapter focuses on income risks during a marriage. I analyse the samples of
married couples based on their marital choice. During the sample period some marriages
resulted in planned divorce. Even though, a divorce constitutes a considerable adverse
income shock and is associated with considerable income fluctuations, I do not consider
this group as, post divorce, the married couple reflects the income risk of individuals.
Further, the planned nature of these divorces does not capture the unexpected event of
an adverse income shock. Thus I disregard the sample which leads to a form of attrition.
This group of individuals is relatively small and does not provide meaningful results.
Nevertheless, separated but legally married couples are included in the sample. This
enables me to capture some of the fluctuations associated with separation.
3.3.3 Variables
To analyse the household members, I decompose each of the samples based on whether
they contribute to the household and their marital choice strategy. The decomposition
of the samples enables me to examine household development and the impact of marital
choice on net income risk. Moreover, I construct cohort bands to account for fixed effects
in the level identification scheme, and I also separate the sample into three age cohorts
according to when the individuals turn 25 and enter the labour market, namely: below or
equal to 1991 (Cohort 1), 1991 to 2000 (Cohort 2), and above or equal to 2001 (Cohort
3). The number of cohorts is dictated by the size of the sample.
The UKHLS provides data on personal income. These income variables express in-
dividual gross income and adjust for tax and transfers to give net income. It takes into
account whether the individual is part of a household. Therefore, this chapter focuses
on net income. The income is expressed in weeks, by defining it as the multiplication
of typical monthly wages by 12, and then divided by 52 weeks. It is a precise measure
of income, as applied in related literature (ONS, 2017; Heathcote et al., 2010). Simi-
larly, the datasets provide information on which socioeconomic background each spouse
belongs too. This is based on a variable provided by the dataset. The UKHLS differen-
tiates three categories: Higher Management and Professional Occupations, Intermediate
Occupations, and Routine and Manual Occupations (see Appendix C for more details on
the socioeconomic status variable).
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3.3.4 Counterfactual Exercise: Synthetic Sample
The intensive margin of married couples influences the extent of pool income. Therefore,
I create a counterfactual exercise to analyse household net income risk dynamics and
create a synthetic sample based on the original sample of married couples. I consider the
household income for the actual households in comparison to income changes for randomly
formed couples. The key idea is to randomise the couples and the respective partners over
the eight waves based on their marital choice. Thus, the spouses are matched with a new
partner based on either an assortative or cross-group marital choice. Any endogenous
response of household income associated with the number of hours worked by the partner
is, by construction, non-existent for synthetic couples. The synthetic sample of married
couples have new partners with the same attributes based on their initial marital choice.
Consequently, I investigate the income risk dynamics of the synthetic sample as well, so
as to compare it with the original sample.
To estimate the temporary and permanent income shock variances I include only cou-
ples with information over three consecutive waves, as the identification of one permanent
income shock requires moments from three consecutive periods (waves), t− 1, t and t+ 1.
To ensure that the household is consistent over the periods, I use the head of the house-
hold provided by the survey. The advantage is that the household identifier stays the
same throughout the three years for the original or the synthetic sample.
I consider randomly formed couples given their marital choice. The actual couples
are randomised based on their original marital choice. In other words, married couples
are matched with a partner from the same socioeconomic background and vice versa. To
each synthetic couple, I apply the same selection criteria as for the actual households. In
the next step, I control for some characteristics of actual household formation, as sorting
along those dimensions might in part explain changes in actual household incomes. Thus,
I make synthetic couples more similar to actual households, while still isolating potential
endogeneity. In particular, I control for age, gender and education.
Then, I simulate 1000 synthetic samples, for each wave triplet and for each synthetic
married couple based on their marital choice. For each simulation, I calculate the transi-
tory and permanent shocks, and my results are the average over those 1000 calculations.
For comparability, for the original sample, I calculate the transitory and permanent shocks
for each wave triplet and each assortative mating group. Overall, I find the same ranking,




This section describes the model used in this analysis. It follows the approach by Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) and Heathcote et al., (2010), who analyse trends in income dynamics
in the UK and the USA respectively. I focus on the UK, using panel data from the UKHLS
over the time horizon from 2009 to 2018. In line with the literature, I analyse the ’residual’
dispersion (Brzozowski et al., 2010, Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2010, Heathcote et al., 2010).
Here I focus on individuals and households.
I consider individual log net income, ygh,c,t, for a household h, belonging to a cohort c
and population subgroup g, and observed in year t. I assume the following model.




I also examine the individual income (yi,c,t) for individuals i, age cohorts c and time
dimension t:




which means that the log net income consist of a determinist (or explained by observ-
ables) linear part βgXi,c,t and a residual (unexplained or idiosyncratic) part u
g
i,c,t. Xi,c,t
includes a constant term, a quadratic in experience approximated by age, age of spouse,
dummies for region of residence, dummy for gender, dummy for marital status and time
fixed effects. Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010) I also include as a regressor the log-
arithm of the household size. The superscript g denotes the eight subgroups defined by the
combination of three variables: sex (men and women), ethnicity (White and Non-White),
education (degree holders or not).3 Moreover, I consider three cohorts. Controlling for
the observables captures the idea that expected changes to income do not represent risk
(see Japelli and Pistaferri, 2017). The key interest is in the income risk trends between
households and individuals. I also examine the size of income shocks between married
couples based on marital choice.
3Analytically, the eight subgroups are: i) male, degree, White; ii) male, degree, Non-White; iii) male,
no degree, White; iv) male, no degree, Non-White; v) female, degree, White; vi) female, degree, Non-
White; vii) female, no degree, White; viii) female, no degree, Non-White.
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I further assume that the residual term, ugi,c,t, consists of two components, a perma-
nent component, pgi,c,t, and a transitory component, ε
g
i,c,t; the permanent component is
a random walk while the transitory component is a purely i.i.d shock. In addition, the
two components are additive (in logs). The formal expression of ugi,c,t, can be found in
Chapter 1 Section 3 and 4.
3.5 Results and Discussion
This section presents the results and discusses the implications. Section 3.5.1 shows the
results of individual risk by marital status. Section 3.5.2 examines the household risk by
marital choice. Section 3.5.3 presents the results of the synthetic sample. The chapter
disentangles the impact of marriage and marital choice on net income risk. Income risk is
expressed in the form of transitory and permanent income shock variances, in which higher
income shock variances indicate a higher income instability and subsequently higher net
income risk. Several key findings have been identified.
Firstly, the analysis of individual risk by marital status provides evidence for a private
insurance mechanism through marriage. Single individuals face higher levels of net income
risk compared to married couples. They are also more likely to face adverse income
shocks compared to married individuals. Thus, the results indicate a marriage insurance
mechanism expressed in lower levels of net income risk for married couples compared to
single individuals (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). The underlying factor is the access
to income pooling for married individuals, which single individuals do not have. This
finding is in line with the literature, including Antonovices and Town (2004), Christiansen
et al.(2015), Hyslop (2001), Autor, (2014), Greenwood et al.( 2014), Pestel (2017), and
Hryshko et al. (2017).
Secondly, a key finding of this chapter concerns the role of marital choice in deter-
mining the magnitude of net income risk. I find that marriage reduces income volatility
when married couples share the same socioeconomic characteristics, namely assortative
married couples, relative to couples that do not share them. Assortative couples also face
a 1.4 percentage point lower likelihood of facing an adverse income shock compared to
couples who differ in these characteristics. Another contribution is my novel statistical
decomposition for quantifying the effect of marital choice on net income risk. This decom-
position examines the magnitude of marital insurance between married couples. A key
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factor of the insurance relates to the net income risk associated with the socioeconomic
and educational background of married couples. Thus, the chapter contributes to the
net income risk literature by providing evidence on the magnitude of marriage insurance
against adverse income shocks based on marital choice. It provides a unique perspective
on the dynamics between marriage and net income risk.
Thirdly, the household risk by marital choice indicates that the marriage insurance
mechanism depends on marital choice. Married individuals with assortative choice show
lower net income risk compared to married couples with cross-group marital choice (see
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2). In particular, the permanent income shock variances of cross-
socioeconomic married couples is higher compared to household members with assortative
choice. The synthetic sample supports the marital choice findings (see Table 3.5). Even
though the degree of net income risk exposure is lower, the same ranking between marital
choice can be identified. The lower degree of risk in the synthetic sample is related to the
removal of endogeneity related to the intensive margin.
Fourthly, I calculate the risk ratio based on marital status and marital choice. The risk
ratio is defined as the ratio of permanent income shocks encountered by single individuals
relative to married couples. It indicates the difference between the groups and expresses
the degree of income variation between the respective groups. A high risk ratio indicates a
high degree of permanent income shocks resulting in higher income volatility. In contrast,
a low-risk ratio indicates few permanent income shocks and, therefore, income stability.
Thus, the risk ratio acts as an indicator of income variation related to permanent income
shocks and endorses the economic relevance of this chapter.
This section also discusses the economic implications of the key results. These focus
on the advantage married couples have compared to single individuals. The degree of
private insurance through marriage is found to depend on marital choice. I also analyse
the impact of an adverse permanent income shock on individuals and households. The
approach follows the utility welfare loss based on standard deviations in Chapter 1 (see
Section 1.5 for more details).
3.5.1 Marital Status
This section focuses on the results of individual risk by marital status, namely being single
or married. Table 3.1 indicates the distinct net income risk exposure of married and single
individuals. The individual income measure of married individuals is used to make the
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income variable comparable to single individuals. The income risk estimates show that





= 0.0227, respectively. In contrast, married individuals encounter lower income
shock variances with σ2
εMIt
= 0.0588 and σ2
ζMIt
= 0.0199. The time series evidence in Figure
3.1 indicates the magnitude of the difference of permanent and transitory income shock
variances between married and single individuals (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, the difference
in the permanent risk estimates of singles and married individuals is significantly different
at the 90 per cent confidence interval. The marriage insurance mechanism is characterised
by the lower levels of net income risk compared to single individuals, on average. Table
3.2 shows the distinct welfare loss between single and married individuals.
The risk ratio ( SI
MI
= 1.1) underpins the difference between the two groups and shows
that single individuals encounter a higher risk ratio. This insurance mechanism is based
on the ability of married individuals to pool their income to smooth income shocks.
In addition, single individuals have higher labour market mobility compared to married
ones (Becker, 1973,1974; Gardiner, 2017; Guner, Kulikova and Valladares-Esteban, 2015).
Consequently, the results in Table 3.1 provide evidence for a marriage insurance mecha-
nism.












Married Individuals (MI) 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0027) (0.0021)
Sample Size 119,761
Single Individuals (SI) 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0047) (0.0046)
Sample Size 53,109
Notes: Single individuals face higher income risk compared to married
on 1000; Individual Net Income; The bootstrap standard errors are based
on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses; *significant at p<0.1;
**significant at p<0.05;***significant at p<0.01.
The risk ratio is based on σ2
ζgt
.
Figure 3.1 shows the net income risk based on marital status from 2010 to 2017. It
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shows that single-person households face higher levels of net income risk compared to
married households.
Figure 3.1: Individual Income Risk Estimation based on Marital Status




































Notes: Figure 3.1 shows that single individuals face higher levels of transitory and permanent
income shock variances compared to married individuals from 2010 until 2017.
Discussion: Marital Status
In the following, I discuss the economic implications of net income risk heterogeneity
in marital status in the UK (see Table 3.2). I consider the impact of a one standard
deviation change in permanent income shock. The estimates in Table 3.2show that single
102
individuals face higher net income risks and encounter a subsequently higher welfare loss
with2.78 per cent, compared to 2.31 per cent by married individuals. Thus, a marriage
insurance mechanism does exist in the form of lower level net income risk.
Another way to quantify permanent income shocks is by expressing them in proba-
bilities. Table 3.3 shows the probability of encountering a 20 per cent and a 50 per cent
income gain or loss based on marital status. The results indicate that single individuals
are 6.92 per cent likely to face an income loss of 20 per cent due to an adverse income
shock. In contrast, married couples face a 5.68 per cent likelihood to encounter a 20 per
cent income loss. The considerable difference in the probabilities of adverse income shocks
indicates the presence of an insurance against adverse income shocks through marriage.
The results indicate that married individuals face lower levels of income risk compared
to single individuals. The findings relate to the associated commitment of a marriage,
with a shared financial situation including sharing expenses, combined investments and
easier access to loans (Chiappori et al., 2018; Grover and Helliwell, 2017).These factors
are related to the underlying advantage of income pooling which allows married couples to
offset income losses. The net income risk literature has identified the insurance mechanism
through several channels: for example, unemployment insurance, the added worker effect,
and the marriage premium (Antonovices and Town, 2004; Chiappori et al., 2012; Dynan et
al., 2012; Pestel, 2017). As a result, the private insurance through marriage allows married
couples to pool income. This type of insurance is not accessible to single individuals.
Consequently, the income pooling partially explains the difference in the level of income
risk between married and single individuals.
The higher net income risk for single individuals is supported by the literature. Jensen
and Shore (2015) find a systematic increase in volatility for a majority of single individuals
in the U.. The increase in average volatility has been driven almost entirely by a sharp
increase in the earnings volatility of single individuals, depending on occupational back-
ground. Self-employment is associated with high income volatility as it entails a stronger
element of self-identity and risk-seeking compared to employed individuals. Thus, the dis-
tinct net income risk exposure is also related to the occupational background of married
and single individuals.
In summary, individual risk by marital status provides evidence of a private insurance
mechanism through marriage. Single individuals face higher levels of net income risk
compared to married couples. They are also more likely to face adverse income shocks
compared to married individuals. Consequently, the results indicate a marriage insurance
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mechanism as expressed in lower levels of net income risk for married couples compared
to single individuals. The underlying factor is the access to income pooling for married
individuals. This finding is in line with literature such as Antonovices and Town (2004),
Christiansen et al.(2015), Hyslop (2001), Autor, (2014), Greenwood et al.( 2014), and
Pestel (2017).
Table 3.2: Utility Welfare Loss, Marital Status
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
Married Individuals 14.23% 2.31%
Single Individuals 15.12% 2.78%
Notes: Table 3.2 indicates that single individuals face a higher utility welfare
loss compared to married ones; Individual net income; The loss indicates a
one standard deviation change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent
income shock from one period to the next.
Table 3.3: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Marital Status
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent
Married Individuals Single Individuals










income gain>50%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.50)) 0.20% 0.36%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζ i,t > ln (1.20)) 9.78% 11.27%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.50)) 0.30% 0.71%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζ i,t < ln (0.80)) 5.68% 6.92%
Notes: Table 3.3 shows that single individuals are more likely to encounter an adverse permanent income shock.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζ i,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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3.5.2 Marital Choice based on Socioeconomic Status
This section focuses on the results of household risk by marital choice based on the
socioeconomic background of married couples in the UK. The results in Table 3.4 provide
evidence of a stronger insurance mechanism for married couples with assortative mating
compared to married couples with a cross-group choice. Assortative married couples
face, on average, lower levels net income risk compared to married couples with a cross-
group choice. Married individuals with an assortative choice choice face lower transitory
(σ2
εAMt
= 0.0195) and permanent (σ2
ζAMt
= 0.0209) income shock variances. The results
show that cross-group married couples on average face higher levels of income risk. This
holds for both income risk types, with transitory income shock variances of σ2
εCGMt
= 0.0222
and permanent income shock variances of σ2
ζCGMt
= 0.0242. The risk ratio of CGM
AM
= 1.2
emphasises the difference in net income risk. Table 3.4 indicates the distinct welfare
loss between assortative and cross-socioeconomic group married couples. In addition, the
difference in the permanent risk estimates between assortative and cross-group couples
based on socioeconomic status is significantly different at the 90 per cent confidence
interval.
Moreover, the complementary findings show that the same pattern of marital choice
can be found based on the educational selection. The robustness test in Section 3.3
indicates that couples from the same educational background also have an advantage
over couples from different educational backgrounds. The findings support the role of
assortative marriages showing a higher insurance against adverse income shocks. This is
expressed in the lower levels of income risk for assortative married couples compared to
cross-group couples.
Further, Figure 3.2 reports the magnitude of the difference between permanent and
transitory income shock variances for married couples based on marital choice associated
with the socioeconomic status. Figure 3.2 shows the income risk estimates from 2010 to
2017. Thus, the magnitude of private insurance depends on marital choice. This finding
might be related to coordination of decision making and the net income risk associated
with the socioeconomic and occupational background of the spouse.
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Assortative Couples (AM) 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0019) (0.0023)
Sample Size 39,500
Cross Group Couples (CGM) 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0024)
Sample Size 17,624
Note: Cross Group Couples encounter higher transitory and permanent income
shock variances compared to assortative couples; Net Household Income; The
bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
*significant at p < 0.1; **significant at p < 0.05;




Figure 3.2: Household Income Risk based on Marital Choice,
Socioeconomic Status













Assortative Couples based on Socioeconomic Status
Cross Group Couple based on Socioeconomic Status















Notes: Figure 3.2 shows that cross group couples based on marital choice
associated with of the socioeconomic status encounter higher levels of income shock
variances compared to assortative couples from 2010 until 2017.
Discussion: Marital Choice based on Socioeconomic Status
In the following, I discuss the economic implications of the net income risk heterogeneity
associated with marital choice based on socioeconomic status in the UK (see Table 3.5).
I consider the impact of a one standard deviation change in the permanent income shock.
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The estimates in Table 3.5 show that assortative choice married couples face lower net
income risks and encounter a subsequently lower welfare loss with 1.57 per cent compared
to 2.71 per cent by cross-socioeconomic group married couples (see Table 3.5). The
current results provide evidence that married couples with an assortative choice strategy
show less income variation compared to the married couples of a cross group marital
choice. Consequently, the degree of marital insurance depends on marital choice.
Table 3.6 shows the probability of encountering a 20 or 50 per cent income gain or
loss. The decomposition is based on the marital choice of the married couples. The results
indicate that cross-group couples are 7.57 per cent likely to face an income loss of 20 per
cent due to an adverse income shock. In contrast, assortative couples face a 6.13 per
cent likelihood of encountering a 20 per cent income loss. The difference indicates that
assortative couples seem to have a lower income risk exposure, and thus supports the
finding that marital choice plays a role in mitigating income risk.
The distinct net income risk in marital choice is a reflection of the socioeconomic
and occupational background. The results in Table 3.4 indicate that cross-group married
couples face higher transitory and permanent income shock variances than assortative
couples. Factors that drive the net income risk heterogeneity in martial choice are related
to the spouse’s occupation. The UKHLS data shows that 41 per cent of cross-group
married couples have a spouse who works in a routine or manual occupation. The different
occupational background in cross-group marriages generates additional net income risk,
which the spouse would not have encountered if they had remained single. Consequently,
the income pooling results in additional income risk, which decreases the degree of private
insurance for cross-group couples.
In contrast, most assortative couples are from professional and higher management
occupations. This creates stronger private insurance against adverse income shocks, ex-
pressed in lower levels of income risk. A robustness test on the role of assortative choice
based on socioeconomic background would be to control for industries in which the spouses
of married couples work. This exercise could elicit information on the degree of insurance
based on marital choice. Yet, the UKHLS data set does not provide the necessary indus-
try level data for such an exercise. Consequently, the income levels associated with the
occupation of the couples is an underlying factor that partially explains the difference in
private insurance. The robustness check based on the synthetic sample that randomises
the spouses based on their original marital choice confirms the findings. The synthetic
income risk estimates provide the same ranking in the degree of private insurance based
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on marital choice. Further, complementary findings based on the educational background
of the marital choice indicate similar degrees of private insurance.
Nevertheless, assortative choice contributes to segregation in a society. Frémeaux
(2014), Frémeaux and Lefranc (2017) and Chiappori et al. (2020) find that an assortative
selection strategy reinforces the trend of rising income inequality. Married individuals
from the same socioeconomic background reduce social mobility, by reinforcing the con-
centration of wealth. The UKHLS data set indicates a similar pattern of assortative
couples across professional and higher management occupations. Blanden et al., (2001)
compares and contrasts estimates of the extent of intergenerational income mobility. They
argue that assortative choice marriage is an underlying factor that reduced social mobil-
ity between the 1970s and the late 1990s. The evidence of this analysis indicates that
assortative marital choice patterns mean that individuals have married within the same
socioeconomic status group during the past 10 years. As a result, the assortative marital
choice may have contributed to lower social mobility within the UK.
In summary, the findings indicate differing degrees of private insurance against income
risk based on marital choice. The results suggest that assortative married couples have
stronger private insurance than cross-group couples in terms of lower levels of net income
risk. The underlying factor that partially explains this pattern is associated with the
occupations held by spouses. Further, the assortative choice strategy may have reduced
social mobility, as like marries like.
Table 3.5: Utility Welfare Loss, Marital Choice based on Socioeconomic Status
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
Assortative Couples 14.58% 1.57%
Cross Group Couples 15.53% 2.71%
Note: Assortative couples face lower utility welfare losses compared to
cross group couples; Net Household Income; The loss indicates a one standard
deviation change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent
income shock from one period to the next.
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Table 3.6: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Marital Choice
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent











income gain>50%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.50)) 0.25% 0.45%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.20)) 10.32% 12.02%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.50)) 4.17% 8.20%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.80)) 6.13% 7.57%
Note: Assortative couples are less likely to encounter an adverse permanent income shock.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζh,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
3.5.3 Robustness Check: Counterfactual Exercise
I create a synthetic sample to remove any endogeneity and test the robustness of the
household risk by marital choice. Table 3.7 indicates the transitory and permanent income
shock variances of the actual and the synthetic samples (see section 3.7 for details of its
construction). The synthetic sample yields the same ranking of findings as the actual
sample, yet on a different magnitude. The difference in the magnitude of the net income
risk between the original and the synthetic sample implies that factors other than marital
choice might be contributing to the insurance mechanism.
In the original sample cross-socioeconomic group couples face higher net income risk,




= 0.0061 and the transitory




= 0.0207. Also in the synthetic sample cross-group









= 0.0192 income shock variances. The results in Table 3.7 indicate
that assortative choice households face lower permanent and transitory income shocks
compared to cross-group married couples. The lower level of transitory and permanent
income shock variances for assortative households can be translated as a form of insurance
because they face lower net income risk. Hence, the results indicate a net income risk
difference based on marital choice.
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Assortative Couples (AM) 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
s.e (0.0022) (0.0015)
Cross Group Couples (CGM) 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
s.e (0.0024) (0.0017)
Synthetic Marital Choice
Assortative Couples (AM) 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗
s.e (0.0011) (0.0008)
Cross Group Couples (CGM) 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
s.e (0.0013) (0.0010)
Notes: Table 3.7 shows that the same patterns of the original sample
are also found in the synthetic sample; Net Household Income;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications
and presented in parentheses;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant
p < 0.05;***significant p < 0.01; Level estimation.
Discussion Robustness Check: Counterfactual Exercise
The counterfactual exercise involves the creation of a synthetic sample in which the part-
ners of the couples are randomised based on their initial marital choice. The counterfac-
tual exercise supports the findings for marital choice in the original sample in Table 3.7.
The reduced net income risk of households with assortative couples reflects an advan-





= 0.0025 higher income shock variances compared to assortative
couples. Consequently, the synthetic sample supports the evidence of an advantage for
assortative couples compared to cross-group couples based on marital choice associated
with the socioeconomic status of their partner.
Further, Table 3.7 shows that the couples in the synthetic sample face lower income
shocks compared to those in the original sample. This indicates that by randomising the
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spouse based on marital choice net income risk decreases. This reduction in net income
risk reveals that other factors are playing a role in insuring couples against adverse income
shocks, such as positive covariance between spouses’incomes. The lower degree of risk in
the synthetic sample is probably related to the removal of a form of endogeneity.
3.5.4 Robustness Check
Marital Choice based on Education
This section focuses on the results of household risk by marital choice based on education
of households across the UK. The original work of Becker (1973, 1974) focused on assorta-
tive choice across couples based on education. The similar results between socioeconomic
background and education are to be expected, as highly educated individuals are likely
to obtain more well paid jobs, which reflects in the occupational background of socioeco-
nomic status. The similar patterns of results indicates that marital choice findings based
on socioeconomic status are robust.
The UKHLS data set provides information on the level of educational attainment for
all households and individuals. As a consequence, I use the following education categories:
‘university degree’, which includes those with an honours degree or equivalent; ‘interme-
diate education’for those with A-levels or equivalent, and ‘obligatory education’which
covers the remainder of the sample. On the basis of this classification I test whether
married couples of the same educational background have a similar advantage relative to
married couples from different educational backgrounds.
The results in Table 3.8 provide evidence for a stronger insurance mechanism for
assortative married households as they face lower net income risk, in terms of lower
variances in transitory (σ2
εAM.t
= 0.0431) and permanent (σ2
ζAMt
= 0.0101) income shocks.
The results indicate a considerably higher net income risk exposure for married couples
from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Married households on average face higher
variances in both, transitory income (σ2
εCGMt
= 0.0467)and permanent income shocks
(σ2
ζCGMt
= 0.0198). The risk ratio 2 reports the difference in net income risk and indicates
higher income volatility for couples who do not share the same educational background.
Further, the difference in the permanent risk estimates between assortative and cross-
group couples based on an educational marital choice is significantly different at the 90
per cent confidence interval. Consequently, the advantage for assortative married couples
based on education is also evident, emphasising the robustness of the findings.
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Assortative Couples (AM) 0.0431∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 2∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0025) (0.0017)
Sample Size 35,124
Cross Group Couples (CGM) 0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0019)
Sample Size 21,914
Notes: Table 3.8 shows that cross group couples encounter higher levels
of income shock variances; In Net Household Income; The bootstrap
standard errors are based on1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2
ζgt
; g refers to groups.
*significant at p < 0.1;p < 0.05;***significant p < 0.01; Level estimation.
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Figure 3.3 shows the estimation of net income risk from 2010 to 2017. The income
risk distinction is based on assortative and cross-group couples categorised by level of
education. It shows that couples who share the same educational background face lower
transitory and permanent income shocks compared to couples where partners are from
different educational backgrounds. The evidence in Figure 3.4 supports the findings in
Table 3.8, confirming the findings associated with socioeconomic background. It indi-
cates that households with the same characteristics such as education and socioeconomic
background face lower income risk compared to couples from different backgrounds. In
other words, assortative couples also show an advantage over cross-group couples where
on marital choice is classified by education.
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Figure 3.3: Household Income Risk based on Marital Choice, Education
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Notes: Figure 3.3 shows that cross group couples based on marital choice associated with the education
encounter higher levels of income shock variances compared to assortative couples from 2010 until 2017.
Discussion Marital Choice based on Education
In the following, I discuss net income risk associated with marital choice based on edu-
cation. The evidence of educational homogamy in Table 3.9 indicates patterns similar to
those for socioeconomic status. I consider the impact of a one standard deviation change
in the permanent income shock. The estimates in Table 3.9 show that assortative married
couples face lower net income risks and encounter a subsequently lower utility welfare loss
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of 1.62 per cent compared to 2.33 per cent for cross-socioeconomic married couples (see
Table 3.9). The results are similar to those based on socioeconomic status. The current
results provide evidence that married couples with an assortative choice strategy show
less income variation than couples with a cross-group marital choice. As a result, the
findings confirm the impact of marital choice on insurance against adverse income shocks,
indicating that the degree of marital insurance does depend on marital choice.
Table 3.8 shows the probability of couples facing a positive or negative income shock,
associated with different degrees of losses and gains. The results indicate that cross-
group couples are 5.63 per cent likely to face an income loss of 20 per cent due to an
adverse income shock. In contrast, assortative couples face a 1.31 per cent likelihood of
encountering a 20 per cent income loss. The results indicate that non-assortative couples,
based on education, have almost four times the likelihood of encountering an adverse
income shock. This iterates the findings based on the role of marital choice in mitigating
income risk. The results are similar to Hryshko et al. (2017) and Eike et al.(2019).
Table 3.9: Utility Welfare Loss, Marital Choice based on Education
Subgroup Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent
Assortative Couples 10.11% 1.62%
Cross Group Couples 13.88% 2.33%
Notes: Table 3.9 shows that cross group couples face higher utility welfare
losses compared to assortative couples; Net Household Income;
The loss indicates a one standard deviation change in the utility welfare
of a negative permanent income shock from one period to the next.
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Table 3.10: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Marital Choice based on Education
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent











income gain>20%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.20)) 0.02% 0.20%
income gain>50%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.50)) 3.46% 9.72%
income loss>50% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.50)) 2.64% 3.13%
income loss>20%: Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.80)) 1.31% 5.63%
Notes:Table 3.10 shows that cross group couples are more likely to face adverse permanent income shocks.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζh,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter measures the private insurance against adverse income shocks based on
marriage in the UK. It analyses the relationship between marriage, marital choice and
net income risk. I find that married individuals have an income insurance advantage
through income pooling compared to single individuals. Further, I find that amongst
married couples the degree of private insurance depends on marital choice. I consider the
socioeconomic background of the spouses within the marital choice. The analysis is based
on the PIH by Friedman (1957), which separates the income process into both transitory
and permanent components. The robustness test entails a counterfactual exercise in which
a synthetic sample is created. This randomises the spouses of each married couple based
on their marital choice which enables me to remove any endogeneity. This estimation
is based on the UKHLS survey, which contains socioeconomic information from the UK
between 2009 and 2018. The degree of income risk faced by individuals and married
couples is an important issue in understanding economic behaviour and for developing
government policies.
The main contribution lies in the findings on insurance opportunities arising from
marriage, based on marital status and marital choice. Individual risk by marital status
provides evidence for a private insurance mechanism through marriage. Single individuals
face higher levels of net income risk compared to married couples, and are also more likely
to face adverse income shocks compared to married individuals. Consequently, the results
indicate a marriage insurance mechanism, as expressed in lower levels of net income risk
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for married couples compared to single individuals. The underlying factor is the access
of married individuals to income pooling. This finding is in line with literature such as
Hyslop (2001), Antonovices and Town (2004), Christiansen et al. (2015), Autor (2014),
Greenwood et al. ( 2014), and Pestel (2017).
Moreover, the results reveal that the degree of private insurance through marriage de-
pends on marital choice. Private insurance is expressed in terms of lower income risk for
assortative married couples compared to cross-group married couples. The findings show
that marriage reduces income volatility for couples sharing the same socioeconomic char-
acteristics relative to couples who do not. Assortative married couples also face a 1.4 per
cent point lower probability of facing an adverse income shock of 20 per cent compared to
couples who differ across socioeconomic characteristics. The occupation associated with
the couples’partners might explain the additional income risk for cross-group couples.
Marital choice based on education indicates the same pattern. Consequently, the mag-
nitude of marriage insurance depends on marital choice, a conclusion supported by the
results from the synthetic sample of the counterfactual exercise.
Another key contribution is the statistical decomposition to quantify the effect of
marital choice on net income risk. The marital choice decomposition is an innovative
approach to examine the dynamics between marriage insurance and net income risk. The
decomposition by marital choice enables the analysis of private insurance based on mar-
riage. The robustness check entails a counterfactual exercise in which I create a synthetic
sample of married couples based on their marital choice by spouses’socioeconomic status.
Within this synthetic sample I randomise the partners based on their original marital
choice, namely assortative or cross-group socioeconomic choice. The income risk esti-
mates with the randomised partners indicate the same income risk pattern and support
the key findings.
From a policy maker’s perspective, the information on the impact of marriage related
to marital choice is useful for policy design. The results indicate the advantage for married
households compared to single individuals. The analysis suggests incorporating consid-
eration of adverse income shocks in the policy design. The design of taxes and benefits
should take into account the distinctive income risk exposures of married couples and
single individuals.
One limitation of this research concerns the time dimension of UKHLS from 2009 until
2018. This relatively short period does not allow for investigation of the long-run factors
such as the duration of marriages in the discussion of private insurance mechanisms.
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Another factor that should be highlighted is the possible attrition bias due to married
couples who divorce during the sample period. Further, the lack of industry level data does
not allow for additional robustness tests on the degree of private insurance for married
couples.
Future research should examine the duration of marriage, based on marital choice. A
suffi ciently large panel data set might provide insights as to whether marriages based on
shared background characteristics of the spouse are more long lasting. Such a discussion
could provide insight on how far marriage constitutes an insurance against adverse income
shocks. Another research question could focus on a policy analysis comparing married
and cohabiting couples. Consequently, there is scope for further analysis to contribute to




SOCIAL INSURANCE POLICIES AND
INCOME RISK IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
4.1 Introduction
This chapter quantifies the link between British welfare policy reform and net income
risk for welfare receiving households. Targeted welfare policies conditional on household
income can further supplement the need for self-insurance through a progressive welfare
system. They typically help low-income households to deal with the adverse shocks to
income, which are otherwise uninsurable due to incomplete markets. Therefore, changes
to the welfare framework have a direct impact on the well-being of programme recipients.
This is particularly relevant as the British welfare system is undergoing a major reform,
replacing the Legacy System with Universal Credit, which is less generous than the former
system (Brewer, 2019). In this analysis I exploit a natural experiment by examining
the impact of the welfare scheme reform in the UK on the level of income risk that
the households face. This contributes to the understanding of how the design of welfare
policies affects the social insurance of welfare-receiving households, faced with unexpected
income changes.
The main finding is of a rise in net income risk for households under Universal Credit.
In contrast, the income risk for households under the Legacy System and Non-Welfare
receiving households is stable. Further, households under Universal Credit are almost
twice as likely to face an adverse permanent income shock of 10 per cent compared to
households under the Legacy System. This likelihood increases even further if children
are present in the household. This difference is explained by newly implemented policy
measures such as the benefit reductions of Universal Credit. As a result, this implies a
need to take account of income risks in the design of welfare policies.
This analysis contributes to the literature through its novel findings on the develop-
ment of net income risk associated with a British welfare reform. Labour market earnings
constitute the main source of income for most households. For low-income households,
income also often includes benefits from welfare policies such as cash benefits, benefit
transfers, and tax credits. These programmes reduce the after-tax, after-benefit level of
income volatility for households with limited resources (Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002; Belfield,
2017; Brendler, 2020). Yet, the welfare support potentially amplifies income instability if
programme receiving households face benefit reductions and depend on eligibility criteria.
It is not yet well understood how changes in welfare policies affect programme receiving
households. The literature provides sparse evidence on the dynamics between income risk
and changes in welfare support. Consequently, this thesis contributes to the debate by
measuring net income risk associated with the British welfare reform for welfare receiving
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households.
The process of restructuring the British welfare system is a part of the austerity
package in response to the Great Financial Crisis in 2007/08. The transition of British
welfare policies from the Legacy System to Universal Credit was initiated with the Welfare
Reform Act in April 2012. It was launched offi cially in 2015 across the United Kingdom.
The key aims of Universal Credit are to (i) simplify the administrative body of the Legacy
System, (ii) decrease poverty and (iii) make work pay (UK government, 2020). The
simplification occurs through repackaging six benefit types in the former system into
one ’universal’package. The decrease in poverty and the idea of making work pay are
addressed through considerable regulatory changes (Brewer, 2019). Thus, the underlying
idea of the new welfare policy is to decrease the costs of welfare support while motivating
progress into employment.
The regulatory changes associated with Universal Credit have led to a controversial
debate. It is unclear whether the new framework addresses its key aims while providing
social insurance to households under the programme. The implementation of Universal
Credit is associated with considerable reductions in benefit payments compared to the
former system. The decrease in payments under Universal Credit is intended to moti-
vate households to increase their employment levels (Department for Work and Pensions,
2019). Yet, the benefit reduction also causes income variability, which decreases the so-
cial insurance provided by Universal Credit. Brewer et al. (2020) and DeAgostini (2017)
show that households face considerable financial losses, associated with significant benefit
reductions under the new programme. Consequently, the new Universal Credit frame-
work may increase net income risk for welfare receiving households. Understanding the
role of income risk is important if effective stabilisation, stimulus policies and government
insurance programmes are to be formulated.
The ongoing reform offers a unique natural policy experiment. The United Kingdom
Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS) contains welfare information of households from
2009 to 2018 under each welfare policy. Since 2015 eligible households only receive benefits
by applying for Universal Credit. This phase refers to the natural migration. In a second
phase from January 2019 the ’managed migration’was launched. During this second phase
households from the Legacy System are transferred to the Universal Credit framework.
The second phase of the managed migration is not included in this analysis. I use the first
phase of the natural migration as part of the natural policy experiment. This structure
enables me to create an independent sample of households under each policy from 2009
until 2018. The longitudinal structure of UKHLS permits a comparison of the size of net
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income risk for welfare receiving households under each policy. The comparison between
both welfare policies over the same period reveals new findings on the design of welfare
policies.
I follow the PIH to captures the extent to which households experience sizable unantic-
ipated income changes. The associated uncertainty in future income can be split into two
stochastic components, i) permanent and ii) transitory (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Meghir,
2004). The nature of the two components is shaped by their characteristics (see chapter
1 for a detailed review).
The estimation method focuses on income dynamics, based on the approach by Heath-
cote et al. (2010). In particular, the idiosyncratic component of income is modelled as
a sum of two sub-components, a purely transitory and a permanent one (see eq. (1.2)
and (1.3)). I exploit the variance-covariance structure of the idiosyncratic income com-
ponent to estimate the properties of the distribution of transitory and permanent income
shocks. The idiosyncratic income component is approximated as the residual of a first step
Mincerian regression, partialling out such observables as age, region, household size and
year effects (Mincer, 1974). The direct comparison before and after the implementation
of Universal Credit provides a natural experiment, facilitating comparison of household
income risk between both social welfare policies.
This chapter comprises six sections. Section 4.2 offers a literature review, which elab-
orates on current empirical and theoretical evidence. Section 4.3 provides information
on the dataset. Section 4.4 reflects on the methodology applied and section 4.5 provides
the income risk estimates with suggestions on the implications of the results. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Social Insurance Policy
This section discusses the role of conditional social insurance for welfare receiving house-
holds. The social insurance is conditional as only low-income households are eligible to
apply for the welfare support associated with the Legacy System and Universal Credit.
The main findings in the literature are discussed, highlighting key factors that contribute
to social insurance such as the redistributive nature of the welfare system, its progressive-
ness, the size and type of benefit payments.
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Social insurance influences the size of adverse income shocks. Government policies
can supplement or partly replace the need for self-insurance, through taxes and benefits
which are accessible to all households. Current empirical findings provide a consensus on
income risk mitigation through policy support. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Blundell
et al. (2008) find that a key factor that blunts the transmission of adverse income shocks
into consumption choice derives from government policies. As a consequence, partial
self-insurance or social insurance can mitigate the impact of adverse permanent income
shocks (Blundell et al., 2008; Blundell and Etheridge, 2010; Heathcote et al., 2010; Dolls
et al., 2012; Blundell et al., 2013; Blundell et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2017; Bush et al., 2020;
DeNardi et al.,2021). In particular, during economic recessions, the government provides
social insurance for individuals or households (Guvenen et al., 2014; Belfield et al., 2017).
This work contributes to the social insurance literature by measuring changes in net
income risk based on the British welfare reform. A large part of the literature focuses on
the mitigation of income risk through welfare policies. Empirical findings indicate several
key channels such as the progressiveness of the welfare system, and the redistributive
size of benefit payments and tax credits. In particular, during economic downturns, social
insurance supports households with limited resources (Bitler et al., 2017). It complements
work on changes in social insurance, including Kniesner and Ziliak (2002), Hood and
Oakley (2004), Gregg et al. (2009), Blundell et al. (2008), Brewer and Wren-Lewis
(2012), Heathcote et al. (2016), Brewer et al. (2017), Doll et al. (2017), Blundell et al.
(2018), Cribb et al. (2018), Avram et al. (2019), De Nardi et al. (2019) and Brendler et
al. (2020). Yet, it is not well understood how changes in welfare support affect receiving
households. The new structure of welfare programmes can amplify income instability
for welfare receiving households whether through benefit reductions or stricter eligibility
criteria. To date, this chapter is the first to address how welfare reforms affect household
income risk and social insurance for programme recipients.
To investigate social insurance dynamics, comparative policy experiments are a stan-
dard method used in the literature. Gregg et al. (2005) examine the change in household
expenditures following the increase in British child support in the 1990s. They find that
the increase in child support increases the consumption choices of low-income households
after the reform (Gregg et al., 2005). Similarly, Blundell et al. (2016) create a policy
experiment based on British welfare reforms between 1992 and 2002. In particular, they
examine the impact of the reforms on female labour supply, finding considerable elas-
ticity in labour supply amongst lone mothers. Further, Dolls et al. (2017) explore the
fiscal responses of the Great Financial Crisis (GFS) between the European Union and
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the USA. They test the change and effectiveness of the welfare systems after the crisis in
2007/2008 in these economies. This work provides a unique analysis based on the natural
policy experiment offered by British welfare reform. The comparison between the Legacy
System and Universal Credit provides new findings on the impact of welfare reforms on
net income risk. It also gives a new perspective on the economic implications of social
insurance for welfare receiving households.
The redistributive nature of the welfare system induces social insurance. A progressive
welfare policy redistributes resources to low-income households. In the UK, the poorest
fifth receives 16 times more in benefits and taxes as a share of their net income than the
highest-income fifth (Brewer et al., 2019; Hudson Sharp et al., 2017). The redistribution
process of the British welfare framework through benefits and tax credits generates partial
insurance against adverse income shocks (Blundell et al., 2008; Blundell et al., 2016). It
enables welfare receiving households to smooth adverse income shocks across time. Fur-
ther, Halvorsen et al. (2019), De Nardi et al. (2019; 2021) and Bush et al. (2020) report
that the progressive Norwegian and Dutch welfare systems contribute towards reducing
the effect of the negatively skewed labour income. In particular, government transfers are
a key source of insurance against adverse income shocks. They offset some of the largest
declines in income (Bush et al., 2020). Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that the
progressive nature of the welfare systems is a key factor in protecting households against
adverse income risks. This chapter contributes to the ongoing discussion by comparing
the degree of income risk under the two policies which differ in the nature of welfare
support offered.
In the presence of a less generous welfare system, households resort to other insurance
mechanisms. De Nardi et al. (2019) show that insurance through family networks plays
a much larger role in the USA than in the Netherlands. The divergent trends in net
income risk in the Netherlands and the USA are due to the nature of the policy regimes.
Another insurance mechanism occurs through income pooling. Pruitt and Turner (2020)
use administrative data from the USA and find that the probability of the spouse entering
employment rises when the male experiences earnings losses. Thus, in the absence of
welfare support, family networks and spousal income pooling protect against adverse
income shocks.
The generosity of benefits payments contributes to the size of social insurance. Benefits
are a direct tool against adverse income shocks because they support the financial liquidity
of households by increasing the amount of disposable income available. This enables
households to smooth consumption against adverse income shocks from one period to
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the next. Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) find that annual consumption variation is reduced
by almost 20 per cent due to the explicit and implicit income smoothing of the welfare
system. Moreover, Bitler et al. (2017) and Cribb (2018) emphasise the positive impact of
the expansion of benefit payments, during the 1990s and 2000s. They find that the benefit
expansion reduces income variation in the UK. Consequently, benefits provide explicit
insurance by partially offsetting adverse income shocks for welfare receiving households.
Child tax credits are an indirect benefit to support low-income households with chil-
dren. The child tax credit is a means-tested payment which is part of the new Universal
Credit package and aimed at households with children, in contrast to child benefit, which
is a flat rate to all households with children independent of their income. The child tax
credit has been available since 2003 to low-income families irrespective of work status. It
is accessible for households with a labour income below £ 32,000, which is paid on top of
the child benefit. Thus, the child tax credit supports vulnerable households against finan-
cial challenges. Brewer et al. (2005) and DeNardi et al. (2021) emphasise the key role
of the generosity of tax credits that have supported net income growth among low-wage
households for benefit receiving households in the UK. Avram et al. (2019) show that
cash benefits and income-dependent refundable tax credits reduce UK household income
volatility by around a quarter. Thus, direct and indirect benefits create social insurance
against adverse income shocks.
Current literature highlights the impact of financial support for children. Households
under a welfare programme with children are particularly vulnerable to adverse income
shocks due to their family structure. Targeted welfare support for these households such
as child tax credit plays a key role in giving financial relief. Dahl and Lochner (2012)
provide evidence that high levels of income instability affects a child’s achievement in
mathematics and reading. They use an instrumental variable approach to test how the
expansion of earned income tax credit affects the child’s potential in mathematics and
reading. The study indicates a positive impact of the increase in household income through
tax credits on children’s mathematics and reading test scores1. As a result, child-specific
welfare affects the potential health and educational development of children. Reductions
in child support can amplify stress levels of both parent and child (Leete and Bania, 2009;
Adams et al., 2016; Wolf and Morrissey, 2017; Hardy and Hill, 2019, DeNardi et al.,2021).
Therefore, examining the level of income risk associated with changes in child tax credit
under Universal Credit provides new insight on the link between income risk and welfare
1Dahl and Lochner (2012) baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises contempo-
raneous math and reading test scores by 6 percent of a standard deviation.
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programmes.
Welfare policies play a key role during recessions. In an economic downturn, incomes
are more likely to drop and induce financial losses than creating financial gains (Guvenen
et al., 2014; Wolf and Morrissey, 2017; Pruit and Turner, 2020). Therefore, welfare policy
support during recessions is particularly important for households with limited resources
as the likelihood of adverse income shocks increases. The social insurance created by
welfare policies helps mitigate the impact of the adverse income shocks. Blundell and
Etheridge (2010) and Avram et al. (2019) highlight that the British welfare system
partially offsets the impact of recessions on the lower quintals of the income distribution.
Their findings illustrate the alleviation of adverse income shocks through welfare policies.
4.2.2 Income Risk and Universal Credit
Universal Credit represents a major transformation of the British welfare framework.
While the principles of social insurance, simplification and making work pay are key aims
of the ongoing reform, questions remain about Universal Credit’s ability to deliver on those
aims. Some of the initial policy choices around Universal Credit, coupled with subsequent
revisions over the last few years, have led to concerns regarding their feasibility to provide
social insurance (Brewer, 2020). Therefore, this section discusses the dynamics between
income risk and changes associated with Universal Credit.
The standard approach to analyse income risk is based on the PIH (Friedman, 1957).
This approach assumes that the income stream consists of two components, which are
characterised by the nature of income shock variances (see eq. (1.2) and (1.3)). The
permanent component reflects the expected income over the life cycle and translates
to permanent income differences between households. The reasons for these permanent
differences can be traced (among others) to job displacement, changes in returns to edu-
cation, or severe injuries. In contrast, a transitory component reflects fast mean reversion
income changes such as bonus payments or unemployment spells or lottery wins (Meghir
and Pistaferri, 2011). Consequently, the nature of income risk differs depending on its
characteristics (see Chapter 1 for more details).
The PIH asserts that a household’s consumption and savings choices respond dif-
ferently to permanent income shocks compared to transitory ones. Permanent income
shocks directly translate into consumption choices, while transitory income shocks may
be smoothed throughout periods. An increase in the variance of permanent income shocks
127
leads to a decrease in welfare, because households have to save more to be better pre-
pared for income volatility and especially adverse income shocks. However, if a household
cannot smooth income shocks, due to liquidity constraints, welfare losses can also arise
from transitory income shocks (see Chapter 1 for an in-depth review).
This is particularly relevant for households that have limited private resources. Low-
income households face financial challenges and receive financial support through the
welfare system. As a result, they are vulnerable to changes in the welfare framework
that is less generous as it increases the exposure to net income risk (Blundell, Pistaferri
and Preston, 2008). The implementation of Universal Credit is associated with benefit
reductions, which decrease net income for welfare receiving households and increase ex-
posure to a given level of income risk. Brewer et al. (2018) and Bernard (2019) show
that households under Universal Credit face financial losses (DeAgostini, 2017; Brewer et
al., 2018; Cribb, 2018; Hudson Sharp et al., 2018). The new policy regulations associated
with Universal Credit thus influence a household’s exposure to net income risk.
This chapter contributes to the literature by measuring net income risk in the light
of the transition from the Legacy System to Universal Credit. Given the lower generos-
ity of Universal Credit, changes in net income risk can be observed in a natural policy
experiment.
Further, dependency on the level of benefit payments has a direct impact on the con-
sumption choices of households under a welfare policy. The benefit reductions associated
with Universal Credit mean that households need to adjust their consumption choices and
select cheaper alternatives. Thompson et al. (2017) and Loopstra et al. (2018) find that
the demand for food bank donations increases in the areas where Universal Credit has
been implemented. The adjustment in consumption choices in these areas might indicate
the impact of permanent income risk based on the implementation of Universal Credit.
The comparison between both welfare policies over the same period reveals new in-
sights on household net income risk associated with the implementation of Universal
Credit. The new regulatory framework incorporates an employment conditionality, which
drives fluctuations in worked hours per week, increases income variability and thereby
induces income risk (Adam and Browne, 2013). The income variability occurs through
changing employment types, for example in favour of part-time or zero-hours contracts.
These policies can generate additional income risk via the reduced social insurance over
labour income changes. As a consequence, income streams are more volatile under Uni-
versal Credit.
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The changes associated with Universal Credit direct the British welfare structure to-
wards a regressive system. In other words, the largest impacts are felt by those with
lower incomes. Portes and Reed (2018) find that those in the bottom two deciles will lose,
on average, approximately 10 per cent of net income, with much smaller losses for those
higher up the income distribution. They show that adverse impacts are particularly large
for households with more disabled members, and individuals with more severe disabili-
ties, as well as for lone parents on low incomes. Key drivers for these developments lie
in the freeze in working-age benefit rates, changes to disability benefits and a reduction
in Universal Credit rates. Thus, the degree of social insurance is affected by Universal
Credit changes.
Current studies highlight an uneven regional impact and diverse local impact of Uni-
versal Credit regulations for welfare receiving households. Betty et al. (2011) show the
regional effects of Universal Credit. They find a difference in financial benefit loss per
capita that is four times greater in Blackpool compared to Hampshire (Betty et al., 2011).
Jackson and Nixon (2013) focus on the local impact of the welfare reform in Manchester.
Their estimation indicates a potential reduction of £ 45 million a year in the local area of
Manchester (Jackson and Nixon, 2012). Similarly, Edwards et al. (2013) find a consider-
able proportion of the loss in North-East England is attributable to benefit reductions for
disabled people. It is estimated that over 70,000 people in the North East are affected by
the time-limiting of contribution-based Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and
the stricter eligibility criteria. This chapter contributes to the literature with a national
analysis that emphasises the changes in net income risk for households under Universal
Credit.
According to Goulden (2020), child poverty is at an unprecedented high in the UK,
exacerbated by reductions in child tax credit. Hood and Waters (2017) show that absolute
child poverty has increased by around four percentage points based on the Universal Credit
regulations. They emphasise that of this increase, around three quarters is attributable to
benefit and child tax credit changes, which increase the exposure to adverse income shocks
for households with children. In particular, households with three or more children see
particularly large losses due to the two child limit (Portes and Reed, 2018). Consequently,
the design of Universal Credit regulations influences the degree of child poverty in the
United Kingdom.
The empirical evidence indicates an uneven distribution of welfare support across
households under Universal Credit. Brewer et al. (2019) and De Agostini et al. (2018)
emphasise that under the new policies of Universal Credit low-income households with
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children and single parents encounter less benefit support. They estimate in a microsim-
ulation model that households in the bottom 10 per cent of the income distribution on
average lose the most due to Universal Credit (Brewer et al., 2018). Lone parents, who
are more likely to have low incomes, lose on average 2 per cent of their disposable income,
as a consequence of the benefit reductions (De Agostini et al., 2018). However, while vul-
nerable households face considerable financial constraints induced by Universal Credit, in
contrast, the evidence indicates that dual-earner households and pensioners benefit from
the new regulations (DeAgostini et al., 2018).
4.2.3 British Welfare System
This section reviews the welfare policy changes in the UK and, in particular, the transfor-
mation of the welfare framework from the Legacy System to Universal Credit, including
changes therein (see Appendix D for a detailed review of Universal Credit).
The British welfare system has been considerably expanded since the late 1990s. The
characteristics of the scheme have shifted away from the three main income-related, out-
of-work benefits (incapacity benefit, income support and unemployment benefit, which
made up 25 per cent of welfare spending in 1987- 88 but only 9 per cent in 2017-18) and
towards tax credits, housing benefit and cost-related disability benefits (Gardiner, 2019).
The government increased the generosity of social assistance and tax credits from 1997
to 2010, intending to minimise child poverty (Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). However, since
2011 the British government has focused on austerity policies to address the impact of
the Great Financial Crisis in 2007/2008. In 2013 the government implemented a set of
reductions to means-tested working-age benefit as part of a package of post-recession fiscal
consolidation measures. The reductions associated with the fiscal consolidation resulted
in the welfare reform and the implementation of Universal Credit (see Appendix D4 for
detailed review).
The fiscal austerity measures have direct implications for the generosity and reach of
anti-poverty programmes and the welfare system. Along with these measures, Universal
Credit was launched in 2015, as part of a package contained in the Welfare Reform Act in
2012 (Smith and Freud, 2012). Under current plans, Universal Credit is expected to be
fully rolled out by December 2023. The policy is a repackaged version of the former Legacy
System. It is designed to simplify the benefits system, reduce poverty and incentivises
paid work, while providing a social insurance framework (Brewer et al., 2019).
130
The simplification process means that the six benefit types of the Legacy System are
combined in one ’universal’system, replacing the six-means tested benefits and tax credits
with one single payment scheme. These means-tested benefits are working tax credit,
child tax credit, income-based job seeker’s allowance, income support, income-related
employment and support allowance and housing benefit. The simplification process also
aims to facilitate access to benefit payments. Furthermore, through different incentives,
Universal Credit seeks to decrease poverty and increase employment stability. The key
measures to achieve these aims are summarised as follows:
• Limiting the child element of Universal Credit to two children for new claims (July
Budget 2015).
• Removing the family element in Universal Credit for new claims (July Budget 2015).
• Reducing the income disregards and work allowances in Universal Credit (July Bud-
get 2015).
• Uprating the minimum income floor with the National Living Wage (Autumn State-
ment 2015).
• Reducing the taper rate to 63 per cent (Autumn Statement 2018).
The key measures are facilitated through financial and non-financial incentives. The
financial incentives are reflected in benefit reductions. This refers to reductions in en-
titlements of £ 2 billion per annum, a 5-year benefit payment freeze and the two-child
limit. The benefit reductions aim to encourage households to find employment or in-
crease currently worked hours. Within the framework of financial incentives, one of the
most extensive reductions focuses on the taper rate and its associated work allowance.
The taper rate reflects the number of hours that a benefit recipient is allowed to work.
It means that 63 pence is deducted from the work allowance for every additional hour
worked. This amount is reduced from the benefit payment. In contrast, under the Legacy
System, withdrawal of benefits was dependent on family and marital status and on hous-
ing status ((Department for Work and Pensions, 2019). Consequently, the welfare support




This chapter focuses on household net income risk. I construct the households based on
the information provided by the UKHLS data set. Given the information on household
identifiers, I obtain households with several household members. A household consists
of either one person living alone, or a group of people (not necessarily related) living at
the same address (UKHLS, 2019). I also include children of the respective household if
they are reported. The head of the household is between 25 and 60 years of age with
a positive income. To examine income risk and social insurance it is essential to create
a homogeneous sample with comparable information. All imputed income variables are
dropped and only households with positive income included. To account for inflation, the
income variables are deflated using the retail price index (RPI). In addition, to consider
possible outliers, I trim the top and bottom of the observations of income variables in
any wave at 0.25 per cent. These processes enable me to create a homogeneous household
sample, which maintains the same households across all waves.
The transition from the Legacy System to Universal Credit is shaped by two migration
types. These types refer to the natural and the managed migration of programme recip-
ients. The natural migration constitutes the launch of Universal Credit in 2015. With
the offi cial implementation of the programme new claims to the Legacy System are no
longer possible. From January 2019 the government piloted the second migration: the
managed migration, which refers to the movement of existing benefit claimants from the
Legacy System to Universal Credit. The full managed migration was enacted in 2020.
The UKHLS data set maintains information for the Legacy System from 2009 until 2018
and for Universal Credit from 2015 until 2018. The migration framework of the sample
does not include information on the managed migration, which ensures that the welfare
policy samples are independent and do not overlap. The phase 2 managed migration is not
part of this analysis. Consequently, the natural migration process during phase 1 allows
me to examine the natural policy experiment in the form of a welfare policy comparison
from 2009 until 2018. This period includes the implementation of Universal Credit and
the natural migration phase.
The UKHLS provides socioeconomic information on households under both British
welfare schemes from 2009 until 2018. To understand the size of social insurance gen-
erated by welfare systems, it is crucial to split the data set into periods based on the
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implementation of Universal Credit. Consequently, this analysis considers two periods,
divided by the implementation date of Universal Credit in wave 5, which translates into
years 2014/2015. Period 1 covers information from wave one until wave five. While pe-
riod 2 contains information from wave six to wave nine. The comparison between the two
periods offers new insight onto income risk patterns and the size of social insurance for
each welfare system (see Table 4.1).
The nature of the policy comparison requires samples that represent households un-
der each welfare system. The creation of the sample depends on the accessibility of the
UKHLS information. The information on Legacy System households can be accessed di-
rectly as the data set offers clear variables throughout the sample period. Consequently,
I create a Legacy System sample based on the UKHLS variables (see variable section).
Similarly, the UKHLS data set reports information on households under the new, Uni-
versal Credit system, in period 2. To examine the households under Universal Credit in
period 1 I track the households based on the household identifier, which enables me to
find the households in each period. Consequently, the ’tracked Universal Credit’sample
maintains households in period 1 that receive Universal Credit in period 2 (see Table
4.1 and Appendix D4 for more details on the variable construction). In addition, I also
include households that do not receive any welfare support under either system. The
sample of non-welfare households is a baseline. Their income is too high, which excludes
them from receiving additional welfare support. The creation of clear samples enables the
comparison of both welfare systems.
Figure 4.1 shows the average net income of each sample from 2010 until 2017. It shows
the net labour income for each welfare system and households under no welfare scheme.
Households that never received any welfare payments have the highest net average income
over time. A difference in net income between the Legacy System and Universal Credit
can be observed. Households under the Legacy System receive higher net average income
relative to households under Universal Credit.
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Table 4.1: Data Structure












the period structure by wave.
Figure 4.1: Net Average Income based on Welfare Schemes in the UK















Source: UKHLS, own calculations
UC implementation
Notes: Figure 4.1 indicates that households under Universal Credit receive the lowest net
income compared to the other groups; based on net weekly household income.
134
4.3.2 Variables
My benchmark measure of income is weekly net labour income because it captures key
information on income volatility. Moreover, as some programme recipients might not have
additional income using net labour income, the net income reflects benefit payments. I
use weekly net wages as a measure for income: it is the standard approach in the literature
within the UK, and therefore, for the purpose of comparability I use the same measure.
The UKHLS provides income data on a monthly basis. Consequently, I calculate the
weekly income variable based on the available monthly income information. In doing so,
I multiply the monthly wages by 12 and then divide it by 52 weeks, which results in a
measure for an average net weekly wage. It is a precise measure of income changes which
is found in related literature such as Avram et al.(2019), Blundell and Etheridge (2010)
and Heathcote et al.(2010).
To compare income risk patterns based on welfare schemes, it is essential to create
distinct groups according to whether they are benefits recipients or not, and whether they
are LS or Universal Credit recipients. The information of the Legacy System is based on
six different variables that reflect the distinct benefit types. To construct the indicator
variable for the ’Legacy System’I pooled information from the following benefit types: i)
income support; ii) income-based jobseeker’s allowance; iii) income-related employment
and support allowance; iv) housing benefit; v) child tax credit and; vi) working tax credit
(See Appendix D4.1).
The UKHLS dataset does not report emergency benefits. As a result, the analysis
does not include discretionary hardship or crisis payments, which households can claim
in emergencies, or schemes put in place by the governments of Scotland or Northern Ire-
land which currently provide some (albeit limited) financial hardship mitigation through
supplementary payments.
The key samples of this chapter are households under a welfare scheme. To analyse the
income risk exposure under the Legacy System and Universal Credit, I focus on net labour
income of households, which represents the income after benefit payments and tax credits
have been added, providing evidence of the dynamics related to the welfare schemes.
As a baseline I also consider households who never have been under a welfare scheme, to
provide an additional income risk comparison. Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics
in period 1 for households under the Legacy System, future Universal Credit households
(in period 2) and households under no welfare scheme.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Income in Period 1
Variables Mean SD Max. Min.
Non-Welfare Scheme Households (NWS)
Net Labour Income NWS 341.88 179.02 1571.82 3.60
Benefit receiving Households (BRH)
Legacy System 288.80 126.00 1231.86 6.16
Tracked Universal Credit 279.60 122.93 972.02 44.01
Notes: Table 4.2 highlights that NWS have the highest net income in period 1.
Income based on net weekly household income; Tracked Universal Credit
households are households that receive Universal Credit in period 2;
Period 1 refers to 2009 until 2015.
Table 4.3 provides the descriptive statistics of net labour income for period 2. It shows
how Universal Credit recipients on average receive considerably less income compared the
households under the Legacy System. Households under no welfare scheme earn the
highest net income.
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Income in Period 2
Variables Mean SD Max. Min.
Non-Welfare Scheme Households (NWS)
Net Labour Income NWS 346.28 180.35 1377.24 1.170
Benefit receiving Households (BRH)
Legacy System 288.56 124.18 1377.24 17.54
Universal Credit 246.55 119.87 1015.32 6.31
Notes: Table 4.3 highlights that NWS have the highest net income in.
in period 2; Income based on net weekly household income;




This section describes the model used in this analysis. It follows the approach by Blundell
and Etheridge (2010) and Heathcote et al., (2010), who analyse trends in income dynamics
in the UK and the USA respectively. I focus on the UK and use the panel data from the
UKHLS over the time horizon from 2009 to 2018. In line with the literature, I analyse
the ’residual’dispersion based on the level identification scheme seen also in Brzozowski
et al., (2010), Fuchs-Schündeln et al., (2010), Heathcote et al., (2010). In this chapter,
the focus is on welfare receiving households.
I consider household log weekly net income, ygh,c,t, for a household h, belonging to a
cohort c and population subgroup g, and observed in year t. I assume the following model




which means that the log net income consist of a determinist (or explained by observ-
ables) linear part βgXh,c,t and a residual (unexplained or idiosyncratic) part u
g
h,c,t. Xh,c,t
includes a constant term, a quadratic in experience approximated by age, dummies for
region of residence, dummy for gender, dummy for marital status and time fixed effects.
Following Blundell and Etheridge (2010) I also include as a regressor the logarithm of the
household size. The superscript g denotes the four subgroups defined by the combination
of three variables: sex (men and women), education (degree holders or not)2. Moreover,
I consider three cohorts. Controlling for the observables captures the idea that expected
changes to income do not represent risk (see Japelli and Pistaferri, 2017). Of key interest
are the income risk patterns between the welfare receiving households under the Legacy
System and Universal Credit.
I further assume that the residual term, ugh,c,t, consists of two components, a perma-
nent component, pgh,c,t, and a transitory component, ε
g
h,c,t; the permanent component is
a random walk while the transitory component is a purely i.i.d shock. In addition, the
two components are additive (in logs). The formal expression of ugh,c,t, can be found in
Chapter 1 Section 3 and 4.
2Analytically, the four subgroups are: i) male, degree; ii) male, no degree; iii) female, degree; iv)
female, no degree.
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4.5 Results and Discussion
This section outlines the estimates and economic implications of the natural policy ex-
periment. The main finding indicates a rise of net income risk for households under
Universal Credit. In contrast, the income risk for households under the Legacy System
households and non welfare receiving households is stable. Further, households under
Universal Credit are more exposed to income risk. They are almost twice as likely to
face an adverse permanent income shock of 10 per cent compared to households under
the Legacy System. The likelihood increases even further if children are in the household.
This difference is explained by the newly implemented policy measures such as benefit re-
ductions through Universal Credit. Consequently, welfare receiving households encounter
higher net income risk under Universal Credit compared to the Legacy System.
The ongoing reform offers a unique natural policy experiment, to compare income
risk under the Legacy System and Universal Credit. To this end I separate the sample
into two periods based on the implementation of Universal Credit in 2015. This allows
examination of the development of income risk before and after the policy reform. The
income risk is expressed in the form of permanent and transitory income shock variances.
Given the considerable change in the policy framework between the Legacy System and
Universal Credit it is expected that income risk will be affected.
Within this chapter I focus on the of 10 per cent, 20 per cent and 30 per cent likelihood
of encountering a labour income gain/loss. The change in the probabilities is based on
the low income of the households who receive support either under the Legacy System
or Universal Credit. Consequently, I focus on different probabilities of permanent income
shocks.
Moreover, I calculate the risk ratio based on the type of policy support. The risk
ratio is defined as the ratio of the permanent income shocks based on Universal Credit
and Legacy System households. It expresses the differences and the degree of income
variation between the respective households receiving policy support. A high level of
risk ratio indicates a high degree of permanent income shocks resulting in higher income
variation. In contrast, a low risk ratio indicates few permanent income shocks indicating
income stability. It is an indicator of income variability related to permanent income
shocks and supports the economic relevance of this chapter. The impact of an adverse
income shock on welfare receiving households is also analysed. The approach follows the
utility welfare loss based on standard deviations in Chapter 1 (see 1.5 for more details).
The well-being analysis is complemented by a probability exercise.
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4.5.1 Social Insurance Policy Results
Table 4.3 shows the net income risk estimates of each welfare system during period 1. It
reports net income risk for households under the Legacy System and the tracked house-
holds under Universal Credit in period 1: year 2009 until 2015. The net income risk
is expressed in transitory and permanent income shock variances. The group ’tracked
households’refers to the sample of households in period 1 who receive Universal Credit in
the future. Through the household identifier code it is possible to track the households in
both periods. The results in Table 4.4 indicate that tracked Universal Credit households
face lower permanent income shock variance, with a difference of σ2
ζgt
= 0.0086 compared
to Legacy System households. The difference in permanent risk estimates between the
households under the Legacy System and Universal Credit is significantly different at the
90 per cent confidence interval. Households that do not receive any benefits face the
highest net income risk exposure σ2
ζgt
= 0.0143.
In period 1 tracked Universal Credit households have not yet applied for the new wel-
fare scheme. Hence, these estimates represent households in employment, which explains
the lower net income risk exposure compared to households under the Legacy System.
During period 1 tracked Universal Credit households were mainly in semi-skilled and
routine jobs based on the data set (UKHLS, 2019).
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Legacy System Households (LS) 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0011)
Sample Size 24,447
Tracked Universal Credit Households (TUC) 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0062) (0.0003)
Sample Size 1,467
Non-Welfare Scheme Households (NWS) 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0013)
Sample Size 27,066
Notes: Table 4.4 reports that NWS encounter the highest level of permanent income shock
variance; TUC sample are households that receive Universal Credit in period 2;
∗∗∗ indicates p-value<0.01; ∗∗indicates p-value<0.05; ∗indicates p-value
<0.1. The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and are
presented in parentheses;Period 1 refers to 2009 until 2015; g refers to groups.
Table 4.5 provides information on net income risk exposure based on the two welfare
policies in period 2 from 2015 until 2018. It shows a increase in net income risk exposure
for households under Universal Credit. This increase translates into a lower net income
risk mitigation effect under Universal Credit. The permanent income shock variance of
Universal Credit households is σ2
ζgt
= 0.0190 higher compared to Legacy System house-
holds in period 2. The permanent risk estimates between the households under the two
systems are significantly different at the 90 per cent confidence interval. The permanent
income shock more than doubles for households under Universal Credit across the two
periods. A comparison between period 1 and period 2 indicates that the permanent in-
come shock variance for households under the Legacy System changes only marginally.
Further, the marginal change in net income risk exposure for households under the Legacy
System across period 1 and 2 provides evidence of lower income variation, as the risk has
not changed considerably.
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To create a baseline I also consider the net income risk of non-welfare policy house-
holds. These households are not receiving welfare benefits under either system. Consid-
ering the net income risk estimates between period 1 and period 2 the results show that
net income risk does not change (see Table 4.4 and 4.5). It is relatively stable compared
to the welfare receiving households. Figure 4.3 supports the estimates.
Consequently, the increase in net income risk observed for households under Universal
Credit is associated with the regulations under the new welfare system such as benefit
reductions and changes in the work allowance (Brewer et al., 2019; Cribb et al., 2018).
The considerable rise in net income risk exposure is related to the change in the financial
framework associated with the new regulations of Universal Credit. The results in Table
4.5 can be interpreted as a decrease in the net income risk mitigation effect through the
implementation of Universal Credit.












Legacy System Households 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 2.3∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0033) (0.0019)
Sample Size 10,301
Universal Credit Households 0.0841∗∗∗ 0.0190∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0012) (0.0057)
Sample Size 1,366
Non-Welfare Scheme Households 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0028)
Sample Size 14,504
Notes: Table 4.5 reveals the higher levels of permanent income
shock variance compared to the other groups;∗∗∗ indicates p-value<0.01;
∗∗indicates p-value<0.05.;∗indicates p-value <0.1; The bootstrap
standard errors are based on 1000 replications and are presented
in parentheses; g refers to groups; Period 2 refers to 2015 until 2018.
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Figure 4.2 reports the permanent income shock variance based on both welfare schemes.
It indicates a considerable increase in net income risk after 2015, which reflects the imple-
mentation of Universal Credit, whereas, the permanent income shock variance for house-
holds under the Legacy System is relatively constant throughout both sample periods.
Consequently, Figure 4.3 reflects the results in Table 4.4 and 4.5.
Figure 4.2: Income Risk based on Welfare Policies





























Source: UKHLS, own calculations
UC implementation
Notes: Figure 4.2 reports that households under Universal Credit encounter considerably higher levels of
permanent income shock variances after the welfare scheme implementation compared to the other groups.
Discussion Welfare Policies
This discussion focuses on the economic implications of the difference in net income risk
exposure based on the British welfare schemes. The findings in Table 4.6 emphasise
the utility welfare loss associated with the net income risk exposure of Universal Credit
compared to the Legacy System. I consider the impact of a one standard deviation change
in the permanent income shock variance. The estimates show that the utility welfare
loss for households under Universal Credit is 1.32 percentage points higher compared to
households under the Legacy System. Households under Universal Credit face a higher
net income risk exposure associated with a higher utility welfare loss.
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Table 4.7 shows the probability of households facing an income gain or loss of 10 per
cent, 20 per cent or 30 per cent, based on the policy type. The results indicate that
Universal Credit households are 24.23 per cent likely to face an income loss of 10 per cent
due to an adverse income shock. In contrast, households under the Legacy System face a
12.37 per cent likelihood of encountering a 10 per cent income loss. Households under the
Universal Credit programme are almost twice as likely to encounter an adverse income
shock of 10 per cent. The findings further underpin the evidence of increased income risk
for households under Universal Credit.
The utility welfare loss for households under Universal Credit can be translated into
monetary terms. The results show that the utility welfare loss translates into a weekly
loss of £ 22.64 for households under Universal Credit with a weekly income of around
£ 246.55. This indicates considerable utility welfare and monetary loss for households
under Universal Credit.
The utility welfare loss induced by Universal Credit has an impact on the household
consumption choice. These losses result in a lower ability to smooth net income risks from
one period to the next. Evidence from the National Audit Offi ce (NAO) showed that
households under Universal Credit did not have enough savings to last until their first
payment was made (Gardiner, 2020). Furthermore, households under Universal Credit
indicate problems with monthly budgeting due to fluctuating benefit payments under
Universal Credit (Leete and Bania, 2009; Gardiner et al., 2020). The evidence of the NAO
combined with the findings of increased net income risk, confirm that households are worse
off under the new welfare scheme. Complementing these findings, Thompson et al.(2019)
find that the demand for food bank donations increased considerably in areas where
Universal Credit was rolled out. They show that twelve months after the implementation
of Universal Credit an increase of 30 per cent in the demand for local food bank donations
was observed. In contrast, Thompson et al.(2019) find a rise of 13 per cent in non-
Universal Credit areas based on data from 2015 until 2017. Hence, the implementation of
Universal Credit is associated with a change in household consumption behaviour, that
is, the choice shifts towards food bank donations. The net income risk results in Table
4.4 complement findings in the literature that emphasise financial losses for households
receiving welfare under Universal Credit.
However, the structure of Universal Credit might stimulate net income risk through
its non-financial incentives. A key aim of Universal Credit is to reduce poverty by moti-
vating households to progress into work through a ’work commitment’policy. Yet, this
also increases the variability of household income. Tucher (2017) finds that the monthly
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payments to households vary considerably through changes in benefit entitlements. The
income variability is associated with employment transitions, for example extra hours
worked. Thus, the new regulations associated with Universal Credit such as the work al-
lowances and work commitment create a framework that exacerbates income variability,
and hence the increase in net income risk observed in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 might also
reflect the new policy structure.
A new policy structure can be developed by expanding the redistributive power of
the tax and benefit system in the UK. The British tax and benefit system has been
transformed into a less progressive system during the past 50 years. Thus, perhaps a way
to finance a more generous welfare scheme is to revert back to a more progressive tax
system (Adam, 2011). In addition, other ways to finance a more fair welfare scheme have
been suggested such as increases in taxing of corporate and estate rents or regulating the
functioning of tax havens (see e.g. Zucman, 2021). This topic deserves a separate and
thorough analysis and is left for future research.
In summary, the results indicate a considerable difference in income risk between the
two welfare schemes. The results indicate that households under Universal Credit face
considerably higher income risk compared to households under the Legacy System. This
is combined with evidence of an increased demand for food bank donations in the areas
where Universal Credit has been rolled out. One way to address the issue is to implement
a more progressive taxes and benefit system in order to raise funds that facilitate the
implementation of a more generous Universal Credit.
Table 4.6: Utility Welfare Loss by Policy in Period 2
Welfare Policy Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent Loss in £
Universal Credit 1.31% 3.11% 22.64£
Legacy System 0.90% 1.79% 16.18£
Notes: Table 4.6 indicates the higher utility welfare loss for households under Universal
Credit; The loss indicates a one standard deviation change in the utility welfare.
of a negative permanent income shock from one period to the next.
Period 2 refers to 2015 until 2018.
144
Table 4.7: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Policy Type in period 2
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent











income gain>30%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.30)) 0.20% 2.84%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.20)) 2.25% 9.26%
income gain>10%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.10)) 14.7% 22.40%
income loss>10% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.90)) 12.37% 24.23%
income loss>20% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.80)) 0.71% 5.30%
income loss>30%: Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.70)) 0.00% 0.48%
Notes: Table 4.7 reports that households under Universal Credit are more likely to encounter
an adverse permanent income shock compared with households under the Legacy System.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζh,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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4.5.2 Child Tax Credit Decomposition
The natural policy experiment focuses on the development of net income risk for welfare
receiving households under the British welfare reform. This part of the analysis focuses on
the role of child tax credit. A household with children and an income below about £ 32,200
could claim child tax credit on top of child benefit. The tax credit is "non-wastable" and
is paid independently of employment status. It is integrated with the working tax credit,
which also provides support for child care costs. Thus, the child tax credit is a form of
guardians’allowance and indirect child benefit. Currently, the child tax credit is part of
the Universal Credit structure. Incorporating the child tax credit decomposition in this
analysis enables a new perspective on the distribution of net income risk based on the
nature of each welfare policy. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show net income risk for households with
and without children under each welfare policy.
Table 4.8 compares households receiving allowances under the legacy system and the
tracked Universal Credit households with and without children in period 1. The Legacy
System net income risk estimates indicate that households without children face a higher
variance of σ2ζ,t = 0.014 permanent income shocks compared to households with children.
It indicates that the benefits associated with the Legacy System mitigate some of the
net income risk. Tracked Universal Credit households are not yet under a welfare policy.
Yet, under the tax credit system households with children are eligible for a child tax
credit. Consequently, tracked Universal Credit households face a lower income risk with
a difference of 2ζ,t = 0.0042. The ratio of the risk ratio for benefit recipients indicates
that households with children encounter higher income variation than households without
children under a welfare scheme.
146
Table 4.8: Household Average Net Income Risk, Child Tax Credit, Period 1













Legacy System 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0978∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0046) (0.0014)
Sample Size 8,835 19,000
Tracked Universal Credit 0.0657∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0004)




Notes: Table 4.8 reports that the income shock variances for households receiving
allowances in period 1;∗∗∗ indicates p-value<0.01;∗∗indicates p-value<0.05.;
∗indicates p-value<0.1.; The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and are
presented in parentheses. In Period 1, which refers to 2009 until 2015;
Net household income ; The sample refers to benefit receiving households (BHR).
Table 4.9 shows the net income risk estimates with the Universal Credit implementa-
tion in Period 2. The results for the Legacy System show a similar pattern as in Period 1.
Households with children encounter lower net income risk. In contrast, households with
children under Universal Credit face higher net income risk compared to households with
no children, with a difference σζ,t = 0.0256. Figure 4.3 highlights the difference between
permanent income shocks under each system. Thus, the transition from the Legacy Sys-
tem to Universal Credit indicates that the benefit reductions affect child tax credits. The
main finding in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.3 is of a shift in welfare targeting. Permanent
risk estimates for households with children under the Legacy System and under Universal
Credit are significantly different at the 90 per cent confidence interval. The same holds
for households without children, where permanent risk estimates are also significantly
different at the 90 per cent confidence interval.
The estimates for Universal Credit show that the net income risk has increased for
households with children, while it has decreased for childless households. Consequently,
the estimates provide evidence of a change in social insurance associated with the imple-
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mentation of Universal Credit. The ratio of the risk ratio for benefit recipients indicates
that welfare receiving households with children encounter considerably higher income
variation than households receiving support without children.
Table 4.9: Household Average Net Income Risk, Child Tax Credit, Period 2













Legacy System 0.0728∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0022)
Sample Size 2,807 7,501
Universal Credit 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.1161∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0039)




Notes: Table 4.9 reports that the income shock variances for households receiving
allowances in period 2;∗∗∗ indicates p-value<0.01;∗∗indicates p-value<0.05.;
∗indicates p-value<0.1.; The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and are
presented in parentheses. In Period 2, which refers to 2015 until 2018;
Net household income ; The sample refers to benefit receiving households (BHR).
Figure 4.3 shows the permanent income shocks under each welfare policy considering
child tax credit. It confirms the average permanent income shock estimates and shows
that households with children under Universal Credit face higher net income risk relative
to childless households. The net income risk patterns for the Legacy System are not
influenced by presence of children in the household.
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Figure 4.3: Income Risk Estimation based on Child Tax Credit





























Source: UKHLS, own calculations
UC implementation
Notes: Figure 4.3 shows that households under the new child tax credits encounter considerably
higher levels of permanent income shock variances.
Discussion Child Tax Credit
This discussion focuses on the economic implications of net income risk based on the
presence of children for households under different welfare schemes. The findings in Ta-
ble 4.10 emphasise the utility welfare loss associated with the net income risk exposure
under Universal Credit compared to the Legacy System. I consider the impact of a one
standard deviation change in the permanent income shock variance. Universal Credit
receiving households face a higher net income risk accompanied by a higher utility wel-
fare loss of 3.85 per cent. The estimates show that the utility welfare loss for households
under Universal Credit is 1.32 percentage points higher compared to households under
the Legacy System.
This utility welfare loss can be translated into monetary terms, and is equivalent to
a weekly loss of £ 31.72 for households under Universal Credit with a weekly income of
around £ 249.55 (see Table 4.10). Consequently, another key finding is the considerable
utility welfare and monetary loss for households with children who receive benefits un-
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der Universal Credit. In contrast, households with children under the Legacy System
encounter considerably less
Another way to quantify permanent income shocks is by expressing them in terms
of probabilities. Table 4.11 shows the likelihood of a welfare receiving household with
children encountering a 10 per cent, 20 per cent or 30 per cent income gain or loss. The
results indicate that Universal Credit households with children are 32.14 per cent likely to
face an income loss of 10 per cent due to an adverse permanent income shock. In contrast,
households with under the Legacy System face a 2.92 per cent likelihood of encountering
a 10 per cent income loss. Consequently, households with children under Universal Credit
face a considerably higher probability to facing an adverse permanent income shock of 10
per cent.
Child tax credits are an indirect benefit to support low-income households with chil-
dren. Brewer et al.(2005) emphasise the key role of the generosity of benefits and tax
credits in supporting net income growth among low-wage benefit receiving households in
the UK (Brewer et al., 2005; Blundell et al., 2016). Thus, both direct and indirect benefits
create social insurance against adverse income shocks. Between 1998 and 2003 reducing
child poverty was made a government priority. The empirical evidence indicates that
increases in benefits directly influence a household’s consumption choices. The role of the
rise in child support is a key example of the impact of benefits on consumption choice
(Gregg et al.,2005; Waldfogel, 2008), supporting an increase in consumption spending.
Waldfogel (2008) compares the effects between the UK and the US and finds that low-
income households in both countries who are affected by the reforms increase spending.
Consequently, the empirical evidence shows that household spending increases with the
generosity of benefit payments.
However, Universal Credit is characterised by considerable austerity features. Child
support is at a record low in terms of generosity, with lower rates than those offered under
the Legacy System. The implementation process for Universal Credit includes several key
austerity features to reduce the child tax credit support, such as lower rates, the removal
the first child premium and the two-child limit (Brewer et al., 2016). These features re-
sult in a considerable decrease in child tax credits for Universal Credit recipients (Tucker,
2019). The results in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3 indicate a shift in welfare support for
households under this programme, including a welfare loss for households with children
(see Table 4.10). Consequently, the findings indicate that social insurance has decreased
under Universal Credit. While this makes it a more cost effi cient welfare policy, as a con-
sequence of the austerity features in Universal Credit, receiving households with children
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face higher levels of income risk.
Moreover, the welfare policy reform has changed the nature of child tax credits. Under
Universal Credit the child tax credit is shaped by means-testing. As a result, the child tax
credit varies based on the income level of the welfare receiving households, complementing
the findings in Table 4.10. Consequently, the nature of the child tax credit generates more
income volatility, which translates into higher income risk for households with children
under Universal Credit.
Higher levels of income risk can affect the development of the children. Too much
change in income and economic circumstances can disrupt investment in children and
parenting practices, particularly when the income changes are unanticipated. Adams
et al.(2016), and Hardy and Hill (2019), argue that income changes affect stress levels
of both parent and child. Moreover, Dahl and Lochner (2012) provide evidence that
income variation associated with high levels of income risk affects a child’s mathematics
and reading achievement. They use an instrumental variable approach to test how the
expansion of earned income tax credit affects a child’s potential mathematics and reading
ability. The study indicates a positive impact of an increase in household income through
tax credits on children’s mathematics and reading test scores 3.
Overall, the results indicate a considerable difference in income risk considering the
child tax credit. It shows that households with children under Universal Credit face
considerably higher income risk compared with households under the Legacy System. In
addition, the empirical findings of the literature highlight the importance of long-lasting
impact of welfare support on a child’s health and educational development (Dahl and
Lochner, 2012; Hardy and Hill, 2019). Consequently, the findings of this analysis combined
with the evidence of the empirical literature highlight the importance of maintaining child-
specific welfare support that induces income stability.
3Dahl and Lochner’s (2012) baseline estimates imply that a $1,000 increase in income raises contem-
poraneous maths and reading test scores by 6 percent of a standard deviation.
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Table 4.10: Utility Welfare Loss, Child Tax Credit, Period 2
Welfare Policy Loss in per cent Utility Welfare Loss in per cent Loss in £
Universal Credit 1.61% 3.85% 31.72£
Legacy System 0.50% 1.05% 13.83£
Table 4.10 shows that households under UC face a higher utility welfare loss.
Period 2 refers to 2015 until 2018; The loss indicates a one standard deviation
change in the utility welfare of a negative permanent income shock from
one period to the next.
Table 4.11: Probabilities of Permanent Income Shocks, Child Tax Credit, Period 2
Probability of income gain/loss Permanent income shock in per cent











income gain>30%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.30)) 0.12% 11.02%
income gain>20%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.20)) 0.05% 19.70%
income gain>10%: Pr(ζh,t > ln (1.10)) 4.30% 31.77%
income loss>10% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.90)) 2.92% 32.14%
income loss>20% : Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.80)) 0.20% 14.87%
income loss>30%: Pr(ζh,t < ln (0.70)) 0.23% 4.80%
Table 4.11 reports that households under Universal Credit are more likely to encounter
an adverse permanent income shock compared with households under the Legacy System.
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of permanent income under the mean shock.
Note that ζh,t refers to the natural logarithm of permanent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
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4.5.3 Robustness Check: Exclusion Implementation Period
This section focuses on the robustness of the results. Figure 4.4 shows the permanent
income shock variance without the implementation period of Universal Credit for welfare
receiving households. These estimates do not include the implementation period in wave 5,
which translates to the years 2014-2015. By excluding the transition period any associated
risks are removed, which highlights the robustness of the findings. It shows a difference
of σ2
ζBRHt
= 0.0091 in permanent income risk after the implementation for households
receiving Universal Credit. Consequently, the robustness test supports the evidence that
Universal Credit receiving households face higher income risk compared to households
under the Legacy System.
Figure 4.4: Robustness Check Household Income Risk excluding UC implementation period
Robustness: Policy Comparison

























This chapter focuses on the size of social insurance generated by the welfare policies
for programme recipients in the UK, using the ongoing welfare reform there as a natural
policy experiment. Social insurance creates a lower exposure to labour income risk through
policies such as benefit payments. In other words, it influences the net income risk that
welfare receiving households face. The findings indicate a higher net income risk under
Universal Credit. The chapter expresses net income risk in the form of a permanent and
a transitory component, based on the PIH (see Chapter 1 for a detailed review). The
UKHLS data set maintains information on welfare receiving households for this analysis
from 2009 to 2018. In particular, it contains information on income variables of each
welfare policy within the period. It enables a comparison of net income risk and social
insurance and shows the change in household net income risk associated with the welfare
reform.
The work contributes to the literature with a unique analysis of this natural policy
experiment and its impact on social insurance in the UK. It compares social insurance
against adverse income shocks under both the Legacy System and Universal Credit. The
natural policy experiment enables a direct comparison between the two welfare policies.
Moreover, the implementation date of the British welfare reform in 2015 enables a ’before
and after’ comparison of net income risk over the same time period for both policies.
This approach shows the change in net income risk after the implementation of Universal
Credit. It provides evidence of the different size of social insurance under Universal
Credit compared to the Legacy System. Consequently, the higher income risk under
Universal Credit could create an incentive to progress in employment due to the lower
social insurance provided to programme recipients.
The analysis provides new insights regarding the size of social insurance in the UK.
Households under Universal Credit encounter higher income risk compared to households
under the Legacy System. Universal Credit recipients are almost twice as likely to face
an adverse permanent income shock of 10 per cent compared to households under the
Legacy System. The probability of encountering an adverse income shock is even higher
for welfare receiving households with children. This difference is associated with the
newly implemented policy measures such as benefit reductions through Universal Credit.
Consequently, these findings confirm the lower size of social insurance provided by Uni-
versal Credit, which in turn leads to lower household well-being, combined with a higher
probability of experiencing an adverse income shock. In other words, the net income risk
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mitigation effect of social insurance has decreased under Universal Credit compared to
the Legacy System.
In contrast, for the Legacy System the natural policy experiment indicates that net
income risk is stable. The results show a marginal change in the income risk between
period 1 and period 2. Consequently, this chapter provides new evidence of the increase
in net income risk combined with lower social insurance resulting from the implementation
of Universal Credit. The findings complement literature indicating financial losses due to
the new Universal Credit policy framework, such as De Agostini et al. (2017), Brewer et
al. (2018), and Cribb (2018).
The British government should consider the effects of net income risk on social insur-
ance in their policy design. The findings of this research indicate higher net income risk
for households, and consequently a lower net income risk mitigation effect of social insur-
ance under Universal Credit compared to the Legacy System. In particular, within the
development of Universal Credit policymakers should focus on mitigating losses in well-
being associated with adverse income shocks. The higher net income risk under Universal
Credit could be associated with its recently implemented tools such as benefit reductions,
changes in work allowances and changing entitlement levels. In particular, welfare policy
should stimulate a supportive economic framework for welfare receiving households with
children, as these are especially exposed to net income risk. Social policy design can be
improved with better knowledge of the size of income risk and its distribution across the
welfare programme receiving population. From a policymaker’s perspective, this chapter
provides new evidence suggesting that future welfare policy design should take income
risk into account.
One limitation of this research concerns the time dimension of UKHLS and the roll-
out of the social policies. Currently, information is available from 2009-2018. The short
period does not allow for a long-run examination. Also the roll-out of the welfare reform
is unfinished. Currently, the it is estimated to be finalised in 2023. Once the Universal
Credit roll-out is complete there will be a larger sample of households receiving welfare,
allowing a deeper insight into the dynamics between net income risk and social insurance
for programme recipients. Another, shortcoming is that the analysis does not allow the use
of gross labour income, as some of welfare receiving households have no income according
to this metric. Consequently, I focus on the net income for programme recipients. This
initial limitation, however, has the benefit that households base their choices on net
income.
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Future research should focus on the effects of non-financial policies in the welfare
system. Changes in non-financial policy measures such as work commitment are likely
to be important in the development of social insurance as they contribute to households’
progress in work. In addition, this chapter lays the foundation for future research into
family classifications of the household under Universal Credit. The analysis by family type





5.1 Appendix Chapter A1
5.1.1 Appendix A1: Variable Overview
This section reflects on the Chapter 1. Table A1.1 provides the descriptive statistics for
net income based on weekly wages across for the entire sample of the UKHLS.
Table A1.1: Summary Statistics of Weekly Wage, UK
Subgroup Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Entire Sample 281.92 188.18 2.38 2402.62
Source: UKHLS.
Table A1.2: Variable Information
Income Definition Variables
Net Individual Income Net Personal weekly income. fimnnet_dv
Source: UKHLS
5.1.2 Appendix A2: Identification Scheme Puzzle
A body of work in the income risk literature focuses on estimating the stochastic processes
of earnings for individuals (or households). The literature is shaped by a debate on two
types of identification scheme. Currently, income shocks can be identified through using i)
a level approach or ii) a first differences approach. Both schemes are used in the literature
(Heathcote et al.,2010). The first, more common in macroeconomic applications (e.g.,
Storesletten et al., 2004b; Guvenen, 2007; Heathcote et al., 2008), uses moments in log
income levels, although either approach can be used to estimate the permanent-transitory
model. The second, common in labour economics (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989; Meghir
and Pistaferri, 2004; Blundell et al., 2008), uses moments based on income growth rates,
or first differences in log income.
Given the availability of data and the research approach both methods can be used
to identify the permanent-transitory model. The key distinction between the schemes are
the structural parameters that can be identified. The level identification scheme enables
me to exploit more data observations compared to the first difference approach. Further,
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examining the same data, the estimates of the income process in Chapter 1 Section 1.4,
when targeting the moments in log-wages, the size between the transitory and permanent
income shocks flips between the identification schemes. Although this discrepancy was
first documented using survey-based data it is also identified when using administrative
data. They nature of this discrepancy is inconclusive and identified by Brzozowski et al.,
(2010) for Canada, Domeij and Flodén, (2010) for Sweden, Fuchs-Schündeln et al., (2010)
for Germany, Heathcote et al., (2010) for the USA and Hryshko et al., (2018) for Germany
and Denmark.
The evidence of the UKHLS reflects the identification scheme puzzle. Figure A2.1
shows an inflated variance in the permanent income shock in first differences but a deflated
permanent income shock in levels. In contrast, the variance of the transitory income shock
is inflated in levels, whilst the first difference estimates indicate a deflated variance of the
permanent income shock. To date, it is unclear what drives the differences in the size of the
permanent and transitory income shocks between both identification schemes. Comparing
the income risk ranking based on the group decomposition indicates the same income risk
heterogeneity based on ethnicity and gender. Consequently, the identification in first
differences is a robustness test for the results found in the level identification process.
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Figure A2.1: Identification Puzzle



































Notes: Figure A2.1 shows the income risk based on each identification puzzle.
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5.2 Appendix Chapter B2
5.2.1 Appendix B2: Variable Overview
Income Variables
Appendix B2 gives the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2. This chapter focuses on the
individual income risk. The key income variable is net income, which includes labour
market income, miscellaneous income, taxation deductions, benefits and personal income.
The gross income variables reflect gross labour income before taxes and benefits. Table
2.1 lists the respective variables from the dataset.
Table B2.1: Definition of Income Types
Income Definition Variables
Gross Individual Income Gross personal weekly labour income. fimnlabgrs_dv
Individual Benefits Private personal benefit income. fimnprben_dv
Miscellaneous income Miscellaneous personal income. fimnmisc_dv
Net Individual Income Net Personal weekly income. fimnnet_dv
Notes: Table B2.1 provides a list of income types.
Source: UKHLS
Table B2.2 summarises statistics of weekly wages in the UK. In contrast, part-time
workers earn on average the lowest weekly wage with £ 122.31. Considering only full-time
workers Table C2.1 shows that women earn the lowest weekly wage, £ 220.90.
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Table B2.2: Summary Statistics Net Individual Income
Subgroup Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Gender
Women 220.90 162.42 0.0093 2250.36
Men 331.31 214.76 0.0093 2402.62
Ethnicity
White 277.77 198.22 0.0093 2402.62
Non-White 254.21 193.38 0.0095 2005.62
Marital Status
Married 284.88 204.69 0.0093 2402.62
Single 240.49 167.20 0.0093 2402.62
Parenthood
Parent 272.19 207.46 0.0095 2296.24
Non-Parent 276.77 188.49 0.0093 2402.62
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 272.70 272.70 0.0094 2296.24
Rural 296.24 2296.24 0.0095 2402.625
Employment Status
Full-time 318.51 318.51 0.0093 2402.62
Part-Time 122.31 115.00 0.0093 2112.58
Employed 277.34 187.47 0.0096 2402.62
Self-Employed 259.24 277.83 0.0093 2402.62
Notes: Table B2.2 provides the summary statistics on
income; Source: UKHLS.
Table B2.3 shows the sample sizes of each group. It indicates a larger sample for
women compared to men.
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Table B2.3: Sample Size by group, UK
Subgroup Sample Size Women Men White Non-White
Gender
Women 94,785 - - 78,801 15,331
Men 78,327 - - 65,947 11,680
Ethnicity
White 144,748 78,801 65,947 - -
Non-White 27,011 15,331 11,680 - -
Marital Status
Married 119,761 63,657 56,104 101,807 17,411
Single 53,109 30,983 22,126 42,744 9,558
Education
University Degree 47,427 26,113 21,314 38,720 8,520
High School Degree 80,951 44,144 36,807 71,212 9,417
Parenthood
Parent 79,185 46,386 32,781 62,890 15,719
Non-Parent 93,945 48,399 45,546 81,858 11,292
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 135,196 74,095 61,101 107,871 26,427
Rural 37,916 20,690 17,226 36,877 5844
Employment Status
Full-time 101,121 43,350 57,771 87,622 12,747
Part-Time 29,733 24,135 5,598 25,069 4,446
Employee 117,905 62,861 55,044 91,206 13,427
Self-Employed 13,754 5,080 8,674 8,710 19,354
Note: Figure B2.3 shows the sample sizes of each group;
Source: Data is based on the UKHLS.
Table B2.4. provides information on the level of education by gender and ethnicity.
The education level distinguishes three groups: ’University degree’, ’A-levels, O-levels or
apprenticeship’, and ’No degree’. The sample sizes show that men and White individuals
hold the majority of university degrees. In contrast, Non-White individuals hold most of
the A-levels, O-levels and apprenticeships.
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Table B2.4: Education Decomposition, Sample Size
Subgroup Women Men White Non-White
University Degree 26,113 21,314 38,720 8,520
Non-University Degree 56,096 47,049 89,209 13,536
Total 82,209 68,363 127,929 22,056
Notes: Table B2.4 indicates the sample size by education qualification.
Source: UKHLS
Further, Table B2.5 provides evidence of employment status across gender and eth-
nicity. The distribution of the sample indicates that women are more likely to be self-
employed, while men hold more full-time positions. Considering different ethnic back-
grounds the sample shows that Non-White individuals are more likely to be self-employed,
while White individuals are more likely to be employed.
Table B2.5: Employment Status Decomposition, Sample Size
Subgroup Women Men White Non-White
Full Time 43,350 57,771 87,622 12,747
Part Time 24,135 5,598 25,069 4,446
Self-Employed 8,674 5,080 11,766 15,340
Employed 62,861 55,044 101,625 1,955
Notes: Table B2.5 indicates the sample size by employment status.
Source: UKHLS
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5.2.2 Appendix B2: Net Income Risk Results in First Differ-
ences
UK Results
This section focuses on the income risk estimation based on first differences using individ-
ual net income. Tables B2.6 and B2.7 report the transitory and permanent income shock
variances for individuals in the UK. I follow the same group decomposition approach and
differentiate the individuals based on certain characteristics. The size of the transitory
and permanent income shocks differs based on the first difference identification scheme
compared to the level approach. Yet, the income risk heterogeneity patterns hold across
both identification schemes, which indicates robustness. The permanent income shocks
are considerably higher for women, with the respective differences of σ2ε,t = 0.0146 and
σ2ζ,t = 0.0046 compared to the income risk faced by men. Similarly, Non-White individuals
encounter higher income risk than White individuals, with the difference of σ2ε,t = 0.0065
and σ2ζ,t = 0.0139. Consequently, the income risk estimates in Tables B2.5 and B2.6 sup-
port the evidence of income risk heterogeneity based on gender and ethnicity. The income
risk inequalities are further confirmed in Tables B2.9 to B2.10, which examine the group
income risk in more detail.
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Notes: Table B2.6 shows the income risk heterogeneity across groups.
Individual Net income; The estimation is based on the
differences identification scheme. *significant at p < 0.1;**significant
p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;The bootstrap standard errors are
based on 1000 replications and presented in in parentheses.
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Table B2.6 continues to document income risk based on the first difference estimation.
The group decomposition focuses on marital status, parenthood, urban-rural classification
and employment status. In particular, part-time workers and self-employed individuals
face higher income risk. The sample sizes of each group are reported in Table B2.3.
































Notes: Table B2.7 shows the income risk heterogeneity across groups;
The estimation is based on first differences . *significant at p < 0.1;
**significant; p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;The bootstrap standard
errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses.
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Gender Decomposition First Differences
Tables B2.8 and B2.9 report the transitory and permanent income shock variances for
each wave based on gender. The group heterogeneity patterns are robust between the
estimation methods. The results based on differences show the same ranking between
the groups as the estimation in levels. The results indicate a difference based on gender,
with women facing higher net income risk than men. The sample sizes of each group are
reported in Table B2.3.















Married 0.0532∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0018)
Single 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0032) (0 .0025) ( 0.0032) (0 .0045)
Urban Rural Classification
Urban 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.0797∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0018)
Rural 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0059) ( 0.0032) ( 0.0069) ( 0.0042)
Ethnicity
White 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0019)
Non-White 0.0813∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0041) ( 0.0039) (0.0068) ( 0.0036)
Notes: Table B2.8 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on gender;
Individual Net income; The estimation is based on first
differences identification scheme. *significant at p < 0.1;**significant
p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;The bootstrap standard errors
are based on 1000 replications and presented in in parentheses.
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Table B2.9 shows income risk heterogeneity by gender. The income risk estimation is
based on first differences, and supports the findings on income risk heterogeneity based in
gender. Women across all subgroups face higher income risk compared to men, particu-
larly when they work part-time or are a parent. The estimates in Table B2.9 also suggests
that age cohort plays a role complementing the evidence in Chapter 1. The sample sizes
of each group are reported in Table B2.3.















Parent 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Non-Parent 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0044) (0.0004) (0.0043) (0.0024)
Employment Status
Full-time 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0440∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0039) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0014)
Part-Time 0.2074∗∗∗ 0.3214∗∗∗ 0.1074∗∗∗ 0.2614∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0306) (0.0289)
Employed 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0012)
Self-Employed 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.2288∗∗∗ 0.3006∗∗∗ 0.1288∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0037) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0077)
Notes: Table B2.9 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on gender;
Individual Net income; The estimation is based on the
differences identification scheme. *significant at p < 0.1;**significant
p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;The bootstrap standard errors are
based on 1000 replications and presented in in parentheses.
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Ethnicity Decomposition First Differences
Tables B2.10 and B2.11 show income risk heterogeneity by ethnicity. The income risk esti-
mation is based on first differences. Non-White individuals across all subgroups face higher
income risk compared to White individuals, particularly when they are self-employed or
working in part-time positions. Thus, the income risk estimates support the findings on
income risk heterogeneity based in ethnicity. The sample sizes of each group are reported
in Table B2.3.
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Entire Sample 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0078) (0.0036)
Marital Status
Married 0.0621∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0082) (0.0042)
Single 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.1298∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0091) (0.0045)
Urban Rural Classification
Urban 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0080) ( 0.0038)
Rural 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.1024∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0049)
Gender
Women 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0019)
Men 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0036)
Notes: Table B2.10 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity;
Individual net income; The estimation is based on the
differences identification scheme; *significant at p < 0.1;**significant
p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;The bootstrap standard errors are
based on 1000 replications and presented in in parentheses.
























Parent 0.0604 0.0401 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0833∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0048)
Non-Parent 0.0684 0.0264 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.0273∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0 0025) (0.0040) (0.0019)
Employment Status
Full-time 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0420 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0613∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0032)
Part-Time 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.2231∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.2738∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0051) (0 0025) (0.0029) (0.0018)
Employed 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Self-Employed 0.3012∗∗∗ 0.1215∗∗∗ 0.3039∗∗∗ 0.2142∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0041) (0.0015) (0.0049) ( 0.0031)
Notes: Table B2.11 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity; Individual
Net income; The estimation is based on first differences identification scheme.
*significant at p < 0.1;**significant p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in in parentheses.
σ2ε,t= transitory income shock variance; σ
2
ζ,t= permanent income shock variance
172
5.2.3 Appendix B2: Gross Income Risk Results in Levels
UK Results
This section presents the gross income risk estimates for the subgroups of the entire
sample of the UKHLS in Table B2.12 − B2.13. It focuses on income risk dispersion
based on the subgroups of gender, ethnicity, marital status, parenthood, urban-rural
classification and employment status, as seen in Chapter 2. The estimates in Table B2.12
indicate that particularly women and Non-white individuals face higher levels of income
risk. Table B2.13 reports that married individuals, parents, individuals living in rural
areas and individuals who a part-time working and self-employed encounter higher levels
of income risk. The heterogeneity of income risk reflects the main findings in Chapter
2. Consequently, the exercise on gross income risk provides evidence that the income
risk heterogeneity patterns translate from gross income to net income (see Chapter 2 for
net income risk estimates). Further, Table B2.14 − B2.17 lists the gross income risk by
gender and ethnicity decomposition. Also here the same patterns as in Chapter 2 can be
observed. The sample sizes of each group are reported in Table B2.3.


















Notes: Table B2.12 shows the income risk heterogeneity across groups;
Individual Gross income; The estimation is based on the differences
identification scheme; σ2ε,t= transitory income
shock variance; σ2ζ,t= permanent income shock variance; *significant
at p<0.1;.**significant at p<0.05;***significant at p<0.01
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Notes: Table 2.13 shows the income risk heterogeneity;
differences identification scheme; σ2ε,t= transitory income
shock variance; σ2ζ,t= permanent income shock variance; *significant
at p<0.1;.**significant at p<0.05;***significant at p<0.01
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Gender Decomposition















Married 0.1221∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.1893∗∗∗ 0.0259∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0071) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0048)
Single 0.1030∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.1767∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0074) (0.0049)
Notes: Table B2.14 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on gender;
Individual Gross Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications
and presented in parentheses; The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;
*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01.
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Parent 0.1829∗∗∗ 0.0421∗∗∗ 0.1577∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0093)
Non-Parent 0.1224∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0045)
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 0.1517∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.1307∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0065) (0.0048)
Rural 0.1985∗∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.1879∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0072) (0.0082)
Employment Status
Full-time 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0046)
Part-Time 0.0906∗∗∗ 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0076)
Employed 0.0638∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0701∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0053)
Self-Employed 0.1650∗∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.1995∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0096) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0083)
Notes: Table B2.15 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on gender;
Individual Gross Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
1000 replications and presented in parentheses; The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;
*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01.
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Ethnicity Decomposition















Married 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗∗ 0.1323∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0055)
Single 0.1133∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.1217∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0056) (0.0047) (0.0094) (0.0054)
Notes: Table B2.16 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity;
Individual Net Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications and presented in parentheses;
The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;
***significant at p < 0.01
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Parent 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.0399∗∗∗ 0.1556∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0068)
Non-Parent 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.1389∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
s.e. (0.062) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0057)
Urban-Rural Classification
Urban 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.1234∗∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0045)
Rural 0.0965∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ 0.1429∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0054)
Employment Status
Full-time 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.1013∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0031) (0.0059) (0 .0065) (0.0081)
Part-Time 0.1872∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.1934∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0038) (0.0085) (0.0023) (0.0085)
Employed 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0063)
Self-Employed 0.2234∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.2421∗∗∗ 0.0508∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0095) (0.0034) (0.0093) (0.0083)
Notes: Table B2.17 shows the income risk heterogeneity based on ethnicity;
Individual Gross Income; The estimation is based on the level identification scheme;
The bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 replications
and presented in parentheses The risk ratio is based on σ2ζ,t;
*significant at p < 0.1;**significant at p < 0.05;***significant at p < 0.01
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5.3 Appendix Chapter C3
5.3.1 Appendix C3: Variable Overview
Income Variables
This section focuses on the main variables in Chapter 3. The key income variable is net
income, which includes labour market income, miscellaneous income, taxation deductions,
benefits and personal income. The sample of marital status refers to married and single
individuals. Married individuals are all those who are either cohabiting or legally married.
Single individuals are singles, widowed or divorced. Marital choice refers to the socioe-
conomic status of the partner. Assortative couples are married to a partner from the
same socioeconomic background, while cross-group couples have married someone from a
different socioeconomic background. Further in Table C3.2−C3.4 I describe the variables
that are relevant to Chapter 3.
Table C3.1: Net Income Variables, Couple Type
Subgroup Mean SD Min. Max.
Assortative Couples 586.94 307.0 391.89 8516.94
Cross Group Couples 554.82 343.11 321.65 3363.71
Married Individuals 590.75 329.71 241.24 8516.93
Single Individuals 377.93 343.11 195.47 1572.94
Notes: Table C3.1 shows income variables by Couple Type
Source: UKHLS
Table C3.2: Marital Status Variables
Group Classification Description Variables
Married Married Couples and civil partnerships mastat_dv
Single Singles, divorced, separated and widowed individuals mastat_dv
Notes: Table C3.2 reports the definitions of marital status.
Source: UKHLS
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Table: C3.3: Socioeconomic Group Classifications




Employers in large establishments.




Intermediate clerical and administrative occupations.
Intermediate sales and service occupations.
Intermediate technical and auxiliary occupations.
Intermediate engineering occupations.
Own account workers (non-professional).
Own account workers (agriculture).
Small Employers in small establishments.
in industry, commerce, services
Small Employers in small establishments
in agriculture.
jbseg_dv
3.Routine and Manual Occupations
Lower supervisory and Technical occupations.
Semi-routine occupations.
jbseg_dv
Notes: Table C3.3 reports the definitions of socioeconomic group classifications.
Source: UKHLS
Table: C3.4: Education Level Classifications
Group Classification Description Variable
Past 18 University Degree hiqual_dv
A-levels A-Level degree hiqual_dv
O-levels or apprenticeship O-Levels or below or apprenticeship hiqual_dv
Notes: Table C3.4 reports the education level classifications.
Source: UKHLS
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5.4 Appendix Chapter D4
5.4.1 Appendix D 4: Descriptive Statistics
This section focuses on the descriptive statistics in Chapter 4. Table D4.1 provides in-
formation on the construction of both welfare scheme variables: the Legacy System and
Universal Credit. The UKHLS dataset reports the variables differently. The variable for
Universal Credit households is directly reported as income support ’benbase 4’ for the
respective households. In contrast, the Legacy System is reported in its six benefit types,
which differ by period 1 and period 2. The variable Legacy System has been constructed
on the basis of the individual reported benefit types. Table D4.1 shows the benefit types
under the Legacy System between the different time periods. To analyse the patterns in
net income risk I created two key Legacy System variables based on the implementation
date of Universal Credit in wave 5. Hence, the variable Legacy_System_Pre maintains
the six benefit types in period 1. while the variable Legacy_System_Post implies the six
benefit types in Period 2.
Table D4.1: Benefit Variable Construction, Welfare Schemes
Variables Legacy_System_Pre Legacy_System_Post
Periods Period 1: wave 1-5 Period 2: wave 6-9
Legacy System
Income Support btype2 benbase1
Income based Jobseeker’s Allowance benunemp1 benbase2
Income based employment and Support Allowance bendis2 bendis2
Housing Benefit btype8 renthb
Child Tax Credit btype5 benbase3
Working Tax Credit btype6 etnben5
Universal Credit
Income Support - benbase4
Notes: Table D4.1 reports the variable construction for the benefits under the welfare schemes.
Source: UKHLS
Table D4.2 presents the income summary statistics under each welfare policy.
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Table D4.2: Descriptive Statistics Income Variables Period 2
Variables Mean SD Max. Min.
Legacy System 288.56 124.18 1377.24 17.54
Universal Credit 246.55 119.87 1015.32 6.31
Notes: Descriptive statistics for welfare scheme income
in period 2.; Age Range: 25 to 60 with. net household income.
Source: UKHLS based on wave 6 to 9.
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5.4.2 Appendix D4: Welfare Schemes in the United Kingdom
Universal Credit
The flagship reform of the British benefits system is the introduction of Universal Credit
(UC). The key aims of Universal Credit are to simplify the benefits system, reduce poverty
and increase employment stability. The benefits system is undergoing radical reform, with
six-means tested benefits and tax credits being replaced by a single payment. It is part
of a policy package in the Welfare Reform Act in 2012, which received Royal Assent
in March 2012. The Act sets out the working regulations of Universal Credit, which,
under current plans, is expected to be fully rolled out and replace the Legacy System
by 2023/2024. Universal Credit will be administered by the Department for Work and
Pensions (DWP) in Great Britain and by the Department for Communities in Northern
Ireland. For claimants dealing with the DWP, this will mean that out-of-work and in-work
claims will be administered by one institution rather than the present mix of three: the
DWP for most out-of-work benefits, HM Revenue and Customs for tax credits and their
local authority for housing benefit. This section provides information on the key policies
and its administrative framework.
The implementation of Universal Credit has had two stages, known as Live Service
and Full Service. The Live Service was first introduced in 2013 to a limited client base
as a trial. Universal Credit Full Service, the fully digital service, was introduced in
South London in November 2014 and continues to be rolled out. After this process
has finished, all remaining benefit claimants will be transferred to the Universal Credit
Full Service. This migration process started in 2018. The UKHLS has information on
Universal Credit households from January 2015. Currently, 2.3 million households have
moved onto the Universal Credit system (Department for Work and Pensions, 2020). By
2022, an estimated 7.2 million families in the UK will have received Universal Credit, of
which 3.9 million are in-work households.
The transition between the welfare systems and the implementation of Universal Credit
means considerable investment. The Offi ce for Budget Responsibility (2020) estimates
that actual spending on Universal Credit reached around £ 3 billion in 2017-18. An initial
forecast of actual expenditure in 2018-19 is around £ 8 billion, reflecting the gathering
pace of the roll-out. The marginal saving from the introduction of Universal Credit —
representing much higher costs and offsetting savings — is forecast to be around £ 0.2
billion in 2018-19. It rises to £ 1.0 billion in 2022-23, which comprises a £ 2.5 billion
net saving, due to differences between Universal Credit and the Legacy System being
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partly offset by the £ 1.5 billion cost of transitional protection payments to cases that are
migrated to Universal Credit at the Department for Work and Pensions’s discretion and
that would otherwise lose out when they move onto Universal Credit (OBR, 2020).
The implementation of Universal Credit induces more employment. According to the
Department for Work and Pensions (2020), it is estimated that Universal Credit leads
to an increase of approximately 200,000 individuals in work as a result of financial and
non-financial incentives, additional employment conditionality and the simplicity of the
system. The underlying mechanism is based on benefit cuts to motivate unemployed
households to find work, while the employment conditionality ensures employment secu-
rity and income stability Currently, 74 per cent of Universal Credit households are either
in employment (760,000 or 33per cent) or searching for work (930,000 or 41per cent) based
on the conditionality mechanism. The majority (62per cent) of in-work households are in
the 25 - 49 years age group (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019). Given Univer-
sal Credit’s aim to ensure employment stability, this analysis focuses on net income risk
exposure for in-work benefit households.
The financial incentive is reflected in benefit reductions and changes in the work
allowance. The introduction of Universal Credit is associated with entitlements cuts
amounting to £ 2 billion per annum in several forms. In addition, most working-age ben-
efits were frozen in cash terms from April 2015 to March 2020, ignoring the change in
living standards. One of the most extensive reductions regards the work allowance, re-
sulting in workers seeing a decrease in the number of hours they can work before their
Universal Credit payment starts to decrease. The Universal Credit system maintains a
so-called taper rate, which means that households see their total entitlement withdrawn
at a rate of 63 pence for every pound of net earnings that they earn above their work
allowance (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019) 1. The financial distress based on
the benefit cuts leads to a rise in net income risk for the households. This might lead to
increased employment, combined with increased income stability. Yet, lone parents and
single-earner couples are likely to lose out the most from this change as they may choose
not to work or move to shorter hours based on the cut in work allowance. Consequently,
the mechanism of a reduced taper rate might induce less willingness to work and result
in financial distress due to the change in hours entitlement for in-work households. More-
over, the level of the taper rate influences the hours worked per week and subsequently
1The taper sets the speed with which benefits are withdrawn once earnings exceed the work allowance.
If the taper is set at 0.63, this means that for every extra pound earned after the work allowance has
been met, the total benefit amount received is reduced by 63p.
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affects the variability of household income. Hence, Universal Credit might induce net
income risk for in-work benefit households by the nature of its construction.
To ensure employment stability Universal Credit uses non-financial incentives, As a
non-financial tool, Universal Credit measures use a claimant work commitment to increase
worked hours. All Universal Credit claimants need to comply with a ‘claimant commit-
ment’, which forms the basis of the conditions attached to receiving Universal Credit.
This extends the existing conditionality regime under jobseeker’s allowance and ESA to
in-work recipients and to partners in couples. Out of work claimants will be required to
spend 35 hours a week searching for work, while in work claimants will be required to seek
more hours if they are deemed to be working too few. Self-employed claimants must seek
to increase their earnings if they are deemed too low. Sanctions will apply to claimants
that do not meet the terms of their claimant commitment, removing some or all of their
entitlement for a specified period.
Self-employed households face changes under the new welfare system. In contrast
to the Legacy System, Universal Credit applies a ‘minimum income floor’ (MIF) for
self-employed people. If a claimant’s self-employed earnings are below the MIF, the gov-
ernment calculates their Universal Credit award on the assumption that they earned an
amount equal to the MIF. For most people, the MIF is equivalent to 35 hours a week at
the National Living Wage (i.e. broadly speaking, the minimum they would earn if working
full-time as an employee). Couples in which one partner is below pension credit age, and
the other above were, under the Legacy System, able to receive pension credit (typically
higher than working-age benefits), but under Universal Credit they cannot. Moreover,
the entitlements for individuals with disabilities vary considerably.
Families with more than two children encounter new regulations. Since April 2017,
the ‘two-child limit’means that families will not be eligible for the child entitlement of
tax credits or Universal Credit for third or subsequent children born after that date. In
addition, child tax credit is withdrawn where someone in the household has a taxable
annual income of more than £ 50,000. An investigation by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) shows that around 36 per cent, or 370,000, more families in the UK lost some child
tax credit in 2019-20 than in 2013-14. This is mostly due to the new threshold, which
has not been price or earnings-indexed. Newborn first children stopped receiving a higher
entitlement and newborn third and subsequent children stopped receiving any support at
all. It is estimated that by 2022 more than one in five households with children will face
a reduction in their child tax credit.
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Legacy System
The British welfare system has undergone several expansions and reforms since its cre-
ation. The most notable reforms took place from the 1960s to 1970 and the 1980s to 1990s.
The main focus of this reform was based on increasing the government’s managerial effi -
ciency and economic planning. To this end, the Treasury created a system which allocated
resources to departments and departments to services. The second phase, however, dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s focused on reforming the civil service and the administration of
welfare support. During the second reform, the current Legacy System was set in place
in 1984.
The Legacy System comprises six different means-tested benefits. These can be dif-
ferentiated based on the eligibility requirements, namely the claimant’s household income
combined with the household background and personal characteristics. The benefits under
the Legacy System include income-based jobseeker’s allowance, income support, income-
related employment and support allowance, child tax credit, housing benefit and working
tax credit. This section describes the nature of each benefit type under the Legacy System.
Income Support refers to a benefit type which is only accessible to claimants if they
are one of the following: a carer, pregnant or a lone parent of a child under five years old.
Claimants are only eligible if they meet one of these criteria (Department for Work and
Pensions, 2019).
Income Jobseeker’s Allowance is a benefit for households who are actively seeking
employment and are capable of work. The respective claimant has to be above 18 years of
age and under State Pension age to claim this benefit. In addition, it is understood that
the claimant is not in full-time employment and works no more than 16 hours a week to
claim this benefit. The benefit is means-tested, which means that the amount of benefit
depends on the level of earned income (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019).
The Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) is a benefit for people who have
limited capability for work due to an illness or disability and are not in receipt of Statutory
Sick Pay. Also in this case, the recipient has to be over 16 years old and under State
Pension age. This benefit is also means-tested. In contrast, contribution-based ESA, is
non-means-tested and dependent on the National Insurance Contributions of the claimant
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2019).
Housing Benefit contributes to the rental costs for households with a low income.
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It is means-tested and takes into consideration income and capital in the framework
determining eligibility (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019).
Under the Legacy System, there are two types of tax credits: (i) Working Tax Credit
and (ii) Child Tax Credit. The term ‘tax credits’in Britain is in fact used to describe two
forms of benefit support: a work-contingent benefit, currently namedWorking Tax Credit,
and an additional means-tested element precisely for families with children. Child Tax
Credit has been available since 2003 to low-income families irrespective of work status.
The Child Tax Credit is a benefit to assist with the costs of raising a child. To claim this
tax credit, the claimant needs to be responsible for a child and in receipt of a low income.
Also, in this case, the employment status is not being considered. Working Tax Credit
is a benefit that is available to households that are in employment with a low income.
Eligibility takes into account hours worked, the presence of a disability and the number of
children with the associated child tax credit costs provided by approved child tax credit
services (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019).
In addition, to the set of benefits under the Legacy System, the welfare policies also
maintain contributory benefits. The requirement to be eligible for this benefit includes
regular payments of National Insurance Contributions by the claimant (Department for
Work and Pensions, 2019). The contributions are made by employees whose earnings are
above a threshold, which was £ 155 per week in 2018. However, some welfare support, such
as disability living allowance or child benefit, are neither contributory nor means-tested.
These are accessible to anyone who meets the eligibility requirements independently of
their income. These benefits are not included in the design of the new Universal Credit
policy (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019).
187
Child Tax Credit
The child tax credit introduced in 2003 aims to support low-income households with
children, independent of their employment status. It was available to households in and
out of employment and replaced the child additions to other child benefits. Child tax
credits are based on gross annual income, jointly assessed for a couple. Entitlement is
not directly affected by a family’s savings, as happens in means-tested benefits. Instead,
non-earned income above the first £ 300 p.a. will be taken into account when calculating
awards (Brewer, 2003). The child tax credit consists of two components:
• a family element of £ 545 p.a. (approximately £ 10.45 a week), doubled in the finan-
cial year of a child’s birth;
• an amount per dependent child of £ 1,445 p.a. approximately £ 27.75 a week, and
higher for disabled children).
Under the Universal Credit transformation, the child tax credit faces considerable
changes. Under Universal Credit, the child tax credit is a means-tested payment to which
households with children are eligible (Brewer et al., 2016). Further, it is accessible for
households with a labour income below £ 32,000, which is paid on top of the child benefit.
This contrasts with the general child benefit, which is a flat rate for all households with
children, independent of their income.
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5.4.3 Appendix D4: Households under Non-Welfare Scheme
This section provides information on the degree of income risk by comparing gross and net
income risk for households under no welfare scheme. To provide a comparative view on
net income risk patterns households under no welfare system are also analysed. I create a
sample of households that never received any type of welfare benefits, ’non-welfare scheme
households’. The non-welfare system households are a baseline sample to contextualise
the findings of net income risk patterns under a welfare scheme.
Table D4.1 shows the permanent and transitory income shock variance from wave 1
to 5, which translates into years 2010 until 2017. The key finding of Table D4.1 is the
reduction of net income risk based on automatic stabilisers. The permanent income shock
variance decreases by σζ,t = 0.005 when comparing households’gross and net permanent
income shock variance. The difference between the permanent and transitory income
shock variance may be linked to the taxes paid and general benefits received for example
child benefit for Non-Welfare Scheme households.
The second part of Table D4.1 focuses on the degree of insurance through taxes and
benefits from 2010 to 2017. The results in Table D4.2 show that tax and benefits re-
duce the income shock variance by σζ,t = 0.0054.Table E4.1 also provides evidence of
a reduction in net income risk, which constitutes a net income risk mitigation effect.
Consequently, the automatic stabilisers reduce exposure to net income risk for house-
holds. The results in Table D4.1 provide evidence of the net income risk mitigation effect,
complementing evidence by Avram et al.(2019) and Blundell el al. (2018).
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Sample Period 1: Wave 1-5
Non-Welfare Scheme HH (Gross) 0.1422∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗
s.e (0.0043) (0.0029)
Non-Welfare Scheme HH (Net) 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0013)
Sample Size 27,066
Sample Period 2: Wave 6-9
Non-Welfare Scheme HH (Gross) 0.1365∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗
s.e (0.0039) (0.0023)
Non-Welfare Scheme HH (Net) 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗
s.e. (0.0036) (0.0028)
Sample Size 14,504
Notes: Table D4.3 indicates income risk based on welfare
schemes;∗∗∗ indicates p-value<0.01;∗∗indicates p-value<0.05.;
∗indicates p-value<0.1;The bootstrap standard errors are based
on 1000 replications and are presented in parentheses.
σ2ε,t= transitory income shock variance; σ
2
ζ,t=
permanent income shock variance. Level estimation.
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Figure D4.1 shows the development of the transitory and permanent income shock
variance for gross and net estimates. It supports the evidence in Table D4.1, highlighting
the lower net income risk for the net estimates compared to the gross estimates. It
provides evidence of the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system.
Figure D4.1: Gross and Net Income Risk, Non-Welfare Households
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U C  im p le m e n t a t io n
Notes: Figure D4.1 indicates the household income risk from 2010 until 2017.
Discussion Non-Welfare Households
Tables D4.1 and Figure D4.1 provide evidence of the net income risk mitigation effect
through automatic stabilizers. The degree of insurance for households against adverse
income shocks can be shown by comparing gross and net income risk estimates.
Recent literature highlights the existence of welfare insurance in the UK. The results in
Table D4.3 and D4.4 are in line with findings in the literature. Avram et al.(2019) examine
household income volatility in the UK and find a redistributive factor in the British welfare
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system by comparing gross and net income. They show that the redistributive factor
is expressed through automatic stabilisers. In particular, Cribb (2018) finds evidence
that the expansion of benefit payments, during the 1990s and 2000s, enabled a direct
response to the fall in earnings in the UK. The current literature indicates that automatic
stabilisers contribute to welfare insurance through their redistributive effect. Currently,
the majority of the literature focuses on the relationship between the income levels and
the welfare system’s automatic stabilisers. The findings indicate that automatic stabilisers
also contribute to mitigating net income risk. In particular, Figure D4.2 shows that the
permanent income shock variance of net income is lower compared to gross income.
Figure D4.2 provides information on permanent income shock variances between gross
and net income risk estimates from 2010 to 2017. It highlights the difference in net income
risk of the net and gross estimates. Figure D4.2 also shows the considerably lower income
variability for the net permanent net income risk estimates. Thus, taxes and benefits
partially decrease income risk comparing both gross and net income. This is similar to
the finding on the individual level in Chapter 2.
Figure D4.2: Gross and Net Average Income, Non-Welfare Households
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Notes: Figure D4.1 indicates the gross and net household income from 2010 until 2017.
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5.5 Method Appendix E
5.5.1 Identification Schemes
Level Identification Scheme: Moments
The residuals decomposition:
ui,c,t = pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t (5.1)
Key moments:
The variance at time t:
varc(ui,c,t) = E[(ui,c,t − E(ui,c,t))2]
= V ar[(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)]
= E
 (pi,c,t−1 × pi,c,t−1) + (pi,c,t−1 × ζ i,c,t) + (pi,c,t−1 × εi,c,t)+(ζ i,c,t × pi,c,t−1) + (ζ i,c,t × ζ i,c,t) + (ζ i,c,t × εi,c,t)
+(εi,c,t × pi,c,t−1) + (εi,c,t × ζ i,c,t) + (εi,c,t × εi,c,t)

= E[(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)
2]
= var(pt−1) + σζt + σεt (5.2)
Covariance Structure:
The identification process is the same as in the previous section. I use the residual
term in eq. (5.1) to exploit the covariance structure of the residual term (ui,c,t,) at time
t and t− 1. Given that the cross products are zero, the terms cancel out , which results
in var(pt−1).
Covariance at time t− 1:
covc(ui,c,t, ui,c,t−1) = E[(ui,c,t − E(ui,c,t))(ui,c,t−1 − E(ui,c,t−1))]
= E[(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)(pi,c,t−1 + εi,c,t−1)]
= E
 (pi,c,t−1 × pi,c,t−1) + (pi,c,t−1 × εi,c,t−1)+(ζ i,c,t × pi,c,t−1) + (ζ i,c,t × εi,c,t−1)









I follow the same steps of derivation throughout this section.
Covariance at time t+ 1:
covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t) = E[(ui,c,t+1 − E(ui,c,t+1))(ui,c,t − E(ui,c,t))]
= E[(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t+1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t+1)(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)]
= var(pt−1) + σζt (5.4)
Covariance at time t+ 2 :
covc(ui,c,t+2, ui,c,t) = E[(ui,c,t+2 − E(ui,c,t+2))(ui,c,t − E(ui,c,t))]
= E[(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t+2 + ζ i,c,t+1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t+2)(pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t)]
= var(pt−1) + σζt (5.5)
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Level Identification Scheme continued: Moments
Covariance at t = t+ 1:




covc(ui,c,2, ui,c,1) = var(p0) + σζ1
covc(ui,c,3, ui,c,2) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2
covc(ui,c,4, ui,c,3) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ,2 + σζ3
covc(ui,c,5, ui,c,4) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4
covc(ui,c,6, ui,c,5) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5
covc(ui,c,7, ui,c,6) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6
covc(ui,c,8, ui,c,7) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6 + σζ7
covc(ui,c,9, ui,c,8) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6 + σζ7 + σζ8
The respective variances:
varc(ui,c,t) = var(p0) +
t∑
j=1
σζj + εt (5.7)
varc(ui,c,1) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σε1
varc(ui,c,2) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σε2
varc(ui,c,3) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σε3
varc(ui,c,4) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σε4
varc(ui,c,5) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σε5
varc(ui,c,6) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6 + σε6
varc(ui,c,7) = var(p0) + σζ1+σζ2+σζ3+σζ4+σζ5+σζ6+σζ7+σε7
varc(ui,c,8) = var(p0) + σζ1+σζ2+σζ3+σζ4+σζ5+σζ6+σζ7+σζ8+σε8
varc(ui,c,9) = var(p0) + σζ1+σζ2+σζ3+σζ4+σζ5+σζ6+σζ7+σζ8+σζ9+σε9 (5.8)
Covariance t = t+ 2:
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covc(ui,c,3, ui,c,1) = var(p0) + σζ1
covc(ui,c,4, ui,c,2) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζi2
covc(ui,c,5, ui,c,3) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3
covc(ui,c,6, ui,c,4) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4
covc(ui,c,7, ui,c,5) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5
covc(ui,c,8, ui,c,6) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6
covc(ui,c,9, ui,c,7) = var(p0) + σζ1 + σζ2 + σζ3 + σζ4 + σζ5 + σζ6 + σζ7 (5.10)
196
Level Identification Scheme continued: Moments
Identification of the transitory income shock parameters from t = 1, .., 9 :
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t) = σεt (5.11)
I use eq. (5.11) corresponding to the time periods:
varc(ui,c,1)− covc(ui,c,2, ui,c,1) = σε1
varc(ui,c,2)− covc(ui,c,3, ui,c,2) = σε2
varc(ui,c,3)− covc(ui,c,4, ui,c,3) = σε3
varc(ui,c,4)− covc(ui,c,5, ui,c,4) = σε4
varc(ui,c,5)− covc(ui,c,6, ui,c,5) = σε5
varc(ui,c,6)− covc(ui,c,7, ui,c,6) = σε6
varc(ui,c,7)− covc(ui,c,8, ui,c,7) = σε7
varc(ui,c,8)− covc(ui,c,9, ui,c,8) = σε8
varc(ui,c,9)− covc(ui,c,10, ui,c,9) = σε9
Identification of the variance of the permanent income shock parameters from t =
2, ..., 9 :
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t, ui,c,t−1)− σε = σζt (5.12)
I use eq. (5.12) corresponding to the time periods:
varc(ui,c,1)− covc(ui,c,1, ui,c,0)− σε2 = σζ1
varc(ui,c,2)− covc(ui,c,2, ui,c,1)− σε2 = σζ2
varc(ui,c,3)− covc(ui,c,3, ui,c,2)− σε3 = σζ3
varc(ui,c,4)− covc(ui,c,4, ui,c,3)− σε4 = σζ4
varc(ui,c,5)− covc(ui,c,5, ui,c,4)− σε5 = σζ5
varc(ui,c,6)− covc(ui,c,6, ui,c,5)− σε6 = σζ6
varc(ui,c,7)− covc(ui,c,7, ui,c,6)− σε7 = σζ7
varc(ui,c,8)− covc(ui,c,8, ui,c,7)− σε8 = σζ8
varc(ui,c,9)− covc(ui,c,8, ui,c,8)− σε8 = σζ9
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Hence the set of moments for the identification scheme in levels are:
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t+1, ui,c,t) = σεt (5.13)
varc(ui,c,t)− covc(ui,c,t, ui,c,t−1) = σζt + σεt (5.14)
The entire set of parameters, which can theoretically be identified: σε1 , σε2,, σε3 , σε4 , σε5 ,
σε6 , σε7 , σε8 , σε9 ;σζ1 , σζ2 , σζ3 , σζ4 , σζ5 , σζ6 , σζ7, σζ8, σζ9, .
Yet, given the restrictions of the dataset I use the covariance structure to obtain the
following data parameters: σε2 , σε3 , σε4 , σε5 , σε6 , σε7 , σε8 ;σζ2 , σζ3 , σζ4 , σζ5 , σζ6,σζ7 , σζ8 .
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5.5.2 First Differences Identification
This section reports the variance and covariance structure for the two identification
schemes in differences and levels and applies it to the time framework of the UKHLS.
First Differences Identification Scheme: Moments
Residual decomposition in a permanent and transitory component.
ui,c,t = pi,c,t−1 + ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t (5.15)
First difference of the residual term:
∆ui,c,t = ui,c,t − ui,c,t−1
= ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−1 (5.16)
Key moments:
Variance at time t:
varc(∆ui,c,t) = E[(∆ui,c,t − E(∆ui,c,t)2]
= E[(ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−1)(ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−1)]
= E
 (ζ i,c,t × ζ i,c,t) + (ζ i,c,t × εi,c,t)− (ζ i,c,t × εi,c,t−1)+(εi,c,t × ζ i,c,t) + (εi,c,t × εi,c,t) + (εi,c,t × εi,c,t−1)




(ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−1)2
]
= var(σζt + σεt + σεt−1)
= σζt + σεt + σεt−1 (5.17)
199
Covariance Structure:
Using the variance in eq. (5.15) I am able to disentangle the theoretical transitory
income shock. I use the residual term ( ∆ui,c,t) in the covariance structure at time period
t + 1 and t. Given that the cross products are zero, the terms cancel out , which results
in −σεt .
Covariance at time t+ 1:
covc(∆ui,c,t+1,∆ui,c,t) = E[(∆ui,c,t+1 − E(∆ui,c,t+1))(∆ui,c,t − E(∆ui,c,t)]
= E[(ζ i,c,t+1 + εi,c,t+1 − εi,c,t)(ζ i,c,t + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−1)]
= E
 (ζ i,c,t+1 × ζ i,c,t) + (ζ i,c,t+1 × εi,c,t)− (ζ i,c,t+1 × εi,c,t−1)+(εi,c,t+1 × ζ i,c,t) + (εi,c,t+1 × εi,c,t) + (εi,c,t+1 × εi,c,t−1)









I follow the same steps of derivation throughout this section.
Covariance at time t− 1 :
covc(∆ui,c,t,∆ui,c,t−1) = E[(∆ui,c,t − E(∆ui,c,t))(∆ui,c,t−1 − E(∆ui,c,t−1)]
= −σεt−1 (5.19)
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First Differences Identification Scheme continued: Moments
Identification of transitory income shock parameters for t = 2, .., 9:
covc(∆ui,c,t+1,∆ui,c,t) = −σεt (5.20)










varc(∆ui,c,t) = σζt + σεt − σεt (5.21)
applied to the corresponding to the time periods:
varc(∆ui,c,1) = σζ1 + σε1 − σε0
varc(∆ui,c,2) = σζ2 + σε2 − σε1
varc(∆ui,c,3) = σζ3 + σε3 − σε2
varc(∆ui,c,4) = σζ4 + σε4 − σε3
varc(∆ui,c,5) = σζ5 + σε5 − σε4
varc(∆ui,c,6) = σζ6 + σε6 − σε5
varc(∆ui,c,7) = σζ7 + σε7 − σε6
varc(∆ui,c,8) = σζ8 + σε8 − σε7
varc(∆ui,c,9) = σζ9 + σε9 − σε8
Identification of permanent income shock parameters for t = 3, .., 9:
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varc(∆ui,c,t)− covc(∆ui,c,t+1,∆ui,c,t+1)− covc(∆ui,c,t,∆ui,c,t) = σζt (5.22)
I use eq. (5.22) corresponding to the time periods:
varc(∆ui,c,1)− covc(∆ui,c,2,∆ui,c,1)− covc(∆ui,c,1,∆ui,c,0) = σζ1
varc(∆ui,c,2)− covc(∆ui,c,3,∆ui,c,2)− covc(∆ui,c,2,∆ui,c,1) = σζ2
varc(∆ui,c,3)− covc(∆ui,c,4,∆ui,c,3)− covc(∆ui,c,3,∆ui,c,2) = σζ3
varc(∆ui,c,4)− covc(∆ui,c,5,∆ui,c,4)− covc(∆ui,c,4,∆ui,c,3) = σζ4
varc(∆ui,c,5)− covc(∆ui,c,6,∆ui,c,5)− covc(∆ui,c,5,∆ui,c,4) = σζ5
varc(∆ui,c,6)− covc(∆ui,c,7,∆ui,c,6)− covc(∆ui,c,6,∆ui,c,5) = σζ6
varc(∆ui,c,7)− covc(∆ui,c,8,∆ui,c,7)− covc(∆ui,c,7,∆ui,c,6) = σζ7
varc(∆ui,c,8)− covc(∆ui,c,9,∆ui,c,8)− covc(∆ui,c,8,∆ui,c,7) = σζ8
varc(∆ui,c,9)− covc(∆ui,c,10,∆ui,c,9)− covc(∆ui,c,9,∆ui,c,8) = σζ9
Hence the set of moments for the identification scheme in differences are:




= σζi,c,t + σεi,c,t + σεi,c,t−1 − σεi,c,t − σεi,c,t−1
= σζt (5.24)
The entire set of parameters, which can theoretically be identified: σε1 , σε2,, σε3 , σε4 , σε5 ,
σε6 , σε7 , σε8 , σε9 ;σζ1 , σζ2 , σζ3 , σζ4 , σζ5 , σζ6 , σζ7, σζ8, σζ9, .
Yet, given the restrictions of the dataset I use the covariance structure to obtain the
following data parameters: σε2 , σε3 , σε4 , σε5 , σε6 , σε7 , σε8 ;σζ3 , σζ4 , σζ5 , σζ6,σζ7 , σζ8 .
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